So the storm in the teacup has passed over, and blue skies are here again. Peter Robinson and Martin McGuinness have been jointed elected as First and Deputy First Minister respectively.
What has happened to bring about this smooth conclusion to the crisis of the past few days? From crisis to resolution with almost no visible movement by either side – there has got to be something going on behind the scenes.
The only external factor is the British Prime Minister, Gordon Brown. Only after both parties had met him did the crisis begin to thaw. He announced that he would hold talks with Sinn Féin and the DUP on Friday, and that these talks "will centre on various issues including the forward investment strategy for Northern Ireland, the economic situation and the devolution of policing and justice. Discussions will also address concerns around paramilitary organisations, parades, sites, the Irish language and education, and the putting in place of a process to deal with them.
The PM said he remained committed to the continuing implementation of the St Andrews agreement and to helping the parties to deal with issues that have been raised. The meeting follows talks held with Martin McGuinness and Gerry Adams at Number 10 earlier this week."
For Sinn Féin to have dropped their threat means that they received sufficient assurances from Brown that their concerns will be taken seriously, and that progress will be made on them. Robinson has either agreed with this, or he is heading for a troubled relationship with both Brown and Sinn Féin. In return, no doubt, Brown received assurances from Sinn Féin with respect to the IRA Army Council, the sole bargaining chip left over from that period of militarism.
For the DUP, who have been publicly gloating about their ability to foil and sabotage Sinn Féin's plans, the future looks humiliating. Brown has now very publicly stood over the St Andrews Agreement, and shown that he sees it as the agenda. The DUP has always denied this, and is on record as claiming that police and justice would not be devolved until a time of 'their' choosing. It seems that Brown may do that choosing for them. Other gloats, such as legislation on the status of Irish, may also come to stick in the DUP's throats.
As has been said many times, the DUP has failed to prepare its supporters for the inevitability of 'green' policies being enacted. They seem to have thought that their half of the mutual veto would protect them from ever having to. But unfortunately their position is not as strong as they thought.
Next year sees the European Parliament elections, and if they leave the inevitable policy u-turns too late, then the shock to their supporters may well come at a crucial moment. So, in their own interests, as well as everyone else's, they should bite the bullet and make the changes now.
Here are our suggestions, which may in fact already be part of the behind-the-scenes agreement between the two parties:
(1) Sack Edwin Poots, and thereby implicitly blame him for the lack of movement on Irish.
(2) Encourage Sinn Féin to sack Caitriona Ruane from education as a balancing measure, thereby implicitly blaming her for the selection issue.
(3) Negotiate a quick compromise with Sinn Féin on simultaneous devolution of policing and justice, and the standing down of the IRA Army Council.
After these changes, and a reasonably calm period of non-confrontational politics, the DUP will be in a better position to face its electorate, with less to fear from the TUV.
Failure to resolve the outstanding issues, in the light of Gordon Brown's clear preferences, will leave the DUP in a very difficult position. They now know that Sinn Féin are aware of their tactical nuclear weapon – the resignation of the DFM, triggering an Assembly election – and know that they might use it as precisely the most awkward moment for the DUP. If the DUP are foolish enough to have not dealt with Brown's 'shopping list' by then, the blame will fall on them.
Thursday 5 June 2008
Tuesday 3 June 2008
Sinn Féin's 'nuclear option'
Today's media is full of stories that confirm the recent rumours that Sinn Féin is considering using its 'nuclear option' to deblock the unionist veto. As this blog noted yesterday, Northern Irish government is a system of mutual vetoes. The starting point, however, is not a level playing field, but rather a 'unionist-friendly' environment. Any attempts to bring about any change in this in-built bias are vetoed by the unionists.
Ian Paisley's retirement as First Minister provided Sinn Féin with the opportunity to use the ultimate weapon – the refusal to nominate his successor, Peter Robinson, as First Minister. Under the terms of the Good Friday Agreement, the First and Deputy-First Ministers must be voted into office simultaneously. By refusing to re-nominate the current Deputy First Minister, Martin McGuinness, Sinn Féin blocks the election of Peter Robinson. The situation must be then resolved within one week, or it is referred back to the British government, who are then required to call an election of the Assembly.
Since it was the same British government that publicly promised some of the things that the DUP have subsequently blocked, it is likely that they will approach the week of negotiation that would follow a failure to nominate in a slightly partial manner. The British government want policing and justice to be devolved, as do a majority of the people of Northern Ireland. The British believed it was implicit in the St Andrews Agreement (paragraph 7: It is our view that implementation of the agreement published today should be sufficient to build the community confidence necessary for the Assembly to request the devolution of criminal justice and policing from the British Government by May 2008). It is blocked by the DUP for reasons that few others share. Legislation for the Irish language was also an implicit part of the St Andrews Agreement (Annex 8: The Government will introduce an Irish Language Act reflecting on the experience of Wales and Ireland and work with the incoming Executive to enhance and protect the development of the Irish language.) Again the DUP has refused to progress this, for reasons of anti-Irish bigotry.
On the other hand, even if the British government does not twist the DUP's arm (and realistically, it is unlikely that Sinn Féin really expect them to do so, especially with Gordon Brown needing every Commons vote he can get for his repressive legislation), the shadow of the 'Traditional Unionist Voice' hangs over the DUP. The recent Dromore by-election has shown that the TUV can take a significant chunk of the DUP's support; perhaps enough to rob it of its 'largest party' status, and thus its right to nominate the First Minister. While this, in itself, would not remove the unionist veto, it would be a massive blow to unionist confidence and self-esteem.
A new election would imply a new Programme for Government. In the light of the negativity displayed by the DUP in recent months, it is unlikely that Sinn Féin would agree a Programme for Government, and its associated budget, unless there are clear nationalist-friendly commitments in it. So regardless of the outcome of an election, the DUP will have to back off. The DUP has, through its own bloody-minded over-use of its half of the mutual veto, painted itself into a corner.
Essentially, the high-stakes game being played at the moment is about Sinn Féin flexing its muscles to show the DUP that there are costs involved in constantly blocking nationalist aspirations. Whether the DUP follows the nay-sayers, like their Chairman Maurice Morrow who said yesterday: "If they think this is going to get them a concession, then they are up the wrong street. I suspect they have got that message by now", or whether they join the real world of practical politics, where both sides get something, waits to be seen.
Peter Robinson's first test as DUP leader thus comes before he can become First Minister. Either he retreats from the permanent unionist veto, and visibly allows nationalist-friendly policies to be enacted, or he risks electoral humiliation. If the whole apparatus collapses due to the refusal of Sinn Féin to nominate, or the refusal of unionists to nominate a Sinn Féin First Minister, then Direct Rule by London returns, with all of the negative consequences that that would entail.
