A UUP-Tory merger?

The leaders of the Ulster Unionist Party and the British Conservative Party have announced that they are to "explore the possibilities of closer cooperation leading to the creation of a new political and electoral force in Northern Ireland." Without actually stating that the two parties are to merge, the text of the announcement makes this the obvious conclusion.

The joint statement gushes with enthusiasm for the possibility that the new formation will give "all the people of Northern Ireland a means of becoming involved in the politics of the UK", and will be a clear signal "that Northern Ireland was moving on and becoming a ‘normal’ part of the UK … ".

Such a merger between a very minor provincial party with one MP and the resurgent 'government in waiting' looks quite one-sided. Clearly the Tories are keen to be seen to be more than just an English party, but what does this move promise for the UUP?

The statement hints at the UUP's hopes:

"The Conservative Party and Ulster Unionist Party want the support of all those who share our joint agenda and common vision, regardless of their religion, background, or whatever part of the UK they happen to reside in.

There are too many in Northern Ireland who have been put off playing any role (including voting) in politics by the vicious sectarian divisions of recent years."

The UUP still appears to believe that there are large numbers of 'garden-centre Prods' who can be brought back to the voting booths. In addition, they are still chasing the Holy Grail of unionism – the Catholic unionist. They know that the 'sectarian headcount' nature of Northern Irish politics is one that they are destined to lose, and many individual voices have been calling (usually in vain) for the UUP to 'de-sectarianise' itself in order to attract the potential Catholic votes it believes to be out there. As the UUP, it has always failed to do this. For every voice calling for a non-sectarian 'party of the union' there were ten or a hundred UUP members and politicians who could be counted on to say or do something clearly sectarian, and thus negate the effort. Now, it seems, the UUP think that by hitching their wagon to the Tories, they will miraculously become the non-sectarian party of (some of) their dreams. However, a change of name cannot in itself change the nature of the party. The UUP may start to call itself 'The Conservative Party', but it will have the same members, with the same attitudes and the same history as before. The party's Orange Order members will remain bigots and the petty sectarian attitudes of many others will not be removed by a brand makeover. The underlying hatreds of Northern Irish society will not be washed away overnight. What will become of the UUP members who have, over decades, conspired with the DUP to deny nationalists seats just because they were nationalists? What of those who shared platforms with loyalists, or voted for the PUP while the UVF was still actively murdering Catholics? What of the thousands of small-minded anti-Catholic, anti-nationalist, actions that the UUP's members are still remembered for?

The UUP has an irrational belief in the cathartic effect of a name-change. But while its senior members may feel close to the Tories, what of the rank and file? What of working-class unionists? Will they meekly vote for a right-wing party? Or, more likely, will they migrate en masse to the DUP?

The UUP is clinging to the Tories like a drowning man clings to a raft. It makes them feel safe, as if the support of a large party will shelter them from the electoral death that was almost certainly theirs. However, their interest in the Tories is subtly different from the Tories interest in them. For the UUP, the Tories are first and foremost a unionist party – the joint statement makes no reference to commonality of policy on other issues, it merely boasts that the merger will allow Northern Ireland to 'take part in all the national debates' and to 'be properly represented in the corridors of power'. The important policy commonality for the UUP is that of "shared values of support for the Union". It seems that other areas of policy – economic, social, educational, and international – are irrelevant. As long as the Tories support 'the union' the UUP will provide them with lobby-fodder in Westminster. The hopeful phrases about Northern Irish UUP/Tories having "the real prospect of assuming office as ministers in the government of the day at Westminster" is hugely unrealistic, but designed to make ambitious UUP members salivate.

The merger opens up a clear split between the two main unionist parties. By hitching their wagon to the Tories, the UUP are essentially returning to the integrationist policies of the Molyneaux era. The DUP, by contrast, are becoming more obviously 'Ulster-nationalist' and devolutionist. The DUP have no partners in Westminster (and thanks to Iris Robinson's anti-gay bigotry, probably never will) – they are a strictly Northern Irish party. The UUP seem to have turned their back on the devolution that their own party helped to create, in the expectation that a Tory win in the next Westminster election will exert a centripetal force, countering the centrifugal effects of the Labour government's experiments in devolution. If the UUP-Tory merger goes ahead, Northern Ireland will be faced with three different constitutional options: UK integrationism, devolution, and Irish nationalism.

