The title above is a fancy way of saying 'brain-drain'. It is also the title of a recently published report from the Equality Commission for Northern Ireland, which looks at the area previously covered by this blog here:
27 March 2007: Protestant brain drain?
04 June 2007: Getting to grips with the [Protestant] brain drain
21 June 2007: They must be getting REALLY worried ... !
12 June 2008: C'mon over ... but not 'up'
In essence, the new report adds little to the debate on the Protestant brain-drain. It repeats some known statistics, and makes a plea for 'further research'. In a nutshell, it notes that:
- Protestants comprise a disproportionate amount of those leaving NI to study in Great Britain (GB). In 2005/06, 29% of NI domiciled under-graduate students migrated to GB to study, with the proportion of Protestants to Catholics leaving NI being around 1.5 to 1. Some 34% of Protestants leave, compared to 23% of Catholics and 49% of ‘Others’.
- In NI Higher Educational Institutions, Catholics make up 60% of students
- Following graduation, most students in the UK tend to remain in the region of their HE institution. For NI domiciled students, regardless of university attended, 81% are located in NI six months following graduation. Data indicate that of the 29% of NI domiciled undergraduate students in GB, six months after graduation some 19% are still in GB; this suggests that a net 10% of NI domiciles return to NI following graduation.
So, nothing new – Protestant kids are more likely to go to Britain to university, leaving the universities in Northern Ireland more Catholic than normal. The majority of the (disproportionately Protestant) students who go to Britain, do not come back. So the proportion of Catholics in 'graduate level' jobs in Northern Ireland is higher than the general population at that age. A 'greening' of the professions, so to speak.
For those who do not wish to read all 105 pages of this rehash of previously published facts, there is also an accompanying 8-page Research Update which tells you all you need to know.
Friday 18 July 2008
Election Results 1973–2007
The Electoral Office for Northern Ireland has recently put scans of all of the election results (except by-elections) that have taken place in Northern Ireland since 1973 on their web site. This is a treasure trove of detail for election-watchers which complements Nicholas White's impressive site on Northern Ireland elections.
Although no fault of the Electoral Office, the results can sometimes be hard to read, as the earlier ones are written by hand, and not always clearly. In addition, the early results give only the surname of the candidates, and not the given names, so it is not always clear who is who. By 1975, though, the Electoral Office had invested in a typewriter, and thereafter things get clearer. Download speed can be slow, as some of the files are large.
Although no fault of the Electoral Office, the results can sometimes be hard to read, as the earlier ones are written by hand, and not always clearly. In addition, the early results give only the surname of the candidates, and not the given names, so it is not always clear who is who. By 1975, though, the Electoral Office had invested in a typewriter, and thereafter things get clearer. Download speed can be slow, as some of the files are large.
Tuesday 15 July 2008
Fair Employment Monitoring Report No. 17
Northern Ireland is one of the most weighed and measured regions in the world. Numerous agencies collect and publish statistics on all sorts of things. In addition to the 'normal' state data collection, the 'community' (read 'religious') division in Northern Ireland requires additional data to be collected concerning the religion (or not) of every employee, and the tough equal opportunities legislation in place calls for detailed data concerning almost all areas of society.
The benefit of this, of course, is that we have a great deal of information on the composition of Northern Irish society, and how that composition is evolving. The Equality Commission for Northern Ireland is responsible for publishing huge amounts of this information, amongst which are annual analyses of the composition of the labour force – the Fair Employment Monitoring Reports, of which no 17 is the latest (Summary here). This includes information on the religious evolution of the labour force from 1990 to 2006, and it makes very interesting reading. It is worth repeating that the period covered is only 16 years, which is barely a blink of the eye of history. And yet, even during this blink of the eye, the evolution is remarkable. The report deals separately with various parts of the workforce; public, private, male, female, part-time, full-time, and so on, but the overall evolution is captured well in one image:
[image removed temporarily]
The period from 1990 to 2006 is one in which the economy of Northern Ireland recovered somewhat, the war/troubles came to an end, and equality laws were strengthened. So the starting point in 1990 may not truly represent the actual breakdown of the workforce at that time. It could be that, as Catholic rates of unemployment have fallen, the proportion of Catholics in the workforce has risen. However, unemployment had fallen to quite a low level somewhere by the middle of the series, and yet the Catholic proportion still kept rising. The graph above shows just Catholics and Protestants – the 'not stated' and others are temporarily ignored – but it is nonetheless striking.
