Craigavon Borough Council

Previous blogs have looked mostly at majority nationalist districts, but these are not the only ones that are of interest, of course. There are other categories; districts that are overwhelmingly nationalist or unionist, and for which no change is likely, and districts that have retained a majority from one or other block throughout the period, but for which there are stirrings in the undergrowth.

Today's case is one of the latter: Craigavon Borough Council. Lying at the heart of Northern Ireland just south of Lough Neagh, it contains the towns of Lurgan and Portadown, the latter world famous as the scene of some of the worst community confrontations in recent years, particularly the contentious attempts by the Orange Order to march down Garvaghy Road. The area also saw some of the worst and most bitter sectarian murders of the troubles, and was home to some of the most unpleasant of unionism's supporters. As a result, it is widely seen as a unionist bulwark.

However, as we shall see, even in unionism's back garden some green shoots are budding.

Elections

Craigavon has remained a majority unionist district throughout the last political generation (1985 to 2005). During this time, however, the nationalist minority has grown from 28.7% to 39.3%. In 2001 it even reached 41.4%:

The unionist percentage of the vote did not change significantly during the period, which implies that the period saw a consolidation of the vote into the two communities, and a decline in the unaligned vote – both the Workers Party and the Alliance Party did less well in Craigavon in 2005 than in 1985. Nonetheless, the gain over the period has been by nationalism which ended in 2005 with 10.6% more of the vote than in 1985, whilst unionism ended with 3.9% less than in 1985.


As seen elsewhere, the local elections in 2001 saw a significant increase in the turnout, most likely because they were held on the same day as the 2001 Westminster election. Both unionism and nationalism benefited from the increased turnout:

At the end of the period, in 2005, nationalism was receiving the support of 6.4% more of the electorate than in 1985 (24.1% against 17.7%). Unionism, however, despite its boost in 2001 ended the generation with a lower proportion of the electorate: 35.5%, down from 38.1% in 1985. The gap between the two blocks, in terms of percentages of the electorate, had narrowed by 9%. In terms of the votes actually received, the gap had narrowed by almost 15% (from 33.1% to 18.6%).

Demography

The gradually narrowing gap between unionism and nationalism is historic – but what of the future? Here, a look at the demography of Craigavon may help. The graph below shows the proportions of each age group in the district that are Catholic, Protestant or 'Other/None':

The graph shows that while around 80% of Craigavon's old people are Protestant, this proportion reduces with age, eventually reaching approximate parity at some ages between 20 and 40. Below the age of 20, however, Catholics begin to outnumber Protestants. As the two ends of the electorate are so different (the exit end is 80% Protestant, the entry end is around 45% Protestant), continued change is inevitable. Even if the left-hand side of the graph continues in its apparent flat state, the long-term outcome for Craigavon is approximate equality between the two blocks, or a slight Catholic (and therefore perhaps nationalist) majority.

The sharp increase in the proportion with no religion, or none stated, at very low ages is interesting. The children themselves clearly did not make that decision, so their parents, who declared a religion for themselves, declared none for their children. Perhaps they represent an increase in mixed marriages, in which the children are not designated as either Catholic or Protestant. The next census may throw more light on them.

The electorate

For the time being, Protestants (and thus unionists) have a numerical advantage in the district. The electorate in 2001 was 56.2% Protestant, and 42.1% Catholic. This matches the outcome of the 2001 local elections quite closely: 56.1% unionist, and 41.4% nationalist. However, by the next local elections (2011) many of the older voters will have died, and those who were teenagers in 2001 will be voters. Thus the gap between the two blocks should shrink some more. Approximately 2500 older voters will have died (75% of whom will be Protestant), and around 13000 new voters will have reached 18 (52% of whom will be Catholic). Not all of these new voters will stay in the district, so the potential gain to nationalism will not be so great, but unless migration is severely unbalanced, the net gain to nationalism should be much greater than the net gain to unionism. It must be stressed that not all members of a religious block will vote for its corresponding political block, but experience shows that the overwhelming majority do.

The future

In 2011 Craigavon Borough will form part of the new Armagh City and Bann District Council, along with the current Armagh and Banbridge districts. The new district will have a unionist majority, but one that is gradually reducing. The precise balance and evolution will be examined in a later blog.

A silver lining

This blog has not yet commented on the reported semi-marriage of the UUP and the English Tories, as the details do not yet permit a clear view of what has been agreed.