Ian Paisley's retirement as First Minister provided Sinn Féin with the opportunity to use the ultimate weapon – the refusal to nominate his successor, Peter Robinson, as First Minister. Under the terms of the Good Friday Agreement, the First and Deputy-First Ministers must be voted into office simultaneously. By refusing to re-nominate the current Deputy First Minister, Martin McGuinness, Sinn Féin blocks the election of Peter Robinson. The situation must be then resolved within one week, or it is referred back to the British government, who are then required to call an election of the Assembly.
Since it was the same British government that publicly promised some of the things that the DUP have subsequently blocked, it is likely that they will approach the week of negotiation that would follow a failure to nominate in a slightly partial manner. The British government want policing and justice to be devolved, as do a majority of the people of Northern Ireland. The British believed it was implicit in the St Andrews Agreement (paragraph 7: It is our view that implementation of the agreement published today should be sufficient to build the community confidence necessary for the Assembly to request the devolution of criminal justice and policing from the British Government by May 2008). It is blocked by the DUP for reasons that few others share. Legislation for the Irish language was also an implicit part of the St Andrews Agreement (Annex 8: The Government will introduce an Irish Language Act reflecting on the experience of Wales and Ireland and work with the incoming Executive to enhance and protect the development of the Irish language.) Again the DUP has refused to progress this, for reasons of anti-Irish bigotry.
On the other hand, even if the British government does not twist the DUP's arm (and realistically, it is unlikely that Sinn Féin really expect them to do so, especially with Gordon Brown needing every Commons vote he can get for his repressive legislation), the shadow of the 'Traditional Unionist Voice' hangs over the DUP. The recent Dromore by-election has shown that the TUV can take a significant chunk of the DUP's support; perhaps enough to rob it of its 'largest party' status, and thus its right to nominate the First Minister. While this, in itself, would not remove the unionist veto, it would be a massive blow to unionist confidence and self-esteem.
A new election would imply a new Programme for Government. In the light of the negativity displayed by the DUP in recent months, it is unlikely that Sinn Féin would agree a Programme for Government, and its associated budget, unless there are clear nationalist-friendly commitments in it. So regardless of the outcome of an election, the DUP will have to back off. The DUP has, through its own bloody-minded over-use of its half of the mutual veto, painted itself into a corner.
Essentially, the high-stakes game being played at the moment is about Sinn Féin flexing its muscles to show the DUP that there are costs involved in constantly blocking nationalist aspirations. Whether the DUP follows the nay-sayers, like their Chairman Maurice Morrow who said yesterday: "If they think this is going to get them a concession, then they are up the wrong street. I suspect they have got that message by now", or whether they join the real world of practical politics, where both sides get something, waits to be seen.
Peter Robinson's first test as DUP leader thus comes before he can become First Minister. Either he retreats from the permanent unionist veto, and visibly allows nationalist-friendly policies to be enacted, or he risks electoral humiliation. If the whole apparatus collapses due to the refusal of Sinn Féin to nominate, or the refusal of unionists to nominate a Sinn Féin First Minister, then Direct Rule by London returns, with all of the negative consequences that that would entail.
Monday 2 June 2008
"We make no apology for foiling Republican plans …"
It was bound to happen, but nonetheless, now that the initial euphoria has worn off, the true nature of the DUP's participation in the government of Northern Ireland is becoming clearer.
The DUP's underlying purpose was set out by their South Belfast MLA Jimmy Spratt on 21 May, when he gloated that: "First Gerry McHugh and now Paul Butler – there is a growing recognition within Sinn Fein ranks that it is the DUP who are setting the agenda in Stormont", and that: "We make no apology for foiling Republican plans whilst advancing the agenda of the pro-Union community". Earlier, on 8 May, North Down MLA Peter Weir published an article in the Newsletter in which he expressed much the same negativity: "I and my party have no love of Sinn Fein and the very sight of them up at Stormont is hard for people to stomach, but the truth of the situation is that the best way Unionist interests can be protected is through using the devolved institutions to push our own agenda and to sabotage theirs. A cost-benefit analysis of the last twelve months would show that it is Unionism that has undoubtedly come out on top. Even Sinn Fein MLA’s have acknowledged that Unionism is in charge up at Stormont."
So, in a nutshell, the DUP is acting as a kind of goal-keeper for unionism. Not scoring, but just trying to stop their opponents from scoring. Their supporters are probably happy enough with this position, as the status quo is already overwhelmingly unionist, and thus any change can only dilute this. The DUP have therefore become ultra-conservative, holding on tightly to the existing reality, and unwilling to allow any movement.
What might be the implications of such conservatism?
In the short term, the DUP will probably benefit from it – their supporters are happy, and it is true that under the current governmental arrangements they can block any and every Sinn Féin proposal.
In the medium term, however, a policy of total conservatism is likely to prove disastrous for the DUP and for unionism. If the world did not change, then conservatism could mean the continuation of tried and tested policies and practices – but the world does change, and after a few years total conservatism becomes simple stagnation. And worse than that, unionism cannot afford the luxury of a permanently disenfranchised 'minority', because that minority is growing as unionism is shrinking. The consequence of effectively disenfranchising nationalists by vetoing every proposal that they or they representative want, is that nationalists build up a head of resentment, with possibly explosive results. The troubles/war of 1969-1994 was caused by precisely the same refusal by unionism to allow nationalism any space. From 1922 to 1972 unionism ran Northern Ireland as a single party state, and nationalism was repressed, ignored, and treated as the enemy within. The results of that flawed policy fill many books (and too many grave-yards). The lesson that unionism should have learned was that if they want nationalists to accept the northern state, then they have got to feel that that state is also their state. From 1922-1972 it most definitely was not. The great hope of the 1998 Good Friday Agreement was that both sides had agreed to share both power and the physical space that is Northern Ireland.
The DUP's statements and actions demonstrate that they are trying to recreate a situation of effective unionist veto over all nationalist proposals, and that their policy is to foil and sabotage them. The governmental mechanisms allow them to do this. By doing so they are effectively denying nationalists any real power, and instituting a system of mutual vetoes, in which no initiatives can be taken by either side.
But the world moves on, and two separate factors will ensure that the DUP's policy will fail, to unionism's enormous cost.
The first factor is that real power remains elsewhere, largely with the British government. While in the short term they can tolerate another political slum in Northern Ireland, in the longer term the political stagnation will lead to economic stagnation and possibly unrest. A less sympathetic British government may lose patience with unionism if it perceives it as being the primary cause of economic stagnation leading to high levels of subsidy. A British government co-operating closely with Dublin on political and economic matters may look unfavourably on a Northern Ireland that will not play the game because of a bloody-minded veto being played by a party with no policies other than anti-Irishness.