It seems that what the Equality Commission is recording is the extremely rapid (in historical terms) increase in the Catholic proportion of the workforce, and by extension in the general population. A rise of 8.2% in the Catholic proportion of the workforce over 16 years, bringing it to only 6.9% short of a majority, implies that parity may be only a decade away. And after parity, there is no reason to think that the evolution will stop. We know, for example, that more school kids are Catholic than Protestant, and that more Protestant students go to university in Britain and do not come back. As older workers (majority Protestant) retire, they will be replaced by younger (majority Catholic) entrants to the workforce.
The timing of the tipping of the balance in the workforce is remarkably close to that of the electorate (see here). It seems that the 20-teens are going to be a traumatic decade for unionism. In addition to the realisation that its days of majority in its self-carved statelet are over, unionism will have to face a plethora of centenaries, all of which will remind us of the unfinished business of national reunification and independence; 2014 (Home Rule Act), 2016 (Easter Rising), 2018 (General Election), 2019 (First Dáil), and so on.
The benefit of this, of course, is that we have a great deal of information on the composition of Northern Irish society, and how that composition is evolving. The Equality Commission for Northern Ireland is responsible for publishing huge amounts of this information, amongst which are annual analyses of the composition of the labour force – the Fair Employment Monitoring Reports, of which no 17 is the latest (Summary here). This includes information on the religious evolution of the labour force from 1990 to 2006, and it makes very interesting reading. It is worth repeating that the period covered is only 16 years, which is barely a blink of the eye of history. And yet, even during this blink of the eye, the evolution is remarkable. The report deals separately with various parts of the workforce; public, private, male, female, part-time, full-time, and so on, but the overall evolution is captured well in one image:
[image removed temporarily]
The period from 1990 to 2006 is one in which the economy of Northern Ireland recovered somewhat, the war/troubles came to an end, and equality laws were strengthened. So the starting point in 1990 may not truly represent the actual breakdown of the workforce at that time. It could be that, as Catholic rates of unemployment have fallen, the proportion of Catholics in the workforce has risen. However, unemployment had fallen to quite a low level somewhere by the middle of the series, and yet the Catholic proportion still kept rising. The graph above shows just Catholics and Protestants – the 'not stated' and others are temporarily ignored – but it is nonetheless striking.
It seems that what the Equality Commission is recording is the extremely rapid (in historical terms) increase in the Catholic proportion of the workforce, and by extension in the general population. A rise of 8.2% in the Catholic proportion of the workforce over 16 years, bringing it to only 6.9% short of a majority, implies that parity may be only a decade away. And after parity, there is no reason to think that the evolution will stop. We know, for example, that more school kids are Catholic than Protestant, and that more Protestant students go to university in Britain and do not come back. As older workers (majority Protestant) retire, they will be replaced by younger (majority Catholic) entrants to the workforce.
The timing of the tipping of the balance in the workforce is remarkably close to that of the electorate (see here). It seems that the 20-teens are going to be a traumatic decade for unionism. In addition to the realisation that its days of majority in its self-carved statelet are over, unionism will have to face a plethora of centenaries, all of which will remind us of the unfinished business of national reunification and independence; 2014 (Home Rule Act), 2016 (Easter Rising), 2018 (General Election), 2019 (First Dáil), and so on.
Thursday 10 July 2008
The 2007 balance sheet – Part 2 (New Voters)
Having pointed out in Part 1 how unionism suffered a net loss in 2007 of some 4,556 potential voters due to deaths (although, thanks to turn-out rates the actual loss of votes only amounts to some 2,820), this second part of the 2007 Balance Sheet will examine the new voters that the two main political blocks can expect to gain as voters reach their 18th birthdays.