The tone of the joint statement is carefully designed to promote one of unionism's myths – that the Good Friday Agreement represented the surrender of Irish nationalism, and the copper-fastening of the border. The statement talks as if Catholics have given up any hope of re-uniting Ireland, and are only waiting for a suitable way to integrate themselves into the "the mainstream of UK politics". Nowhere is any reference made to the fact that a large proportion of the people are Irish by culture, identity and legal status. No reference is made to cross-border policies or activities. The joint statement treats the border as of it were hermetically sealed and northern nationalists are locked forever, and without hope or expectation of eventual release, within the UK. This has been a unionist dream since the very start of partition, and while it may appeal to unionists in North Down or Antrim, it is incomprehensible to nationalists in Newry, Fermanagh, Tyrone, Derry, south Armagh, and other areas where the south is just a continuation and extension of their normal lives.

So what will become of the UUP-Tory merger? It will probably be a minor success among middle-class unionists in the greater Belfast region. They will win some Council seats in 2011, and probably retain Sylvia Hermon's Westminster seat in North Down in 2010. But the strains will start to show when faced with tribal rivalries – what position, for instance, with the UUP/Tories take in Fermanagh-South Tyrone? Will they 'stand aside' in tribal solidarity with the DUP, or will they fight the seat as a 'new force'? There are many such hazards ahead, and it is clear that the UUP/Tories will fail at some of them, and its shiny new image may start to show its real colours. In the short term, though, it is likely that tribal unionist voters – the majority outside greater Belfast – will probably turn to the DUP as their true saviours. Within the Belfast Pale the UUP/Tories will have to fight the Alliance Party for votes, and while they may take votes from Alliance, the overall unionist share of the cake will continue to shrink. On the other hand, UUP members who are not natural Tories (the last remaining 'liberal unionists') may in fact go over to Alliance, so the effect may be limited.

Unionists in general are usually attracted to the thought of British parties establishing themselves in Northern Ireland. They see the growth of such 'third force' groups as having the possibility to take support from both unionism and nationalism – but being British, the 'third forces' would, by definition, be small-u unionist. Such moves are welcomed by unionists as a way of getting Catholics to vote for unionism. But they have never worked. What usually happens is that an enthusiastic group of people (mostly ex-unionist) vote for them, but they quickly decline into insignificance. The last attempt by the British Tories to establish themselves in Northern Ireland went exactly that way. Will this attempt be any more successful? Probably not – the UUP may re-brand themselves, but they will remain what they are, and who they are, and if the Tories get their expected majority in Westminster in 2010, the little UUP with its one seat will be a irrelevance to them.

Arlene Foster's contempt for the electorate

Following the death of Councillor Joe Dodds, and the inability of the Council to agree to aa co-option, a by-election is to be held in the Enniskillen DEA of Fermanagh District Council. The DUP (Dodds' party) wanted to co-opt a young student called Thomas Hogg, but the leader of the UUP group on the Council disagreed and thus forced the by-election. The reason the UUP gave was that Hogg was an inappropriate choice.

Logically, therefore, one would expect that Hogg would be the DUP's candidate in the by-election – after all, he was their choice for co-option. However, at the DUP's selection meeting on Monday 21 July, Hogg was not chosen. Instead, the DUP chose Arlene Foster MLA, and Minister for Enterprise, Trade and Investment in the Executive.

To stand in a District Council by-election!

The choice of Arlene Foster as candidate demonstrates the complete contempt with which the DUP treats the electorate.