The second factor that will ensure unionism's downfall if they continue with the DUP's total conservatism is the demographic change that North Ireland is undergoing. Nationalism already represents between 42-45% of the electorate, and this percentage is growing. Unionism still has a plurality of the vote, but no longer the guaranteed majority of the past. If the DUP continues to frustrate the reasonable demands of nationalism, that growing percentage will become more and more frustrated, and more and more likely to vote for whatever option that can rid it of the dead hand of unionism. Given that the Good Friday Agreement gives unionism a veto even when it is a minority (as nationalism today has a corresponding veto), the achievement of a nationalist majority, and a nationalist First Minister, will still not rid nationalism of the 'foilers' and the 'saboteurs'. The only way to do that, and to achieve anything like real power, will be to vote for Irish reunification, under the terms of the Good Friday Agreement.
So the DUP's determination to block anything proposed by nationalism is likely to ensure a stalemate that angers both the British government and the growing nationalist electorate. Taken together, these two groups will have both the ability and the interest to bring about Irish reunification within a generation.
The DUP's underlying purpose was set out by their South Belfast MLA Jimmy Spratt on 21 May, when he gloated that: "First Gerry McHugh and now Paul Butler – there is a growing recognition within Sinn Fein ranks that it is the DUP who are setting the agenda in Stormont", and that: "We make no apology for foiling Republican plans whilst advancing the agenda of the pro-Union community". Earlier, on 8 May, North Down MLA Peter Weir published an article in the Newsletter in which he expressed much the same negativity: "I and my party have no love of Sinn Fein and the very sight of them up at Stormont is hard for people to stomach, but the truth of the situation is that the best way Unionist interests can be protected is through using the devolved institutions to push our own agenda and to sabotage theirs. A cost-benefit analysis of the last twelve months would show that it is Unionism that has undoubtedly come out on top. Even Sinn Fein MLA’s have acknowledged that Unionism is in charge up at Stormont."
So, in a nutshell, the DUP is acting as a kind of goal-keeper for unionism. Not scoring, but just trying to stop their opponents from scoring. Their supporters are probably happy enough with this position, as the status quo is already overwhelmingly unionist, and thus any change can only dilute this. The DUP have therefore become ultra-conservative, holding on tightly to the existing reality, and unwilling to allow any movement.
What might be the implications of such conservatism?
In the short term, the DUP will probably benefit from it – their supporters are happy, and it is true that under the current governmental arrangements they can block any and every Sinn Féin proposal.
In the medium term, however, a policy of total conservatism is likely to prove disastrous for the DUP and for unionism. If the world did not change, then conservatism could mean the continuation of tried and tested policies and practices – but the world does change, and after a few years total conservatism becomes simple stagnation. And worse than that, unionism cannot afford the luxury of a permanently disenfranchised 'minority', because that minority is growing as unionism is shrinking. The consequence of effectively disenfranchising nationalists by vetoing every proposal that they or they representative want, is that nationalists build up a head of resentment, with possibly explosive results. The troubles/war of 1969-1994 was caused by precisely the same refusal by unionism to allow nationalism any space. From 1922 to 1972 unionism ran Northern Ireland as a single party state, and nationalism was repressed, ignored, and treated as the enemy within. The results of that flawed policy fill many books (and too many grave-yards). The lesson that unionism should have learned was that if they want nationalists to accept the northern state, then they have got to feel that that state is also their state. From 1922-1972 it most definitely was not. The great hope of the 1998 Good Friday Agreement was that both sides had agreed to share both power and the physical space that is Northern Ireland.
The DUP's statements and actions demonstrate that they are trying to recreate a situation of effective unionist veto over all nationalist proposals, and that their policy is to foil and sabotage them. The governmental mechanisms allow them to do this. By doing so they are effectively denying nationalists any real power, and instituting a system of mutual vetoes, in which no initiatives can be taken by either side.
But the world moves on, and two separate factors will ensure that the DUP's policy will fail, to unionism's enormous cost.
The first factor is that real power remains elsewhere, largely with the British government. While in the short term they can tolerate another political slum in Northern Ireland, in the longer term the political stagnation will lead to economic stagnation and possibly unrest. A less sympathetic British government may lose patience with unionism if it perceives it as being the primary cause of economic stagnation leading to high levels of subsidy. A British government co-operating closely with Dublin on political and economic matters may look unfavourably on a Northern Ireland that will not play the game because of a bloody-minded veto being played by a party with no policies other than anti-Irishness.
The second factor that will ensure unionism's downfall if they continue with the DUP's total conservatism is the demographic change that North Ireland is undergoing. Nationalism already represents between 42-45% of the electorate, and this percentage is growing. Unionism still has a plurality of the vote, but no longer the guaranteed majority of the past. If the DUP continues to frustrate the reasonable demands of nationalism, that growing percentage will become more and more frustrated, and more and more likely to vote for whatever option that can rid it of the dead hand of unionism. Given that the Good Friday Agreement gives unionism a veto even when it is a minority (as nationalism today has a corresponding veto), the achievement of a nationalist majority, and a nationalist First Minister, will still not rid nationalism of the 'foilers' and the 'saboteurs'. The only way to do that, and to achieve anything like real power, will be to vote for Irish reunification, under the terms of the Good Friday Agreement.
So the DUP's determination to block anything proposed by nationalism is likely to ensure a stalemate that angers both the British government and the growing nationalist electorate. Taken together, these two groups will have both the ability and the interest to bring about Irish reunification within a generation.
Thursday 22 May 2008
Paisley's legacy?
He is not dead yet, but his career is over, and it won't be long until he meets his maker (so he thinks, anyway). In order to beat the rush, this blog would like to publish its obituary now, so that we can ignore his death when it comes.
Unfortunately, when he dies Ian Paisley is going to receive a full broadside of hypocritical sycophantic 'great man' obituaries – the few voices that dissent will be drowned in a deluge of syrup. We'll be told how he was a man of God, a loving husband and father, a great leader, a peacemaker, a sturdy Ulsterman, and gallons of other such tripe.
This blog has no intention of critically examining the man or his 'achievements', and still less intention of trying to build him up to something that he wasn't. He was a nasty bigot with medieval views and a loud voice. He was a bully, a hypocrite, a fomenter of hatred and violence. He was a divider, a sectarian, and a deliberate exploiter of other men's foolishness. He knowingly stirred up enmities old and new, and led men in directions that he knew to be dangerous, un-Christian and violent. The blood of many people is on his hands, and countless lives were impoverished by those who followed his words and deeds. He lit fires where he knew the tinder was dry, and he cared little for those who got burned.
And yet, in some strange way, his extremism and the sheer outlandishness of his views and his actions may well have a counter-intuitive effect on Northern Ireland. The enormity of his bigotry, and the larger-than-life nature of his personality, have tended to draw the attention of both supporters and observers. He has said, and allowed to be said by others, things that would be unacceptable in civilised countries. He has created a climate where, for a while, his supporters could give expression to blatantly sectarian opinions. His dominance of the northern Irish political scene provided a seemingly solid ground for such expression. Yet while this was going on the world was changing. Paisley started his career of rabble-rousing at a time before human rights, before tolerance or respect for diversity, and his constant presence over more than 40 years has tended to obscure the changes that have taken place in all those fields. Paisley's generation has not moved forward, and has always had him to support them.