This is fairly easy, as the people who turned 18 in 2007 will largely be those who were 12 in 2001, when the Census recorded their religions (in Table S305: Age By Sex And Community Background (Religion Or Religion Brought Up In)). Migration may also play a small part, but since 18 year-olds who move (to university, for instance) tend to remain registered at their home address, if they vote at all, it is likely to be in the same place that they lived as children.
The religious break-down of 12 year-olds in 2001 was as follows:
Catholic – 13,352 (50.6%), Protestant – 11,941 (45.2%), other religion or none – 1,110 (4.2%).
So around 26,403 new voters came of age in 2007. For 1,110 of them no real conclusions can be drawn (more's the pity), but for the vast majority this blog's working hypothesis (reminder: that (constitutional) political preferences in the north of Ireland are very closely related to religious affiliation) tends to indicate a net gain for nationalism of 1,411.
If we combine these figures with the figures previously given in Part 1, we can calculate a rough balance sheet for 2007, taking the votes in the 2007 Assembly election, adding the new voters and subtracting the deaths. However, some allowance must be made both for the actual turnout rates, and for the different turnout rates of younger and older people. While no data on this has been published for Northern Ireland, there are a number of studies that show that older people are very likely to vote (in the order of 85%), while younger people have turnout rates of barely over 50%. It is difficult to extrapolate for Northern Ireland, a very politicised society, from, for example, the UK where youthful disaffection is massive. Nonetheless, turnout in Northern Ireland is also dropping quite fast. Taking these factors into account, this analysis will assume a turnout rate of 80% for the older voters, and 50% for new voters.
(1) Nationalism
2007 Assembly election: 293,767 (42.6% of the total)
Plus - New voters: 13,352 x 50% = 6,676
Minus - Deaths (voting age only): 4,874 x 80% = 3,899
New total: 296,544
(2) Unionism
2007 Assembly election: 335,888 votes (48.7% of the total)
Plus - New voters: 11,941 x 50% = 5,970
Minus - Deaths (voting age only): 9,517 x 80% = 7,614
New total: 334,244
(3) Others or no religion
2007 Assembly election: 60,658 votes (8.8% of the total)
Plus - New voters: 1,110 x 50% = 555
Minus - Deaths (voting age only): 145 x 80% = 116
New total: 61,097
At the end of 2007, therefore, we might expect a voting electorate of 691,885, of whom:
– 296,544 will vote nationalist (42.9%)
– 334,244 will vote unionist (48.3%)
– 61,097 will vote for other candidates (8.8%)
The gap between nationalism and unionism, 42,121 votes in the 2007 Assembly election, would be reduced to 37,700, representing a reduction in this gap of 4,421. In only one year, therefore, unionism would have lost over 10% of its numerical superiority over nationalism.
In Part 1 of the balance sheet we estimated that unionism had barely 15 years of numerical superiority left. However, Part 1 did not take into account either the new voters coming on to the register, or the different turnout rates amongst younger and older voters. Once these factors are added, the life expectancy of unionism's numerical superiority over nationalism reduces to less than 10 years.
This is fairly easy, as the people who turned 18 in 2007 will largely be those who were 12 in 2001, when the Census recorded their religions (in Table S305: Age By Sex And Community Background (Religion Or Religion Brought Up In)). Migration may also play a small part, but since 18 year-olds who move (to university, for instance) tend to remain registered at their home address, if they vote at all, it is likely to be in the same place that they lived as children.
The religious break-down of 12 year-olds in 2001 was as follows:
Catholic – 13,352 (50.6%), Protestant – 11,941 (45.2%), other religion or none – 1,110 (4.2%).
So around 26,403 new voters came of age in 2007. For 1,110 of them no real conclusions can be drawn (more's the pity), but for the vast majority this blog's working hypothesis (reminder: that (constitutional) political preferences in the north of Ireland are very closely related to religious affiliation) tends to indicate a net gain for nationalism of 1,411.