• Firstly, because Foster is already an MLA and a Minister – she clearly has neither the interest nor the time to be getting involved in local politics. There is no way that she would be, could be, or intends to be, a fully functioning District Councillor.
• Secondly, because she is being brought in simply to fight the election for reasons much wider than Enniskillen or Fermanagh. The DUP is just using this by-election as an opportunity to beat the UUP, without any real interest in the needs of Enniskillen.
• Thirdly, because the DUP already tried to co-opt Hogg. If he was good enough to be co-opted, then why is he not good enough to be elected? The DUP know that he was an inadequate choice, but thought that he could be slipped in quietly by co-option to give his political career a start. They knew that he could not get elected, as he lacks any political skills or experience. In other words, he was being co-opted for party reasons, not for the good of the people of Enniskillen.
• Fourthly, by selecting Foster instead of Hogg, the DUP are now admitting that the UUP were correct in rejecting Hogg for co-option. And yet the DUP have not apologised or retracted any of the venom that they directed at the UUP for their refusal to co-opt Hogg.
• Fifthly, Foster was already elected as a councillor for Enniskillen in 2005, but resigned her seat in order to give her the time to pursue her Stormont career. If she did not have to resign then, why did she do it? If she has now the time to be a Councillor, MLA and Minister, then why did she resign before?

Foster is being brought in for this minor by-election, one for a position well below that which she currently holds, purely because she is a popular Enniskillen-based politician, and the DUP are terrified of another Dromore-style failure. They want to exploit her undoubted popularity amongst unionists to score a symbolic victory over the UUP, and probably also the TUV, in one of the last elections before next year's European Parliament election.

A failure to beat the other unionist parties would seriously dent the DUP's standing. But there is another, greater risk. The electorate of Enniskillen is split almost half-and-half between unionists and nationalists. If the unionists fight a bitter fight, and thus fail to transfer between their candidates, there is a real possibility that the seat will go to Sinn Féin.

And does it really matter who wins the seat? The simple answer is 'no'. Fermanagh District Council has a clear nationalist majority, and this by-election will not change that. At present there are 14 nationalist members (7 Sinn Féin, 5 SDLP, and two ex-Sinn Féin independents) and 8 unionist members (5 UUP, 3 DUP), and the vacant seat. If the DUP succeed in winning the seat, then the Council reverts to the status quo ante (14 nationalist/9 unionist). If Sinn Féin take the seat, then the nationalist majority increases slightly.

Educational Migration and Non-Return in Northern Ireland

The title above is a fancy way of saying 'brain-drain'. It is also the title of a recently published report from the Equality Commission for Northern Ireland, which looks at the area previously covered by this blog here:

27 March 2007: Protestant brain drain?
04 June 2007: Getting to grips with the [Protestant] brain drain
21 June 2007: They must be getting REALLY worried ... !
12 June 2008: C'mon over ... but not 'up'

In essence, the new report adds little to the debate on the Protestant brain-drain. It repeats some known statistics, and makes a plea for 'further research'. In a nutshell, it notes that:

- Protestants comprise a disproportionate amount of those leaving NI to study in Great Britain (GB). In 2005/06, 29% of NI domiciled under-graduate students migrated to GB to study, with the proportion of Protestants to Catholics leaving NI being around 1.5 to 1. Some 34% of Protestants leave, compared to 23% of Catholics and 49% of ‘Others’.

- In NI Higher Educational Institutions, Catholics make up 60% of students

- Following graduation, most students in the UK tend to remain in the region of their HE institution. For NI domiciled students, regardless of university attended, 81% are located in NI six months following graduation. Data indicate that of the 29% of NI domiciled undergraduate students in GB, six months after graduation some 19% are still in GB; this suggests that a net 10% of NI domiciles return to NI following graduation.

So, nothing new – Protestant kids are more likely to go to Britain to university, leaving the universities in Northern Ireland more Catholic than normal. The majority of the (disproportionately Protestant) students who go to Britain, do not come back. So the proportion of Catholics in 'graduate level' jobs in Northern Ireland is higher than the general population at that age. A 'greening' of the professions, so to speak.

For those who do not wish to read all 105 pages of this rehash of previously published facts, there is also an accompanying 8-page Research Update which tells you all you need to know.

Election Results 1973–2007

The Electoral Office for Northern Ireland has recently put scans of all of the election results (except by-elections) that have taken place in Northern Ireland since 1973 on their web site. This is a treasure trove of detail for election-watchers which complements Nicholas White's impressive site on Northern Ireland elections.