But when he leaves the scene, we may find that behind the façade of outdated prejudice that he encouraged and sheltered, there are younger and more tolerant people who do not entirely share his viewpoint. While he was alive they either kept quiet or toed his dominant line, but when he dies, they may come into their own. Like Spain after the death of Franco, or Eastern Europe after Communism, we may find that the monolith was a screen behind which change was going on out of sight. When Paisley dies the chief support and justification of the other lesser bigots will be gone. Exposed to the light of day, and to modern expectations of tolerance, democracy and mutual respect, they may fade away into well-deserved obscurity. Their places may be taken by people who have more modern attitudes towards religion, nationality, respect and tolerance. Already hints are being made about the 'modernising' wing of the DUP, but as long as Paisley is still in change they remain unproven. After his death we could yet see a pragmatic and reasonable version of unionism. His death may allow unionism to collectively heap on his shoulders the evils of its past and emerge, like a moth from a chrysalis, renewed and free from its ugly history. Like the cocoon, Paisley can be dropped and forgotten.
Maybe Paisley's death will thus bring about the speedy death of Northern Irish Protestant bigotry, and Northern Irish unionist intolerance. Within a few years of his death his generation will be gone and forgotten, and a new generation, less tainted with religious bigotry, less obsessed with the Empire of their past, and less ignorant of the world of their present, will be in charge.
If for no other reason, his passing is eagerly awaited.
Unfortunately, when he dies Ian Paisley is going to receive a full broadside of hypocritical sycophantic 'great man' obituaries – the few voices that dissent will be drowned in a deluge of syrup. We'll be told how he was a man of God, a loving husband and father, a great leader, a peacemaker, a sturdy Ulsterman, and gallons of other such tripe.
This blog has no intention of critically examining the man or his 'achievements', and still less intention of trying to build him up to something that he wasn't. He was a nasty bigot with medieval views and a loud voice. He was a bully, a hypocrite, a fomenter of hatred and violence. He was a divider, a sectarian, and a deliberate exploiter of other men's foolishness. He knowingly stirred up enmities old and new, and led men in directions that he knew to be dangerous, un-Christian and violent. The blood of many people is on his hands, and countless lives were impoverished by those who followed his words and deeds. He lit fires where he knew the tinder was dry, and he cared little for those who got burned.
And yet, in some strange way, his extremism and the sheer outlandishness of his views and his actions may well have a counter-intuitive effect on Northern Ireland. The enormity of his bigotry, and the larger-than-life nature of his personality, have tended to draw the attention of both supporters and observers. He has said, and allowed to be said by others, things that would be unacceptable in civilised countries. He has created a climate where, for a while, his supporters could give expression to blatantly sectarian opinions. His dominance of the northern Irish political scene provided a seemingly solid ground for such expression. Yet while this was going on the world was changing. Paisley started his career of rabble-rousing at a time before human rights, before tolerance or respect for diversity, and his constant presence over more than 40 years has tended to obscure the changes that have taken place in all those fields. Paisley's generation has not moved forward, and has always had him to support them.
But when he leaves the scene, we may find that behind the façade of outdated prejudice that he encouraged and sheltered, there are younger and more tolerant people who do not entirely share his viewpoint. While he was alive they either kept quiet or toed his dominant line, but when he dies, they may come into their own. Like Spain after the death of Franco, or Eastern Europe after Communism, we may find that the monolith was a screen behind which change was going on out of sight. When Paisley dies the chief support and justification of the other lesser bigots will be gone. Exposed to the light of day, and to modern expectations of tolerance, democracy and mutual respect, they may fade away into well-deserved obscurity. Their places may be taken by people who have more modern attitudes towards religion, nationality, respect and tolerance. Already hints are being made about the 'modernising' wing of the DUP, but as long as Paisley is still in change they remain unproven. After his death we could yet see a pragmatic and reasonable version of unionism. His death may allow unionism to collectively heap on his shoulders the evils of its past and emerge, like a moth from a chrysalis, renewed and free from its ugly history. Like the cocoon, Paisley can be dropped and forgotten.
Maybe Paisley's death will thus bring about the speedy death of Northern Irish Protestant bigotry, and Northern Irish unionist intolerance. Within a few years of his death his generation will be gone and forgotten, and a new generation, less tainted with religious bigotry, less obsessed with the Empire of their past, and less ignorant of the world of their present, will be in charge.
If for no other reason, his passing is eagerly awaited.
Monday 28 April 2008
District Council elections to be postponed until 2011
So it's official now. The elections to the District Councils, which should have been held in 2009, will be postponed until 2011.
Assuming no upsets along the way, this means that the 11 new District Councils, which will replace the current 26, will start working in three years. The precise boundaries of the new councils have not yet been fixed (though a strong hint has already been given), nor has the number of councillors each will have (Minister Foster proposed an upper limit (460), which will, inevitably, become the accepted outcome). One thing is almost inevitable, though; there will have to be fewer councillors than at present (There are currently 582 district councillors).
This means that 2011 is going to be a very important electoral year in Northern Ireland, because the next elections to the Northern Ireland Assembly are also due then. Normally District Council elections are held on different dates to other elections (2005 was an exception), to avoid voter confusion, and perhaps also to make the job more manageable for the Electoral Office. However, by holding the elections on different dates, there is always a risk that the second election will suffer from a lower turn-out, and will receive less public attention. On the other hand, it would give politicians who fail to get elected in the first election a second chance – the 'dual mandate' (i.e. the practice of combining a councillorship with other elected posts) is to be abolished, forcing politicians to decide where they really want to sit. Nothing, however, would stop them seeking election to the higher level, and then if elected resigning from the lower body, but the multitude of by-elections that this would cause is reason enough to space out the elections.
2011 will be an entirely Northern Irish election-fest. The two elections to be held then are Northern Ireland-wide, but have no relevance outside that jurisdiction. There will be no 'interference' caused by extra-Northern Ireland factors, such as those created by Westminster and European elections. The schedule of European elections is fixed (2009 and 2014, following its five-year cycle), and while Westminster is not fixed, there must be an election by 2010 at the latest, and only extreme political instability would provoke another in 2011. So in 2011 Northern Ireland is going to be convulsed by extremely divisive elections, at a point in time where the two principal blocks (nationalist and unionist) are coming ever-closer to parity. The outcomes of the two elections will have strong, and lasting, impacts on the shape of Northern Irish politics for years.