If we combine these figures with the figures previously given in Part 1, we can calculate a rough balance sheet for 2007, taking the votes in the 2007 Assembly election, adding the new voters and subtracting the deaths. However, some allowance must be made both for the actual turnout rates, and for the different turnout rates of younger and older people. While no data on this has been published for Northern Ireland, there are a number of studies that show that older people are very likely to vote (in the order of 85%), while younger people have turnout rates of barely over 50%. It is difficult to extrapolate for Northern Ireland, a very politicised society, from, for example, the UK where youthful disaffection is massive. Nonetheless, turnout in Northern Ireland is also dropping quite fast. Taking these factors into account, this analysis will assume a turnout rate of 80% for the older voters, and 50% for new voters.
(1) Nationalism
2007 Assembly election: 293,767 (42.6% of the total)
Plus - New voters: 13,352 x 50% = 6,676
Minus - Deaths (voting age only): 4,874 x 80% = 3,899
New total: 296,544
(2) Unionism
2007 Assembly election: 335,888 votes (48.7% of the total)
Plus - New voters: 11,941 x 50% = 5,970
Minus - Deaths (voting age only): 9,517 x 80% = 7,614
New total: 334,244
(3) Others or no religion
2007 Assembly election: 60,658 votes (8.8% of the total)
Plus - New voters: 1,110 x 50% = 555
Minus - Deaths (voting age only): 145 x 80% = 116
New total: 61,097
At the end of 2007, therefore, we might expect a voting electorate of 691,885, of whom:
– 296,544 will vote nationalist (42.9%)
– 334,244 will vote unionist (48.3%)
– 61,097 will vote for other candidates (8.8%)
The gap between nationalism and unionism, 42,121 votes in the 2007 Assembly election, would be reduced to 37,700, representing a reduction in this gap of 4,421. In only one year, therefore, unionism would have lost over 10% of its numerical superiority over nationalism.
In Part 1 of the balance sheet we estimated that unionism had barely 15 years of numerical superiority left. However, Part 1 did not take into account either the new voters coming on to the register, or the different turnout rates amongst younger and older voters. Once these factors are added, the life expectancy of unionism's numerical superiority over nationalism reduces to less than 10 years.
Wednesday 9 July 2008
The 2007 balance sheet – Part 1 (Deaths)
This blog believes quite strongly that (constitutional) political preferences in the north of Ireland are very closely related to religious affiliation. In short, most Protestants are unionists, and most Catholics are nationalists.
The relative sizes of the two main political blocks (unionist and nationalist) can therefore be judged, between elections, by the relative sizes of the two main religious blocks (Protestant and Catholic).
Changes in any population are basically caused by four elements; the size of the population at the start; births; deaths; and migration. In the case of Northern Ireland, the religious or political affiliations of migrants cannot be known until they vote, so we are left with only the 'natural increase' (births less deaths) to examine.
As regards deaths, NISRA have recently published their Press Notice on deaths in 2007, which helpfully provides the actual number of deaths for each age band (in Table 3). Combining this with the results of the 2001 Census (Table S305: Age By Sex And Community Background (Religion Or Religion Brought Up In)), and moving the 2001 cohorts forward to more closely match their actual ages in 2007, it is possible to estimate the religious (and thus political) affiliations of the deceased people, and thereby to estimate the relative losses for each of the main political blocks.
The result is as follows. Of the 14,649 deaths in 2007, around 4,972 are likely to have been Catholic, 9,517 Protestant, and 159 'other' or no religion. From a political perspective, of course, only voters matter, so if we take only those of voting age, around 4,874 were Catholic, 9,430 Protestant, and 145 'other' or no religion.
So, in the course of one year – 2007 – unionism lost 4,556 more potential votes than nationalism through death.
In the 2007 Assembly elections unionism won 335,888 votes (48.7% of the total), to nationalism's 293,767 (42.6% of the total). The gap between the two main blocks was therefore 42,121 votes.