Although no fault of the Electoral Office, the results can sometimes be hard to read, as the earlier ones are written by hand, and not always clearly. In addition, the early results give only the surname of the candidates, and not the given names, so it is not always clear who is who. By 1975, though, the Electoral Office had invested in a typewriter, and thereafter things get clearer. Download speed can be slow, as some of the files are large.

Fair Employment Monitoring Report No. 17

Northern Ireland is one of the most weighed and measured regions in the world. Numerous agencies collect and publish statistics on all sorts of things. In addition to the 'normal' state data collection, the 'community' (read 'religious') division in Northern Ireland requires additional data to be collected concerning the religion (or not) of every employee, and the tough equal opportunities legislation in place calls for detailed data concerning almost all areas of society.

The benefit of this, of course, is that we have a great deal of information on the composition of Northern Irish society, and how that composition is evolving. The Equality Commission for Northern Ireland is responsible for publishing huge amounts of this information, amongst which are annual analyses of the composition of the labour force – the Fair Employment Monitoring Reports, of which no 17 is the latest (Summary here). This includes information on the religious evolution of the labour force from 1990 to 2006, and it makes very interesting reading. It is worth repeating that the period covered is only 16 years, which is barely a blink of the eye of history. And yet, even during this blink of the eye, the evolution is remarkable. The report deals separately with various parts of the workforce; public, private, male, female, part-time, full-time, and so on, but the overall evolution is captured well in one image:

[image removed temporarily]

The period from 1990 to 2006 is one in which the economy of Northern Ireland recovered somewhat, the war/troubles came to an end, and equality laws were strengthened. So the starting point in 1990 may not truly represent the actual breakdown of the workforce at that time. It could be that, as Catholic rates of unemployment have fallen, the proportion of Catholics in the workforce has risen. However, unemployment had fallen to quite a low level somewhere by the middle of the series, and yet the Catholic proportion still kept rising. The graph above shows just Catholics and Protestants – the 'not stated' and others are temporarily ignored – but it is nonetheless striking.

It seems that what the Equality Commission is recording is the extremely rapid (in historical terms) increase in the Catholic proportion of the workforce, and by extension in the general population. A rise of 8.2% in the Catholic proportion of the workforce over 16 years, bringing it to only 6.9% short of a majority, implies that parity may be only a decade away. And after parity, there is no reason to think that the evolution will stop. We know, for example, that more school kids are Catholic than Protestant, and that more Protestant students go to university in Britain and do not come back. As older workers (majority Protestant) retire, they will be replaced by younger (majority Catholic) entrants to the workforce.

The timing of the tipping of the balance in the workforce is remarkably close to that of the electorate (see here). It seems that the 20-teens are going to be a traumatic decade for unionism. In addition to the realisation that its days of majority in its self-carved statelet are over, unionism will have to face a plethora of centenaries, all of which will remind us of the unfinished business of national reunification and independence; 2014 (Home Rule Act), 2016 (Easter Rising), 2018 (General Election), 2019 (First Dáil), and so on.

The 2007 balance sheet – Part 2 (New Voters)

Having pointed out in Part 1 how unionism suffered a net loss in 2007 of some 4,556 potential voters due to deaths (although, thanks to turn-out rates the actual loss of votes only amounts to some 2,820), this second part of the 2007 Balance Sheet will examine the new voters that the two main political blocks can expect to gain as voters reach their 18th birthdays.

This is fairly easy, as the people who turned 18 in 2007 will largely be those who were 12 in 2001, when the Census recorded their religions (in Table S305: Age By Sex And Community Background (Religion Or Religion Brought Up In)). Migration may also play a small part, but since 18 year-olds who move (to university, for instance) tend to remain registered at their home address, if they vote at all, it is likely to be in the same place that they lived as children.

The religious break-down of 12 year-olds in 2001 was as follows:

Catholic – 13,352 (50.6%), Protestant – 11,941 (45.2%), other religion or none – 1,110 (4.2%).