However, the question of whether the link-up is a good or a bad thing for nationalism has been answered fairly clearly by the DUP, in a speech by DUP MLA for Strangford, Michelle McIlveen;

"David Cameron has indicated it is his intention to fight every single seat in Northern Ireland. Presumably the Tory Party members of the joint selection committee agree with what Mr. Cameron has said. Does Reg Empey? Will he support running candidates in every seat in Northern Ireland even if it means losing Fermanagh and South Tyrone and South Belfast to anti-Unionist parties?

Furthermore, he has opted to merge with a party whose leading members have made openly offensive remarks about key elements of the Unionist family. Who will forget Jeffrey Peel’s infamous description of the Orange Order as a “backward facing parish pump society”? Certainly not members of the loyal orders or their families when they go to vote. Will such thinking be a factor in picking UUP/Tory candidates? If so Orangemen and women need not apply."

I wonder which parallel universe McIlveen lives on? Fermanagh and South Tyrone and South Belfast have already been 'lost' to anti-unionist parties. While unionism has some chance of taking South Belfast back again, in Fermanagh and South Tyrone there is a clear and increasing nationalist majority and it would require a very united unionist candidate, and a clear split in nationalism, for it to ever again be re-taken by unionism.

Happily, it seems that Ms McIlveen's party is not going to bring about a united unionist front either in Fermanagh and South Tyrone or elsewhere. If her comments reflect DUP thinking, then unionism will be well split for some time to come, to its detriment. If the DUP is going to stir up Orangemen to not vote for the UUP/Tory creation, then areas like Fermanagh and South Tyrone are safe seats for nationalism, and indeed other seats may come into play, in Assembly elections at least.

Splits in unionism are music to nationalist ears, and the more bitter the better. This one has a lovely melody!

Belfast City Council

The biggest single local government district, Belfast is divided into nine District Electoral areas (DEAs); Balmoral, Castle, Court, Laganbank, Lower Falls, Oldpark, Pottinger, Upper Falls and Victoria.

Elections

In many ways Belfast is unusual. Its electorate has been shrinking throughout the period looked at here; from 217406 in 1985 down to 166824 in 2005. At the same time, the nationalist proportion of the vote has been gradually increasing, and the unionist share decreasing, as the graphs below show.



The graphs show the level of separation of the two blocks in Belfast: two DEAs are almost entirely nationalist, and one is almost entirely unionist. Taken over the whole generation from 1985 to 2005, only Court (in loyalist West Belfast) shows an increase in the proportion of the vote going to unionists. Seven of the nine DEAs show a significant increase in the nationalist proportion, including quite dramatic increases in Laganbank, Balmoral and Castle DEAs. In Laganbank and Balmoral, both relatively affluent areas in South Belfast, nationalists now outnumber unionists. Castle DEA shows the largest drop in its unionist proportion, though they still have a plurality of the vote.

Electorate

As a proportion of the electorate, the nationalist vote has been gradually increasing over the generation:



The unionist proportion of the electorate has not declined significantly. The figures show that in 2001 and 2005 turnout in Belfast was considerably higher than its historical trend, so it seems that as the two blocks approached parity (in 1997) both sides voters felt an additional stimulus in the following elections.

However, in 2001 the electorate of Belfast City Council area was 51.6% Protestant, and only 45% Catholic, so either the turnout rate amongst Catholics was higher than amongst Protestants, or more Protestants voted for 'other' candidates. Such candidates received 9.2% of the vote in 2001, including an enormous 23% of the votes cast in Victoria DEA (mostly for the Alliance Party). As Victoria is a largely Protestant DEA, it is likely that many of these votes were Protestant too, and this had the effect of lowering the votes for unionist parties.

Demography

In demographic terms Belfast is also quite unusual. It has gone from being a largely Protestant city to one where the two main religious groups are almost equal in size. Within that equality, however, lies a changing dynamic. The graph below shows the proportions at each age that are Catholic, Protestant, or 'Other or None':


Two factors stand out very clearly. Firstly, old people in Belfast are mainly Protestant. But the proportion of Protestants at each age drops quite quickly, until they form a minority at all ages below 30 (in 2001, thus 37 in 2008). Secondly, the proportion claiming no religion is rising quite fast amongst he children. As children do not complete census forms, this identification must be their parents – they may, therefore, represent the children of mixed marriages. Their own community identification may become clearer at the next census (in 2011).