In the 2007 Assembly election the turn-out was only 61.9%, so the 4,556 potential votes probably represented only 2,820 actual votes (61.9% x 4,556). However, at this rate of attrition unionism has barely 15 more years of numerical superiority (42,121/2,820), and this is even before the question of new voters is examined (that will be done in The 2007 balance sheet – Part 2, to follow later). However, older voters are much more likely to vote than young ones, and the proportion of Protestants (and thus unionists) amongst the old is much higher than amongst the young. Thus the real loss to unionism may be higher than 2,820 votes per year, and thus unionism's life-expectancy may be less than 15 years.
The relative sizes of the two main political blocks (unionist and nationalist) can therefore be judged, between elections, by the relative sizes of the two main religious blocks (Protestant and Catholic).
Changes in any population are basically caused by four elements; the size of the population at the start; births; deaths; and migration. In the case of Northern Ireland, the religious or political affiliations of migrants cannot be known until they vote, so we are left with only the 'natural increase' (births less deaths) to examine.
As regards deaths, NISRA have recently published their Press Notice on deaths in 2007, which helpfully provides the actual number of deaths for each age band (in Table 3). Combining this with the results of the 2001 Census (Table S305: Age By Sex And Community Background (Religion Or Religion Brought Up In)), and moving the 2001 cohorts forward to more closely match their actual ages in 2007, it is possible to estimate the religious (and thus political) affiliations of the deceased people, and thereby to estimate the relative losses for each of the main political blocks.
The result is as follows. Of the 14,649 deaths in 2007, around 4,972 are likely to have been Catholic, 9,517 Protestant, and 159 'other' or no religion. From a political perspective, of course, only voters matter, so if we take only those of voting age, around 4,874 were Catholic, 9,430 Protestant, and 145 'other' or no religion.
So, in the course of one year – 2007 – unionism lost 4,556 more potential votes than nationalism through death.
In the 2007 Assembly elections unionism won 335,888 votes (48.7% of the total), to nationalism's 293,767 (42.6% of the total). The gap between the two main blocks was therefore 42,121 votes.
In the 2007 Assembly election the turn-out was only 61.9%, so the 4,556 potential votes probably represented only 2,820 actual votes (61.9% x 4,556). However, at this rate of attrition unionism has barely 15 more years of numerical superiority (42,121/2,820), and this is even before the question of new voters is examined (that will be done in The 2007 balance sheet – Part 2, to follow later). However, older voters are much more likely to vote than young ones, and the proportion of Protestants (and thus unionists) amongst the old is much higher than amongst the young. Thus the real loss to unionism may be higher than 2,820 votes per year, and thus unionism's life-expectancy may be less than 15 years.
Wedding bells
NISRA has released its very detailed data on the marriages that took place in 2007 in Northern Ireland. As always, there are plenty of figures that can be interpreted in different ways, but there are also some that are quite unambiguous.
Of the 6,132 religious marriages in 2007, 52.6% were Catholic; 19% Presbyterian (including Free Presbyterian), 16% Church of Ireland, 3% Methodist and 9% ‘Other denominations’. This represents yet another small increase in the proportion that were Catholic (in 2006 it was 52.1%), and brings the Catholic percentage to its highest ever level. The corresponding proportions of Presbyterian, Church of Ireland, and Methodist marriages continued to decline.
The proportion of marriages that were religious remained quite stable compared with 2006: 70.6% in 2007, 70.4% in 2006. So the proportion of all marriages that was Catholic rose somewhat. The religions (if any) of those people who married in civil ceremonies is not recorded, so no concrete conclusions can be drawn.
However, the marriage statistics are prima facie evidence that the proportion of Catholics amongst those of 'marrying age' is increasing. Average marrying age is also shown in the NISRA Press Notice: 33 for men, 31 for women.
A few interesting nuggets contained in the last few tables of the Press Notice may provide some food for thought:
Of the 8,687 marriages, Northern Ireland was the normal place of residence of both bride and groom in 7,369 cases. Maybe, one might say, a Northern Irish person is marrying someone from outside, who may then come to live in Northern Ireland. But what can be made of the 596 marriages where both bride and groom are resident 'elsewhere in the UK'? Or the 218 where both bride and groom are resident in the south? In 9.4% of the marriages, therefore, neither bride nor groom lives in Northern Ireland! Is Northern Ireland experiencing a kind of 'wedding tourism'? Or are these marriages of Northern Irish émigrés who come home to marry, but not to live? The latter would seem to be the case, as the Press Notice also helpfully provides details of the place of birth of those marrying. For example, while there are 596 marriages of two people each resident 'elsewhere in the UK', there are only 120 marriages of two people each born 'elsewhere in the UK'.