So around 26,403 new voters came of age in 2007. For 1,110 of them no real conclusions can be drawn (more's the pity), but for the vast majority this blog's working hypothesis (reminder: that (constitutional) political preferences in the north of Ireland are very closely related to religious affiliation) tends to indicate a net gain for nationalism of 1,411.

If we combine these figures with the figures previously given in Part 1, we can calculate a rough balance sheet for 2007, taking the votes in the 2007 Assembly election, adding the new voters and subtracting the deaths. However, some allowance must be made both for the actual turnout rates, and for the different turnout rates of younger and older people. While no data on this has been published for Northern Ireland, there are a number of studies that show that older people are very likely to vote (in the order of 85%), while younger people have turnout rates of barely over 50%. It is difficult to extrapolate for Northern Ireland, a very politicised society, from, for example, the UK where youthful disaffection is massive. Nonetheless, turnout in Northern Ireland is also dropping quite fast. Taking these factors into account, this analysis will assume a turnout rate of 80% for the older voters, and 50% for new voters.

(1) Nationalism
2007 Assembly election: 293,767 (42.6% of the total)
Plus - New voters: 13,352 x 50% = 6,676
Minus - Deaths (voting age only): 4,874 x 80% = 3,899
New total: 296,544

(2) Unionism
2007 Assembly election: 335,888 votes (48.7% of the total)
Plus - New voters: 11,941 x 50% = 5,970
Minus - Deaths (voting age only): 9,517 x 80% = 7,614
New total: 334,244

(3) Others or no religion
2007 Assembly election: 60,658 votes (8.8% of the total)
Plus - New voters: 1,110 x 50% = 555
Minus - Deaths (voting age only): 145 x 80% = 116
New total: 61,097

At the end of 2007, therefore, we might expect a voting electorate of 691,885, of whom:
– 296,544 will vote nationalist (42.9%)
– 334,244 will vote unionist (48.3%)
– 61,097 will vote for other candidates (8.8%)

The gap between nationalism and unionism, 42,121 votes in the 2007 Assembly election, would be reduced to 37,700, representing a reduction in this gap of 4,421. In only one year, therefore, unionism would have lost over 10% of its numerical superiority over nationalism.

In Part 1 of the balance sheet we estimated that unionism had barely 15 years of numerical superiority left. However, Part 1 did not take into account either the new voters coming on to the register, or the different turnout rates amongst younger and older voters. Once these factors are added, the life expectancy of unionism's numerical superiority over nationalism reduces to less than 10 years.

The 2007 balance sheet – Part 1 (Deaths)

This blog believes quite strongly that (constitutional) political preferences in the north of Ireland are very closely related to religious affiliation. In short, most Protestants are unionists, and most Catholics are nationalists.

The relative sizes of the two main political blocks (unionist and nationalist) can therefore be judged, between elections, by the relative sizes of the two main religious blocks (Protestant and Catholic).

Changes in any population are basically caused by four elements; the size of the population at the start; births; deaths; and migration. In the case of Northern Ireland, the religious or political affiliations of migrants cannot be known until they vote, so we are left with only the 'natural increase' (births less deaths) to examine.

As regards deaths, NISRA have recently published their Press Notice on deaths in 2007, which helpfully provides the actual number of deaths for each age band (in Table 3). Combining this with the results of the 2001 Census (Table S305: Age By Sex And Community Background (Religion Or Religion Brought Up In)), and moving the 2001 cohorts forward to more closely match their actual ages in 2007, it is possible to estimate the religious (and thus political) affiliations of the deceased people, and thereby to estimate the relative losses for each of the main political blocks.

The result is as follows. Of the 14,649 deaths in 2007, around 4,972 are likely to have been Catholic, 9,517 Protestant, and 159 'other' or no religion. From a political perspective, of course, only voters matter, so if we take only those of voting age, around 4,874 were Catholic, 9,430 Protestant, and 145 'other' or no religion.

So, in the course of one year – 2007 – unionism lost 4,556 more potential votes than nationalism through death.

In the 2007 Assembly elections unionism won 335,888 votes (48.7% of the total), to nationalism's 293,767 (42.6% of the total). The gap between the two main blocks was therefore 42,121 votes.