The 2011 Assembly elections will be the first opportunity the unionist electorate will have to express its approval or disapproval of the DUP for entering government with Sinn Féin. Of course, the three years from now till then may go well, or extremely badly – we have to wait and see. Perhaps Peter Robinson, after taking over as DUP leader in June will turn out to be constructive and businesslike. Or not. Perhaps the length of time will have dimmed unionist memories (and antagonism) vis-à-vis Sinn Féin. Perhaps Sinn Féin will stall, or show itself unsuited to governmental power. Or not. By 2011 we will also know if Jim Allister's Traditional Unionist Voice (TUV) is going to become a force in unionism – if he does well in the 2009 European election then the DUP will start worrying about 2011. But if the TUV crashes, the DUP will be able to approach 2011 as pragmatic politicians rather than tribal champions.
A scare already being promoted by some unionists (including some in the media) is that the St Andrews Agreement opens the way for Sinn Féin to nominate the First Minister if it has more seats than the DUP. This factor should lead to a lot of unionist angst in the run-up to the election, but will probably mean that unionists will plump for the DUP (as, indeed, was the intention of the rules, according to many observers).
The 2011 District Council elections will set the pattern for the carve-up of power at local level. The new District Councils will, according to the Minister responsible, have real powers; but these may be subject to cross-community distribution (via a version of the D'Hondt system – which, ironically the Minister's own party do not like). At present, everything is still uncertain, but there seems to be little chance that when the smoke clears in 2011 Northern Ireland will not have a new sectarian dividing line between east and west. There is no way that a map of the District boundaries could be gerrymandered to avoid such a divide, and if a DUP Minister tried to push through a blatant gerrymandering, it would be blocked by the nationalist veto.
In Northern Ireland all politics are local, and all concern, to some extent or another, the constitutional position of Northern Ireland. The European election in 2009 will be just a warm-up for most parties. The electorate is less interested in the European Parliament than in other legislatures, and the turn-out is usually lower than in other elections. While politicians and election-watchers will be interested, the general public will not be much concerned by the outcome. The Westminster election, which will come either in 2009 or 2010, will be of greater interest, but since the Northern Irish MPs are unlikely to have any power at Westminster the interest will be less intense. The heat will build up, therefore, for 2011 – two elections for bodies with perceived power and influence. No less importantly, only 3 seats are on offer in 2009's European election (and with barely 10 candidates likely); only 18 in 2009/2010's Westminster election (and probably only 100 candidates); but in 2011 there will be 568 seats on offer, and probably several thousand candidates. On a purely human level, 2011 means a lot more to everyone in Northern Ireland.
Assuming no upsets along the way, this means that the 11 new District Councils, which will replace the current 26, will start working in three years. The precise boundaries of the new councils have not yet been fixed (though a strong hint has already been given), nor has the number of councillors each will have (Minister Foster proposed an upper limit (460), which will, inevitably, become the accepted outcome). One thing is almost inevitable, though; there will have to be fewer councillors than at present (There are currently 582 district councillors).
This means that 2011 is going to be a very important electoral year in Northern Ireland, because the next elections to the Northern Ireland Assembly are also due then. Normally District Council elections are held on different dates to other elections (2005 was an exception), to avoid voter confusion, and perhaps also to make the job more manageable for the Electoral Office. However, by holding the elections on different dates, there is always a risk that the second election will suffer from a lower turn-out, and will receive less public attention. On the other hand, it would give politicians who fail to get elected in the first election a second chance – the 'dual mandate' (i.e. the practice of combining a councillorship with other elected posts) is to be abolished, forcing politicians to decide where they really want to sit. Nothing, however, would stop them seeking election to the higher level, and then if elected resigning from the lower body, but the multitude of by-elections that this would cause is reason enough to space out the elections.
2011 will be an entirely Northern Irish election-fest. The two elections to be held then are Northern Ireland-wide, but have no relevance outside that jurisdiction. There will be no 'interference' caused by extra-Northern Ireland factors, such as those created by Westminster and European elections. The schedule of European elections is fixed (2009 and 2014, following its five-year cycle), and while Westminster is not fixed, there must be an election by 2010 at the latest, and only extreme political instability would provoke another in 2011. So in 2011 Northern Ireland is going to be convulsed by extremely divisive elections, at a point in time where the two principal blocks (nationalist and unionist) are coming ever-closer to parity. The outcomes of the two elections will have strong, and lasting, impacts on the shape of Northern Irish politics for years.
The 2011 Assembly elections will be the first opportunity the unionist electorate will have to express its approval or disapproval of the DUP for entering government with Sinn Féin. Of course, the three years from now till then may go well, or extremely badly – we have to wait and see. Perhaps Peter Robinson, after taking over as DUP leader in June will turn out to be constructive and businesslike. Or not. Perhaps the length of time will have dimmed unionist memories (and antagonism) vis-à-vis Sinn Féin. Perhaps Sinn Féin will stall, or show itself unsuited to governmental power. Or not. By 2011 we will also know if Jim Allister's Traditional Unionist Voice (TUV) is going to become a force in unionism – if he does well in the 2009 European election then the DUP will start worrying about 2011. But if the TUV crashes, the DUP will be able to approach 2011 as pragmatic politicians rather than tribal champions.
A scare already being promoted by some unionists (including some in the media) is that the St Andrews Agreement opens the way for Sinn Féin to nominate the First Minister if it has more seats than the DUP. This factor should lead to a lot of unionist angst in the run-up to the election, but will probably mean that unionists will plump for the DUP (as, indeed, was the intention of the rules, according to many observers).
The 2011 District Council elections will set the pattern for the carve-up of power at local level. The new District Councils will, according to the Minister responsible, have real powers; but these may be subject to cross-community distribution (via a version of the D'Hondt system – which, ironically the Minister's own party do not like). At present, everything is still uncertain, but there seems to be little chance that when the smoke clears in 2011 Northern Ireland will not have a new sectarian dividing line between east and west. There is no way that a map of the District boundaries could be gerrymandered to avoid such a divide, and if a DUP Minister tried to push through a blatant gerrymandering, it would be blocked by the nationalist veto.
In Northern Ireland all politics are local, and all concern, to some extent or another, the constitutional position of Northern Ireland. The European election in 2009 will be just a warm-up for most parties. The electorate is less interested in the European Parliament than in other legislatures, and the turn-out is usually lower than in other elections. While politicians and election-watchers will be interested, the general public will not be much concerned by the outcome. The Westminster election, which will come either in 2009 or 2010, will be of greater interest, but since the Northern Irish MPs are unlikely to have any power at Westminster the interest will be less intense. The heat will build up, therefore, for 2011 – two elections for bodies with perceived power and influence. No less importantly, only 3 seats are on offer in 2009's European election (and with barely 10 candidates likely); only 18 in 2009/2010's Westminster election (and probably only 100 candidates); but in 2011 there will be 568 seats on offer, and probably several thousand candidates. On a purely human level, 2011 means a lot more to everyone in Northern Ireland.