Another feature of Belfast's religious demography is visible in the graph below, which shows the actual number at each age:

The spike in both Catholic and Protestant numbers at age 19 is the opposite of the trough that can be seen in other areas. It represents the students and other young people that Belfast, as a university town, gains from other areas. As can be seen, they tend not to stay after they finish their studies.

Another interesting feature of the graph above is that, despite common belief, students are no less religious than the general public – there is no spike in the 'no religion' numbers at age 19.

The future

In common with most post-industrial cities, Belfast is losing people to the more pleasant suburbs and neighbouring towns. Whether this continues or bottoms out is hard to predict.

In 2011 Belfast will continue to exist as a local government area, but with slightly modified boundaries. It will take in areas of the existing Castlereagh and Lisburn districts – however the description of these areas in the Provisional Recommendations report of the Local Government Boundaries Commissioner does not allow them to be accurately identified, much less quantified either in electoral or demographic terms. It is likely, though, that the effect will be largely neutral, with majority unionist areas from Castlereagh cancelling out the largely nationalist areas from Lisburn. The first election to the new Belfast City Council in 2011 will be watched closely to see how these changes work out.

Fermanagh District Council

Fermanagh is the only district that comprises exactly one county. It has four District Electoral Areas (DEAs): Enniskillen, Erne East, Erne North and Erne West.

Elections

At the start of the current political generation (defined here as 1985 until the present day), unionism was very narrowly dominant in Fermanagh. In 1985 the nationalist parties had secured a small majority on the Council, but this was reversed in 1989 and 1993, when unionists gained a slight majority of the seats. In 1997 neither block had a majority (the balance of power was held by veteran socialist Davy Kettyles). In 2001, however, nationalism started to pull ahead, winning 13 of the 23 seats on the council. When Kettyles did not stand in 2005 his seat was picked up by the SDLP to give a stronger nationalist majority on the council (14 out of 23 seats).

The graphs below show the Nationalist and Unionist percentages of the vote in each of the DEAs from 1985 to 2005:

Although the evolutions of the two blocks are not as striking as we have previously seen in Cookstown, Dungannon and Magherafelt, there is nonetheless some evidence of a downward trend in unionism's share of the vote, and an upward trend in nationalism's share, especially since 1993.

This is more clearly visible if we look at the percentage of the total electorate that the two blocks received during the period:


Here we see evidence of a continuous unionist decline, masked by a period of demoralisation amongst nationalists from 1989 to 1997. In 2001 and 2005 this appears to have ended, most strikingly in Enniskillen where the nationalist vote increased from 27.7% in 1989 to 46.7% 16 years later. No migration or demographic changes could have brought about such a surge – only the revitalisation of the nationalist vote could have done so.

Demography

As seen elsewhere west of the Bann, Fermanagh's religious balance was closer in the past than it is now. The proportions of the population that are Protestant or Catholic are fairly even from the age of 60 upwards. However, below that age, the proportion that is Catholic starts to outstrip the proportion that is Protestant:

The widening of the gap is not, however, as dramatic as elsewhere. Nonetheless, a stable 65/35 breakdown appears to have established itself for all ages below 30.

In terms of absolute numbers, the graph looks like this:

A noticeable feature of the graph above is the steep decline in the Catholic birth rate particularly during the 1990s (i.e. amongst those children aged 10 and below in 2001). From a peak of 719 births in 1976, the Catholic birth rate dropped to as low as 451 in 1989. While the Protestant birth rate also dropped, the drop was less severe. By 2007 the number of births in Fermanagh had not changed much (802 in total), but it is not yet possible to know if the numbers stabilised at the proportions of 2001 (i.e. around 500 Catholic, and 300 Protestant), or if the balance had changed one way or the other.

The electorate

In 2001 the proportions of the population aged 18 and over (i.e. the electorate) were: Catholic, 57.3%, and Protestant, 41.5%.

In that same year the proportion of the vote that went to nationalist candidates was 53.9%, while 43.4% went to unionist candidates. The difference vis-à-vis the sizes of the two religious communities could have been caused by either a low nationalist turnout, or the influence of the mythical Catholic unionists. However, only Protestant unionists actually believe that Catholic unionists exist, despite never having met one.

So that means that nationalists did not turn out in full strength, and this is borne out by a comparison of 1985 and 2001 – in 1985 the nationalist vote was 41.8% of the entire electorate, while the unionist vote was 38.2% of the electorate. By 2001 the unionist vote had declined to 31.2% of the electorate, but the nationalist vote had not even recovered to its earlier position, and was only 40.8% of the electorate, despite the boost that would be expected from the demographic increase shown in the graphs above. So it seems that nationalist demoralisation had not yet entirely dissipated.