In the 2007 Assembly election the turn-out was only 61.9%, so the 4,556 potential votes probably represented only 2,820 actual votes (61.9% x 4,556). However, at this rate of attrition unionism has barely 15 more years of numerical superiority (42,121/2,820), and this is even before the question of new voters is examined (that will be done in The 2007 balance sheet – Part 2, to follow later). However, older voters are much more likely to vote than young ones, and the proportion of Protestants (and thus unionists) amongst the old is much higher than amongst the young. Thus the real loss to unionism may be higher than 2,820 votes per year, and thus unionism's life-expectancy may be less than 15 years.

Wedding bells

NISRA has released its very detailed data on the marriages that took place in 2007 in Northern Ireland. As always, there are plenty of figures that can be interpreted in different ways, but there are also some that are quite unambiguous.

Of the 6,132 religious marriages in 2007, 52.6% were Catholic; 19% Presbyterian (including Free Presbyterian), 16% Church of Ireland, 3% Methodist and 9% ‘Other denominations’. This represents yet another small increase in the proportion that were Catholic (in 2006 it was 52.1%), and brings the Catholic percentage to its highest ever level. The corresponding proportions of Presbyterian, Church of Ireland, and Methodist marriages continued to decline.

The proportion of marriages that were religious remained quite stable compared with 2006: 70.6% in 2007, 70.4% in 2006. So the proportion of all marriages that was Catholic rose somewhat. The religions (if any) of those people who married in civil ceremonies is not recorded, so no concrete conclusions can be drawn.

However, the marriage statistics are prima facie evidence that the proportion of Catholics amongst those of 'marrying age' is increasing. Average marrying age is also shown in the NISRA Press Notice: 33 for men, 31 for women.

A few interesting nuggets contained in the last few tables of the Press Notice may provide some food for thought:

Of the 8,687 marriages, Northern Ireland was the normal place of residence of both bride and groom in 7,369 cases. Maybe, one might say, a Northern Irish person is marrying someone from outside, who may then come to live in Northern Ireland. But what can be made of the 596 marriages where both bride and groom are resident 'elsewhere in the UK'? Or the 218 where both bride and groom are resident in the south? In 9.4% of the marriages, therefore, neither bride nor groom lives in Northern Ireland! Is Northern Ireland experiencing a kind of 'wedding tourism'? Or are these marriages of Northern Irish émigrés who come home to marry, but not to live? The latter would seem to be the case, as the Press Notice also helpfully provides details of the place of birth of those marrying. For example, while there are 596 marriages of two people each resident 'elsewhere in the UK', there are only 120 marriages of two people each born 'elsewhere in the UK'.

So it appears that the marriage statistics cannot be used as an accurate measure of the breakdown of the actual resident population in Northern Ireland.

Jim Allister's blind spot

Jim Allister, TUV MEP, is reported as arguing for the UK to withdraw from the EU because it is a net contributor to the EU budget.

"How much longer are we going to go on pouring millions into the black hole that is Brussels, before it is realised that we'd be better off out?", he asked.

Poor Jim appears not to realise that in a Union there are contributors and beneficiaries – that is the nature of such an organisation. It is the same in families, where parents work and children consume, or in countries where one region is rich and another poor.

If Allister's position is that a country should only stay in a union if it is a recipient, then his mathematics is very shoddy, and his solidarity non-existent. The logic of his position is that he should be calling for Britain to withdraw from Northern Ireland, as it is currently 'pouring billions into the black hole that is Northern Ireland', and would certainly be better off out.

He would argue that Northern Ireland is part of the UK. But then, isn't the UK part of the EU?

Fermanagh District Council, Enniskillen DEA – by-election

Following the death of Joe Dodds, a district councillor for Enniskillen DEA in Fermanagh (and father of Nigel Dodds, currently Finance Minister in the Executive), the District Council were last night unable to agree to a co-option, and must now proceed to a by-election.

A co-option is basically an agreement by all the other members of the Council that the party of the deceased member can pick his or her replacement, and nobody will stand in their way. Given the fraught state of Northern Irish politics such an agreement would always have been difficult to get. Some observers, however, believed that the circumstances of the vacancy (the death of Joe Dodds) should have allowed his party, the DUP, to co-opt a replacement. But it seems that the UUP disagreed, and so there will be an election.