Wednesday 23 April 2008
The European Election dilemma
In 2009 there will be elections to the European Parliament. Northern Ireland elects three Members (MEPs). And therein lies a problem, because there are four parties in Northern Ireland with a chance of a seat. Four into three just doesn't go – someone must get disappointed. In 2004 it was the SDLP who lost out, seeing John Hume's long-time European seat being snatched by Sinn Féin. Jim Allister comfortably kept Ian Paisley's old seat for the DUP (of which he was then a member), and Jim Nicholson scraped home to retain his seat for the UUP.
In 2009, however, there may be changes. Firstly because Jim Allister is no longer a member of the DUP, and is fast becoming their nemesis. They will do their best to dislodge him from 'their' seat, and he will do his best to retain it. On the basis of the (admittedly very unrepresentative) sample of Dromore, Allister won't win, but may take around a third of the DUP votes.
The second major factor is that unionism's historic majority is coming to an end. From a situation in the 1970s where they routinely got two-thirds of the vote, they have been dropping closer to half, and occasionally even below it. At the same time nationalism has risen above 40% of the vote, and in European elections up to 45% (in 1999). So the natural breakdown of two unionist MEPs and one nationalist can no longer be taken for granted.
Unionists are aware of this; on 19 April, Peter Robinson called for greater cooperation between the DUP and the UUP to reverse the trend of low voter turnout in unionist areas. He said: "We need to be mindful of the electoral strength of republicanism. They are getting stronger because unionist turnout is reducing." Since no elections are planned for 2008, his remarks were seen as a general advance to the UUP, which some even took as a prelude to a merger.
However, an article in the Belfast Telegraph on 23 April made it a bit clearer what is starting to worry unionism:
"Trust Peter Robinson to go to the heart of the problem facing unionism, although he didn't put it quite like this: unless it can maximise its vote, around a single unionist party or a two-party electoral coalition, it has little chance of staying ahead of nationalist representation in future elections.
The European election next year will prove this point. If the SDLP and Fianna Fail strike a deal, to maximise the moderate nationalist vote and win back some of John Hume's following, it may take the UUP seat. That would leave Northern Ireland represented in Europe by two nationalists and the DUP."
"The importance of the European election is that if it were to result in a 2-1 win for nationalism, the old order would be changed fundamentally. Either unionism would respond by much greater DUP-UUP co-operation or it would split into several factions, incapable of making the same impact in Westminster, Stormont or local government."
Unionism is faced with a dilemma. As it approaches parity with nationalism (in 2004 the combined unionist vote was only 48.6%; nationalism was at 42.3%) it needs to cooperate in order to ensure transfers, in order to keep two European seats. But the DUP will get few transfers from the TUV, so must look to the UUP for them. The DUP's biggest fear is that the TUV will take so many of its votes that it will be in fourth place in a race for three seats. A split unionist vote could see two unionist candidates being eliminated before the two nationalist candidates, thus giving the dreaded 2/1 victory to nationalism.
On the other hand, the article in the Belfast Telegraph may just be a promotional piece for Robinson's strategy. By hyping up unionist fears of the increasing strength of nationalism, and by being specific in a way that Robinson could not, the Belfast Telegraph may be trying to help the DUP counter its arch-rivals in the TUV.
This blog does not believe that the DUP really has immediate fears of being outvoted. In our view the Belfast Telegraph article is the opening shot in a campaign similar to that run by unionists before the results of the 2001 Census were released. In that case they exaggerated the Catholic proportion of the population, and quoted extensively from over-optimistic nationalist sources. This then allowed them, when the more reasonable results actually came out, to claim that nationalism had suffered a significant reverse. In the 2009 European election, by hyping the chances of two nationalist seats, and encouraging nationalists to believe that such an outcome is possible, they would then be able (if unionism still retains its two seats) to say that nationalism's hopes have yet again been dashed. If the SDLP and Fianna Fáil do actually fight the campaign together, and win back the seat that Sinn Féin won in 2004, unionism will be ecstatic.
The statistics, and previous vote transfer patterns, show that the likely outcome of the election remains two unionists and one nationalist. So any exaggerated hype to the contrary should be seen as what it is – a two handed gambit by the DUP to win its voters back from the TUV, and to humiliate Sinn Féin.
In 2009, however, there may be changes. Firstly because Jim Allister is no longer a member of the DUP, and is fast becoming their nemesis. They will do their best to dislodge him from 'their' seat, and he will do his best to retain it. On the basis of the (admittedly very unrepresentative) sample of Dromore, Allister won't win, but may take around a third of the DUP votes.
The second major factor is that unionism's historic majority is coming to an end. From a situation in the 1970s where they routinely got two-thirds of the vote, they have been dropping closer to half, and occasionally even below it. At the same time nationalism has risen above 40% of the vote, and in European elections up to 45% (in 1999). So the natural breakdown of two unionist MEPs and one nationalist can no longer be taken for granted.
Unionists are aware of this; on 19 April, Peter Robinson called for greater cooperation between the DUP and the UUP to reverse the trend of low voter turnout in unionist areas. He said: "We need to be mindful of the electoral strength of republicanism. They are getting stronger because unionist turnout is reducing." Since no elections are planned for 2008, his remarks were seen as a general advance to the UUP, which some even took as a prelude to a merger.
However, an article in the Belfast Telegraph on 23 April made it a bit clearer what is starting to worry unionism:
"Trust Peter Robinson to go to the heart of the problem facing unionism, although he didn't put it quite like this: unless it can maximise its vote, around a single unionist party or a two-party electoral coalition, it has little chance of staying ahead of nationalist representation in future elections.
The European election next year will prove this point. If the SDLP and Fianna Fail strike a deal, to maximise the moderate nationalist vote and win back some of John Hume's following, it may take the UUP seat. That would leave Northern Ireland represented in Europe by two nationalists and the DUP."
"The importance of the European election is that if it were to result in a 2-1 win for nationalism, the old order would be changed fundamentally. Either unionism would respond by much greater DUP-UUP co-operation or it would split into several factions, incapable of making the same impact in Westminster, Stormont or local government."
Unionism is faced with a dilemma. As it approaches parity with nationalism (in 2004 the combined unionist vote was only 48.6%; nationalism was at 42.3%) it needs to cooperate in order to ensure transfers, in order to keep two European seats. But the DUP will get few transfers from the TUV, so must look to the UUP for them. The DUP's biggest fear is that the TUV will take so many of its votes that it will be in fourth place in a race for three seats. A split unionist vote could see two unionist candidates being eliminated before the two nationalist candidates, thus giving the dreaded 2/1 victory to nationalism.
On the other hand, the article in the Belfast Telegraph may just be a promotional piece for Robinson's strategy. By hyping up unionist fears of the increasing strength of nationalism, and by being specific in a way that Robinson could not, the Belfast Telegraph may be trying to help the DUP counter its arch-rivals in the TUV.