An alternative theory is that the period saw an increase in the strength of 'dissident' republicanism in Fermanagh, and that these people tend not to vote at all, thus giving nationalism a slightly smaller share of the electorate to draw from than the demographics would lead one to expect.

The future

In 2011 Fermanagh will join with the current Omagh district to form a new local government area, to be known (provisionally) as Fermanagh and Omagh District Council. A future blog will examine the (reconstructed) past and likely future of this district.

Fifty per cent plus one?

Bertie Ahern, Iar-Thaoiseach, is reported as believing that a 'united Ireland could not be achieved by a simple majority poll in favour of constitutional change'.

He apparently believes that a narrow 50% plus one in favour of unification would not work, and that “a sizeable amount of people” north and south would be required to move to a united Ireland.

“The only way it can be done is if there’s a sizeable amount of people on the island of Ireland, North and South, believe this is the way forward,” he said. “Fifty per cent plus one is not the way to do it. That would be a divisive thing to do. There’s no point having votes to find out that you’re 1 percent short or 1 percent over. That’s not the way to do it.”

Of course Bertie Ahern is no longer in a position to decide whether steps towards unity should be taken. In any event, nothing will happen for a decade, by which time he will be but a distant memory.

The corollary of this Ahern Doctrine is, of course, that if nationalists cannot have Irish unity even when they are a narrow majority, then unionists cannot have unfettered Britishness when they are a narrow majority. Hence, if unionists agree with Ahern's position, they must accept the progressive removal of the trappings of British rule as their majority gets smaller. After all, '50% plus one in favour of the union with Britain' is no more acceptable as a solution, presumably, than 50% plus one in favour of Irish re-unification.

Ahern also said that "the sooner we engage in the process of addressing Irish unity, in all its complexities, with all of its challenges, and the many opportunities it will present, the sooner the reality will occur.” Amen to that!

Mid Ulster District Council (2011 onwards)

The reorganisation of the current 26 district councils in Northern Ireland into 11 bigger councils in 2011 will present a modified political environment. As an aside to the series of blogs looking at some of the current districts, this blog looks forward to one of the new councils that will emerge. Mid Ulster District Council will be formed from the merger of the current Cookstown, Dungannon and Magherafelt districts. As we have previously looked at all three of these, it is easy to draw some conclusions about the new district by simply adding the statistics for the three components.

Elections

Thanks to the fact that Mid Ulster Council will comprise exactly the three old districts of Cookstown, Dungannon and Magherafelt, the strengths of unionism and nationalism can be accurately gauged, and the theoretical electoral history of the new council can even be projected backwards. In 2005, in the area covererd by the new council, nationalism received 59.5% of the vote, and unionism received 40.2%.

The graph below shows the votes received by the two blocks as a percentage of the valid poll, and of the electorate. While unionism appears to enjoy a brief resurgence in 2005, as we have seen in the posts on the the individual current districts, this is due to a decline in the nationalist turnout in 2005, as can be seen in the second graph below.

When the votes are looked at as a percentage of the total electorate, Unionism's share is in constant decline, dipping below 30% in 2005. The nationalist share is more volatile, but its trend is upward. In 2005 the nationalist turnout dipped, but if it picks up again in 2011 the national share of the votes cast may exceed 60%, and the unionist share may fall below 40%.

Demography

Based upon the 2001 census figures the council area had a population that is 61.0% Catholic, and 37.9% Protestant. However, because of the higher proportion of Catholics amongst the children, its electorate was 58.7% Catholic, and 40.5% Protestant. Given the passage of another decade between the census (2001) and the first election for Mid Ulster Council (2011), however, these figures will have moved further in favour of Catholics. The graphs below show the percentages of Catholics and Protestants at each age in the new district in 2001, and the absolute numbers at each age in 2001:

The group on the right hand side of the graph above (those over 80) are likely to be mostly dead by the time of the first election for Mid Ulster district council in 2011. This group is fairly evenly divided between Protestants and Catholics. However, it will be replaced in the electorate by the group that were teenagers in 2001, and as the graph above shows, they are mainly Catholic (65-70%). The electorate in 2011 should be even more Catholic, and thus nationalist, than in 2005.