The timetable for the by-election in Enniskillen is slightly flexible, within legal limits set out in the Electoral Law Act (Northern Ireland) 1962:

• Last night the council failed to choose a person to fill the "casual vacancy", and so the clerk of the council must, within 7 days of the meeting, notify the Chief Electoral Officer of this; i.e. by 14 July.
• Publication of the notice of election must take place within 21 days from the date on which the "casual vacancy" is deemed to have occurred; i.e. by 28 July at the latest.
• Delivery of nomination papers takes place "on two consecutive days, the second of which shall not be earlier than the 4th day, nor later than the 7th day after the day of publication of the notice of election"; i.e. by 4 August at the latest.
• And polling must take place on a day "which shall not be earlier than the 18th nor later than the 21st day after the last day for delivery of nomination papers", i.e. between 22 and 25 August, if all other steps occur at their latest date.

These are the maximum periods. The timetable can be shortened if the council notifies the Chief Electoral Officer immediately, or if the notice of election is published in less than 21 days from notification.

As this blog previously pointed out, although Enniskillen has slightly more unionists than nationalists (48.6% to 46.7%), the election will be extremely interesting, and may lead to surprises.

Issues that will play a part include:

• The opinion of local unionists to the DUP's agreement to share power with Sinn Féin.
• The vote that Traditional Unionist Voice will receive, if it stands.
• Who will stand for the various parties (the DUP's large share of the vote in 2005 was thanks largely to Arlene Foster, who cannot stand again)
• Whether there will be a split in the unionist vote sufficient to result in Sinn Féin winning the seat.
• Whether the changing demographics of Enniskillen will lead to a nationalist majority in the DEA (no guarantee of the seat, of course - that would depend upon the transfers).
• Whether Sinn Féin will suffer from the recent resignation of Bernice Swift.
• Whether the SDLP will recover from its recent decline to pose a credible threat to Sinn Féin for the nationalist vote.

This blog will follow this election with interest.

Anger management?

The reaction of unionists to almost everything that they do not like is to lash out. The media is full of headlines like:

Fury over INLA display at funeral
Orange fury over Belfast march restrictions
Fury over PM's £6m for Irish language
Sinn Fein slammed for laurel wreath plan
Sinn Fein attacked over 'brinkmanship'
DUP fury at 'savage attack' by Sir Reg

Jim Allister, TUV MEP, excels at blasting and slamming:

Allister blasts sanitisation of IRA
Allister slams Executive over Crossnacreevy blunder
Allister slams Executive over water rates for Orange Halls and Churches
Allister lashes DARD over fishing fuel crisis
Allister slams Absentee MPs in Abortion votes
Allister pummels de Brun in Strasbourg

But his old colleagues in the DUP can do a bit of slamming themselves, too:

Dodds slams Parades Commission Chairman over Parade Ruling
Spratt slams failure of PSNI to tackle burglary in South Belfast
DUP anger at new Portglenone group

Unionists in general have been angry for years, about all sorts of things:

Unionist anger at calls to rewrite history and call the Troubles a war
Unionist anger at Finucane inquiry
Unionist anger over wearing of 'Old IRA' medal
Unionist anger at axing of over half North's police reserves
Unionist anger at ruling on flowers
Unionist fury at Dublin veto on Queen

And on, and on, and on ….

It seems that unionists are the Mr Angry's of northern Irish politics. They lash out, slam and blast, when things don't go their own way, like children in a tantrum.

But this is perhaps a natural reaction. One of the current theories of the grief process suggests that "whenever one's identity and social order face the possibility of destruction, there is a natural tendency to feel angry, frustrated, helpless, and/or hurt. The volatile reactions of terror, hatred, resentment, and jealousy are often experienced as emotional manifestations of these feelings".

So perhaps non-unionists should feel sympathy rather than annoyance at the stream of 'anger' and 'fury' stories coming out of unionism. It is, after all, only their way of coping with the inevitable and progressive destruction of their political world.