This blog does not believe that the DUP really has immediate fears of being outvoted. In our view the Belfast Telegraph article is the opening shot in a campaign similar to that run by unionists before the results of the 2001 Census were released. In that case they exaggerated the Catholic proportion of the population, and quoted extensively from over-optimistic nationalist sources. This then allowed them, when the more reasonable results actually came out, to claim that nationalism had suffered a significant reverse. In the 2009 European election, by hyping the chances of two nationalist seats, and encouraging nationalists to believe that such an outcome is possible, they would then be able (if unionism still retains its two seats) to say that nationalism's hopes have yet again been dashed. If the SDLP and Fianna Fáil do actually fight the campaign together, and win back the seat that Sinn Féin won in 2004, unionism will be ecstatic.
The statistics, and previous vote transfer patterns, show that the likely outcome of the election remains two unionists and one nationalist. So any exaggerated hype to the contrary should be seen as what it is – a two handed gambit by the DUP to win its voters back from the TUV, and to humiliate Sinn Féin.
The moral void at the heart of unionism
Stephen Lawrence, 18, was murdered by white youths in Eltham, south-east London in 1993 solely because he was black. No-one has ever been convicted of his murder.
Yesterday (22 April 2008) his mother Doreen Lawrence was joined by more than 300 people including British Prime Minister Gordon Brown at a memorial service in central London. The Archbishop of Canterbury Dr Rowan Williams led the event at St Martin-in-the-Fields Church in Trafalgar Square.
Also present, Justice Secretary Jack Straw said his death left Britain a "nation shamed". Opposition leader David Cameron and Liberal Democrat leader Nick Clegg also attended the service.
Since Lawrence's death in April 1993, 90 Catholics have been murdered in Northern Ireland solely because they were Catholic. All 90 are listed by the authoritative Sutton database as being 'civilians', i.e. not involved in any security or paramilitary organisation. All were killed by loyalist organisations, or groups of individual loyalists, purely on account of their religion.
In none of the 90 cases has the British establishment reacted as it has done for Stephen Lawrence. In almost all cases they simply ignored the death, or at best released an anodyne condemnation via the Northern Ireland Office. Even where loyalists, acting out of sectarian hatred, have murdered children (nine of the 90 were under 18 years of age), there was no high-level response from the government. In no case did a politician of the stature of Jack Straw claim that the death left Britain a "nation shamed". Never did a memorial service attract the leaders of all three main British parties.
Such a complete lack of interest, concern, or compassion demonstrates clearly that Britain sees Northern Ireland as 'a place apart', not really part of the nation that might be shamed. Hate crimes, committed by people 'loyal' to Britain, are unimportant when the victims are Irish people living in Ireland. There is, in British eyes, a hierarchy of victims, and London stands at the top of the list; Northern Ireland is so far down that it is unnoticed.
So much for the hypocrisy of the British establishment. What about the Christian and democratic leaders of Northern Ireland itself? The leaders of unionism, in particular, proclaim their attachment to 'British values' including freedom, justice and equality. Many of them claim to be Christians too. Were they outraged by the callous, brutal and sectarian murders of the 90 innocents? To their eternal shame, they were not. Unionists, almost to a man, ignored and belittled the deaths of 90 of their fellow citizens. On occasion they even tried to blame the victims themselves (David Trimble's disgusting remarks following the murder of 19 year old Ciaran Cummings in 2001, for example). They continued to associate with the known killers of many of the 90 (Trimble again, who allied himself with the Loyalist Volunteer Force at Drumcree). Out of the spotlights, many unionists quietly condoned the murders of innocent Catholics, seeing them as a communal punishment inflicted on the 'Catholic community'. In doing so, they exposed both their basic sectarianism, and their profound lack of Christianity or humanity. Right up to the present day many unionists are content to participate in Orange Order marches that include banners commemorating known loyalist sectarian murderers. When confronted with this fact, their reaction is to deny having seen such banners – there is no outrage or disgust expressed about the banners, the person being commemorated, or the association between the Orange Order and sectarian murder.
Have the leaders of unionism, and of the Protestant churches, come together to remember any of the 90 innocent Catholic victims of the sectarian murderers? No, they haven't. Apart from weak condemnations of 'all terrorism', what witness have they shown of their disgust at anti-Catholic sectarianism? The answer, shamefully, is none. Individual Protestants, occasionally clergymen, have expressed their condemnation; individual unionists, occasionally politically active, have done so too. But as a united front, at the highest level, unionists have let their silence do the talking.
The blatant lack of interest or compassion shown by most unionists towards the large numbers of their fellow citizens, murdered purely because of their religion, shows the moral void that lies at the heart of unionism.
--------------------------------------------------------------
The 90 innocent Catholic civilians murdered by loyalists solely on account of their religion, since the death of Stephen Lawrence. Though their deaths are no more tragic than any others, it is worth noting that 9 are under 18 years old, 4 are 65+, and 7 are women.
1993
Edward McHugh (65)
Brendan McKenna (29)
Sean Lavery (21)
Seamus Hopkins (24)
Teresa Dowds De Mogollan (48)
James Bell (49)
Michael Edwards (39)
Sean Hughes (40)
Jason McFarlane (20)
Joseph Reynolds (40)
Patrick McMahon (23)
Martin Moran (22)
Sean Fox (72)
James Cameron (54)
Mark Rodgers (28)
Gerard Cairns (22)
Rory Cairns (18)
Steven Mullan (20)
Karen Thompson (19)
James Moore (81)
Joseph McDermott (60)
Moira Duddy (59)
John Moyne (50)
Sean Hagan (47)
John Todd (31)
Brian Duffy (15)
Robert McClay (38)
1994
John Doherty (51)
Cormac McDermott (31)
Mark Sweeney (31)
Sean McParland (55)
Francis Brown (38)
Joseph McCloskey (52)
Paul Thompson (25)
James Brown (47)
Rose Anne Mallon (76)
Martin Bradley (23)
Eamon Fox (42)
Gary Convie (24)
Gavin McShane (17)
Shane McArdle (17)
Maurice O'Kane (50)
Gerald Brady (27)
Adrian Rogan (34)
Malcolm Jenkinson (52)
Barney Greene (87)
Daniel McCreanor (59)
Patrick O'Hare (35)
Eamon Byrne (39)
Robert Monaghan (44)
Kathleen O'Hagan (38)
Harry O'Neill (60)
Martin L'Estrange (36)
Sean Monaghan (20)
Sean McDermott (37)
John O'Hanlon (32)
Noel Lyness (47)
1995
Norman Harley (46)
1996
Michael McGoldrick (31)
1997
John Slane (44)
Robert Hamill (25)
Sean Brown (61)
Bernadette Martin (18)
James Morgan (16)
Gerry Devlin (36)
Edmund Treanor (31)
1998
Terry Enright (28)
Fergal McCusker (28)
Larry Brennan (52)
Benedict Hughes (55)
Liam Conway (39)
John McColgan (33)
Damian Trainor (26)
Adrian Lamph (29)
Ciaran Heffron (22)
Richard Quinn (11)
Mark Quinn (10)
Jason Quinn (9)
Brian Service (35)
1999
Rosemary Nelson (40)
2000
Gary Moore (30)
2001
John McCormick (25)
Ciaran Cummings (19)
Martin O'Hagan (51)
Francis Mulholland (34)
2002
Daniel McColgan (20)
Gerard Lawlor (19)
2003
James McMahon (21)
2005
Thomas Devlin (15)
2006
Michael McIlveen (15)
Yesterday (22 April 2008) his mother Doreen Lawrence was joined by more than 300 people including British Prime Minister Gordon Brown at a memorial service in central London. The Archbishop of Canterbury Dr Rowan Williams led the event at St Martin-in-the-Fields Church in Trafalgar Square.