So it appears that the marriage statistics cannot be used as an accurate measure of the breakdown of the actual resident population in Northern Ireland.
Of the 6,132 religious marriages in 2007, 52.6% were Catholic; 19% Presbyterian (including Free Presbyterian), 16% Church of Ireland, 3% Methodist and 9% ‘Other denominations’. This represents yet another small increase in the proportion that were Catholic (in 2006 it was 52.1%), and brings the Catholic percentage to its highest ever level. The corresponding proportions of Presbyterian, Church of Ireland, and Methodist marriages continued to decline.
The proportion of marriages that were religious remained quite stable compared with 2006: 70.6% in 2007, 70.4% in 2006. So the proportion of all marriages that was Catholic rose somewhat. The religions (if any) of those people who married in civil ceremonies is not recorded, so no concrete conclusions can be drawn.
However, the marriage statistics are prima facie evidence that the proportion of Catholics amongst those of 'marrying age' is increasing. Average marrying age is also shown in the NISRA Press Notice: 33 for men, 31 for women.
A few interesting nuggets contained in the last few tables of the Press Notice may provide some food for thought:
Of the 8,687 marriages, Northern Ireland was the normal place of residence of both bride and groom in 7,369 cases. Maybe, one might say, a Northern Irish person is marrying someone from outside, who may then come to live in Northern Ireland. But what can be made of the 596 marriages where both bride and groom are resident 'elsewhere in the UK'? Or the 218 where both bride and groom are resident in the south? In 9.4% of the marriages, therefore, neither bride nor groom lives in Northern Ireland! Is Northern Ireland experiencing a kind of 'wedding tourism'? Or are these marriages of Northern Irish émigrés who come home to marry, but not to live? The latter would seem to be the case, as the Press Notice also helpfully provides details of the place of birth of those marrying. For example, while there are 596 marriages of two people each resident 'elsewhere in the UK', there are only 120 marriages of two people each born 'elsewhere in the UK'.
So it appears that the marriage statistics cannot be used as an accurate measure of the breakdown of the actual resident population in Northern Ireland.
Jim Allister's blind spot
Jim Allister, TUV MEP, is reported as arguing for the UK to withdraw from the EU because it is a net contributor to the EU budget.
"How much longer are we going to go on pouring millions into the black hole that is Brussels, before it is realised that we'd be better off out?", he asked.
Poor Jim appears not to realise that in a Union there are contributors and beneficiaries – that is the nature of such an organisation. It is the same in families, where parents work and children consume, or in countries where one region is rich and another poor.
If Allister's position is that a country should only stay in a union if it is a recipient, then his mathematics is very shoddy, and his solidarity non-existent. The logic of his position is that he should be calling for Britain to withdraw from Northern Ireland, as it is currently 'pouring billions into the black hole that is Northern Ireland', and would certainly be better off out.
He would argue that Northern Ireland is part of the UK. But then, isn't the UK part of the EU?
"How much longer are we going to go on pouring millions into the black hole that is Brussels, before it is realised that we'd be better off out?", he asked.
Poor Jim appears not to realise that in a Union there are contributors and beneficiaries – that is the nature of such an organisation. It is the same in families, where parents work and children consume, or in countries where one region is rich and another poor.
If Allister's position is that a country should only stay in a union if it is a recipient, then his mathematics is very shoddy, and his solidarity non-existent. The logic of his position is that he should be calling for Britain to withdraw from Northern Ireland, as it is currently 'pouring billions into the black hole that is Northern Ireland', and would certainly be better off out.
He would argue that Northern Ireland is part of the UK. But then, isn't the UK part of the EU?
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