Magherafelt District Council

For this, the third in a series of close examinations of the electoral and demographic situations of some of the 26 District Councils in Northern Ireland, we look at Magherafelt.

Magherafelt district comprises most of south County Derry (though the extreme south is in Cookstown district), and is divided into three District Electoral areas; Magherafelt Town, Sperrin and Moyola.


Elections

The graphs below show the breakdown of the percentage of the vote received by nationalists and unionists at each local election since 1985:



As seen elsewhere, There is a clear pattern shown by these two graphs of nationalist advance and unionist retreat. The unionist percentage of the overall vote in the district shows a fall from almost 45% at the start of the generation to around 35% at its end. This fall occurs in all three DEAs, and in two of the three the unionists lost the slight majority that they had in the 1980s.

The flattening out of the unionist decline in 2005, visible above, is due in Magherafelt as elsewhere, to a slight decline in turnout amongst nationalist voters. As the graph below shows, the unionist vote as a percentage of the electorate has been declining continuously since 1985.


Demography

What does the demography of the district tell us about its future and its past?

The graph below shows the percentage breakdown by religion (Catholic, Protestant, or none) by age in Magherafelt in 2001 (as recorded in the 2001 census; table s306, for the enthusiasts).

The fluctuations on the right hand side are unimportant, as they are caused by only a small number of people, so a few random deaths could change the balance:


This graph is sobering reading for unionists. It shows that Protestants are increasingly a minority at all ages below the very elderly. In fact, the only ages at which Protestants actually outnumber Catholics in Magherafelt are over 75. The children of those elderly people (aged approximately 45-50) are 60% Catholic, and their grandchildren are 70% Catholic.

The age/religion profile is here shown in absolute numbers:


The fluctuations in the numbers of Protestants in their 20s is interesting; it is probably caused by the presence of British soldiers in Magherafelt army base (now vacated, but still occupied in 2001) . The next census may not record these unusual peaks.

The numbers of Catholics who leave Magherafelt at age 18 is proportionately higher than the number of Protestants. This may reflect a greater commitment to third level education amongst Catholics.

Magheralt has moved from being a relatively evenly balanced area in the past, to one with an increasing Catholic majority. The last 60 years has seen a clear widening of the gap between the proportion of Protestants and Catholics born in Magherafelt each year and remaining there (Catholic birth rates may always have been higher than that apparent from the graph above, but Catholics may have had to emigrate).

The groups on the left of the graphs above are not yet all in the electorate. The census was a snapshot taken in 2001, which means that by now (2008) almost all of those aged 10 and over are likely to be voters, but a large proportion of those at the other end of the graph (that on the right) will have died. This represents the loss to the electorate of a group (the elderly) that is at least 50% Protestant, and the gain of a majority-Catholic group (the teenagers of the graph above, of whom around 70% are Catholic). There is no evidence in the graph that this situation will change very much in the years to come. Thus the proportion of the electorate that will be Catholic (and thus largely nationalist) will continue to increase. The nationalist vote as a percentage of the electorate (see graph above) is likely to continue to rise, while the unionist proportion of the vote continues to fall.

The electorate

In 2001, the population of Magherafelt that was aged 18 or over (i.e. potential voters) was 54923, of which 61.6% were Catholic, and 37.5% were Protestant.These figures are similar to the proportions that voted nationalist (64.1%) and Unionist (34.5%) in the 2001 local elections in the district; it seems, however, that in 2001 at least, nationalists came out to vote in greater numbers than normal.

The close correlation between religion and politics can provide some indication of the outcomes of future elections. An approximately equal number of the elderly will have died in both communities, but around 200 more Catholics than Protestants will have joined Magherafelt's electorate each year. By 2011, the date of the next local elections, this may mean that nationalism may have gained 2000 more new voters than unionism since the 2001 snapshot (though somewhat fewer additional votes, due to the turnout).

The future?

Catholic parents (roughly those in their mid-20s to mid-30s), who make up some 65% of their cohort, are having around 70% of the children. Their Protestant counterparts, some 35% of the cohort, are having barely 30% of the children. The fertility rate amongst Catholics is clearly higher than that amongst Protestants, and if this continues, it will ensure a constantly increasing Catholic proportion of the population.In 2011 Magherafelt District Council will disappear, to be merged with Dungannon and Cookstown in a new Mid-Ulster District:


We previously looked at both Cookstown and Dungannon, so we are now in a position to look at the likely shape of the new Mid Ulster Council, in a following blog post.