Also present, Justice Secretary Jack Straw said his death left Britain a "nation shamed". Opposition leader David Cameron and Liberal Democrat leader Nick Clegg also attended the service.
Since Lawrence's death in April 1993, 90 Catholics have been murdered in Northern Ireland solely because they were Catholic. All 90 are listed by the authoritative Sutton database as being 'civilians', i.e. not involved in any security or paramilitary organisation. All were killed by loyalist organisations, or groups of individual loyalists, purely on account of their religion.
In none of the 90 cases has the British establishment reacted as it has done for Stephen Lawrence. In almost all cases they simply ignored the death, or at best released an anodyne condemnation via the Northern Ireland Office. Even where loyalists, acting out of sectarian hatred, have murdered children (nine of the 90 were under 18 years of age), there was no high-level response from the government. In no case did a politician of the stature of Jack Straw claim that the death left Britain a "nation shamed". Never did a memorial service attract the leaders of all three main British parties.
Such a complete lack of interest, concern, or compassion demonstrates clearly that Britain sees Northern Ireland as 'a place apart', not really part of the nation that might be shamed. Hate crimes, committed by people 'loyal' to Britain, are unimportant when the victims are Irish people living in Ireland. There is, in British eyes, a hierarchy of victims, and London stands at the top of the list; Northern Ireland is so far down that it is unnoticed.
So much for the hypocrisy of the British establishment. What about the Christian and democratic leaders of Northern Ireland itself? The leaders of unionism, in particular, proclaim their attachment to 'British values' including freedom, justice and equality. Many of them claim to be Christians too. Were they outraged by the callous, brutal and sectarian murders of the 90 innocents? To their eternal shame, they were not. Unionists, almost to a man, ignored and belittled the deaths of 90 of their fellow citizens. On occasion they even tried to blame the victims themselves (David Trimble's disgusting remarks following the murder of 19 year old Ciaran Cummings in 2001, for example). They continued to associate with the known killers of many of the 90 (Trimble again, who allied himself with the Loyalist Volunteer Force at Drumcree). Out of the spotlights, many unionists quietly condoned the murders of innocent Catholics, seeing them as a communal punishment inflicted on the 'Catholic community'. In doing so, they exposed both their basic sectarianism, and their profound lack of Christianity or humanity. Right up to the present day many unionists are content to participate in Orange Order marches that include banners commemorating known loyalist sectarian murderers. When confronted with this fact, their reaction is to deny having seen such banners – there is no outrage or disgust expressed about the banners, the person being commemorated, or the association between the Orange Order and sectarian murder.
Have the leaders of unionism, and of the Protestant churches, come together to remember any of the 90 innocent Catholic victims of the sectarian murderers? No, they haven't. Apart from weak condemnations of 'all terrorism', what witness have they shown of their disgust at anti-Catholic sectarianism? The answer, shamefully, is none. Individual Protestants, occasionally clergymen, have expressed their condemnation; individual unionists, occasionally politically active, have done so too. But as a united front, at the highest level, unionists have let their silence do the talking.
The blatant lack of interest or compassion shown by most unionists towards the large numbers of their fellow citizens, murdered purely because of their religion, shows the moral void that lies at the heart of unionism.
--------------------------------------------------------------
The 90 innocent Catholic civilians murdered by loyalists solely on account of their religion, since the death of Stephen Lawrence. Though their deaths are no more tragic than any others, it is worth noting that 9 are under 18 years old, 4 are 65+, and 7 are women.
1993
Edward McHugh (65)
Brendan McKenna (29)
Sean Lavery (21)
Seamus Hopkins (24)
Teresa Dowds De Mogollan (48)
James Bell (49)
Michael Edwards (39)
Sean Hughes (40)
Jason McFarlane (20)
Joseph Reynolds (40)
Patrick McMahon (23)
Martin Moran (22)
Sean Fox (72)
James Cameron (54)
Mark Rodgers (28)
Gerard Cairns (22)
Rory Cairns (18)
Steven Mullan (20)
Karen Thompson (19)
James Moore (81)
Joseph McDermott (60)
Moira Duddy (59)
John Moyne (50)
Sean Hagan (47)
John Todd (31)
Brian Duffy (15)
Robert McClay (38)
1994
John Doherty (51)
Cormac McDermott (31)
Mark Sweeney (31)
Sean McParland (55)
Francis Brown (38)
Joseph McCloskey (52)
Paul Thompson (25)
James Brown (47)
Rose Anne Mallon (76)
Martin Bradley (23)
Eamon Fox (42)
Gary Convie (24)
Gavin McShane (17)
Shane McArdle (17)
Maurice O'Kane (50)
Gerald Brady (27)
Adrian Rogan (34)
Malcolm Jenkinson (52)
Barney Greene (87)
Daniel McCreanor (59)
Patrick O'Hare (35)
Eamon Byrne (39)
Robert Monaghan (44)
Kathleen O'Hagan (38)
Harry O'Neill (60)
Martin L'Estrange (36)
Sean Monaghan (20)
Sean McDermott (37)
John O'Hanlon (32)
Noel Lyness (47)
1995
Norman Harley (46)
1996
Michael McGoldrick (31)
1997
John Slane (44)
Robert Hamill (25)
Sean Brown (61)
Bernadette Martin (18)
James Morgan (16)
Gerry Devlin (36)
Edmund Treanor (31)
1998
Terry Enright (28)
Fergal McCusker (28)
Larry Brennan (52)
Benedict Hughes (55)
Liam Conway (39)
John McColgan (33)
Damian Trainor (26)
Adrian Lamph (29)
Ciaran Heffron (22)
Richard Quinn (11)
Mark Quinn (10)
Jason Quinn (9)
Brian Service (35)
1999
Rosemary Nelson (40)
2000
Gary Moore (30)
2001
John McCormick (25)
Ciaran Cummings (19)
Martin O'Hagan (51)
Francis Mulholland (34)
2002
Daniel McColgan (20)
Gerard Lawlor (19)
2003
James McMahon (21)
2005
Thomas Devlin (15)
2006
Michael McIlveen (15)
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