Monday 7 June 2010
UUP selecting Assembly candidates
Nowhere in the report on the process is there even a hint about whether the UUP will again fight the election in partnership with the Tories, or whether that embarrassing and failed experiment is now firmly in the past.
Given the paucity of talent that the Tory part of UCUNF managed to contribute in May, it would be interesting to see if they could find anyone better next year.
Some Tory hopefuls will undoubtedly wish the UCUNF 'joint-selection' process to be used, and for the candidates to then stand as 'UCUNF' candidates – otherwise, standing as Tories, they would have almost no chance of being elected to the Assembly. But perhaps the UUP, still the overwhelming majority of the partnership, have decided that the Tories are more of a hindrance than a help.
Thursday 3 June 2010
The 'west' – 40 years a-greening
A series of comparable elections – from 1973 to 2005 – allows us to look closely at the political evolution of the district council areas, which have remained largely unchanged. For the purposes of this blog 'the west' will be considered to be the area covered by Cookstown, Derry, Dungannon, Fermanagh, Limavady, Magherafelt, Omagh and Strabane districts – for which the results of the nine elections from 1973 to 2005 are available.

Caveats:
- 'The west' is not, of course, the west – that starts on the other side of the Shannon, but for this blog's purposes the term will be used for the western half of Northern Ireland.
- Whether Derry and Limavady are 'the west', or the north-west is a matter of judgement. The blog includes them.
- For some early elections candidates stood under a variety of labels, or as independents. Where possible, they (and their voters) have been considered to be unionist, nationalist or neither on the basis of later political affiliations, or if the patterns are clear, from the transfers of votes to or from them.
- The further back in time one looks, the less clear the picture. For the last few elections, though, the mist has cleared somewhat and the figures are thus more reliable.
Firstly, in terms of the share of the vote that the two main blocks received:
In 1973 – hard though it is now to believe it – unionism polled more votes in the west of Northern Ireland than nationalism did. This has changed steadily, and by 2005 the balance was clearly in nationalism's favour (almost 2 to 1).
At the same time nationalism has seen its share of the electorate rise from 30% to 45%. Whether this is due to demographic increase in its 'natural' community (i.e. Catholics) or its ability to attract the votes of those who voted for centre or independent candidates in the past is immaterial – both types of recruits contribute to the 'greening' of the electorate.
The nationalist population is growing – as the demographic figures predict that it should – and the unionist population is stagnant or shrinking, as its birth rate barely matches its death rate. Neither of these factors is likely to change much in the next few years, so the 'greening' of the 'west' ought to continue. Whether there will be another local election using the same boundaries is, however, less certain.
(Sources: readers can find the full unedited results of all elections since 1973 on the Electoral Office web site at: http://www.eoni.org.uk/index/elections/election-results-1973-onwards.htm. Edited and commented (though sometimes incorrect) versions are to be found on Nicholas Whyte's site at: http://www.ark.ac.uk/elections)
Fermanagh questions
"… doesn't the fact that the Nationalist and Unionist populations of Fermanagh have voted in more or less equal numbers since Partition rather undermine the idea of a fast-growing Nationalist population? Or to put it another way, why hasn't Fermanagh greened like the rest of the West?"
The Fermanagh part of the constituency shows a very clear period of nationalist under-voting, just like the figures for for the whole Westminster constituency. But Dungannon Borough does not show such a period of under-voting. There are electoral influences at work in Fermanagh that appear to be unique to that county.
The period of nationalist under-voting in Fermanagh is evident from the graph below, which shows the results of the nine district council elections from 1973 to 2005:
It is clear, thus, that the withdrawal of large number of nationalists from active involvement in politics was not limited to Westminster, following the traumas of the Hunger Strikes and Bobby Sands election. Many also withdrew from voting in district council elections during the same period.
In 2001, however, they returned to the ballot boxes, in the local elections as in the Westminster elections, and the numerical superiority of the nationalist community was demonstrated again.
What shows the 'greening' of Fermanagh more than the fluctuations of the nationalist vote is the steady decline in the unionist vote after 1989. The unionist vote as a share of the electorate was fairly constant from 1973 to 1989, at around 38%. After 1989, though, it has fallen in every election and by 2005 was just over 31%. At the current rate oif decline it would be below 30% when the next elections are held. This steep decline is a combination of two factors: a general reduction in the turnout rate, and a numerical decline in the number of unionist voters in the county.
Turnout in 1989 was 80%, but in 2005 it was 73.1% - a falling away of 8.6% of the voters (calculated as: (80-73.1)/80). If it is assumed that both communities suffered a decline in voter motivation, than their shares of the electorate should have declined by around the same 8.6% - but unionism's share declined by 19.6%.
Nationalism's share actually increased by 10.9% over the same period, but 1989 is a bad starting point as it fell within the period of nationalist withdrawal. However, even compared with its high-point in 1981 the nationalist share has declined by only 5.3%, while turnout since 1981 had dropped by 13.4% (it was 84.4% in 1981) – implying a real increase in the nationalist share.
Using the share of the electorate is a more accurate measure than using share of the actual vote, because a community's share of the electorate is not dependent upon the ebbs and flows of the other community. The drop in the unionist share of the electorate represents a fall in the unionist share of the electorate and/or its interest in voting. The fact that the drop in the unionist share is far greater than the overall fall in turnout implies strongly that its underlying share of the electorate is dropping.
To answer the original question, therefore, the nationalist and unionist populations of Fermanagh appear, since 1989 at least, to be diverging quite quickly. The unionist share of the county's population appears to be shrinking – as the demographic figures suggest – and the nationalist share appears to be increasing – as the demographic figures also suggest. Fermanagh is 'greening' like the rest of the west – perhaps at a different speed and in its own way – but that is, of course, typical of Fermanagh.
Wednesday 2 June 2010
Curious and curiouser
Grassroots Unionists are crying out for closer co-operation within Unionism. Jim Allister represents the divisions of the past. Grassroots Unionists want to see Northern Ireland moving forward. TUV wants to take us back to being sidelined and ignored in our own country. TUV supporters handed Fermanagh and South Tyrone to Gildernew: that was the TUV contribution to Unionism in the recent election.Given that the TUV did not stand in FST – and explicitly called on unionists to unite where seats were closely contested with nationalism – this is a strange claim.
How precisely could ‘TUV supporters have handed Fermanagh and South Tyrone to Gildernew’? It can be fairly safely assumed that none voted for her, so Foster must be alluding to the question of turnout. The only possible explanation of her remark is that she believes that TUV supporters stayed at home, rather than vote for the ‘unionist unity’ candidate – who was not even a member of Foster’s own party.
But turnout was quite low by FST standards across the board. If TUV supporters stayed at home, then so did DUP and UUP supporters – so how can Foster accuse the TUV of particular complicity?
Foster may, of course, simply be trying to distract attention from her own party’s responsibility for the lower turnout. But pushing for a ‘unionist unity’ candidate Foster, Elliott, and both of their parties, ensured that some unionists felt uncomfortable voting for the chosen ‘unionist champion’. For some, he came too close to being seen as a sectarian ‘Protestant’ champion. Of course, it is very likely that Michelle Gildernew would have won in any event, had there been competition on the unionist side. But having conspired to pull a ‘stroke’ – and failed – Foster may be looking for a weak scapegoat.
The TUV have been quick to respond to Foster, saying that:
The facts are clear. We were the first party to call for non-party candidate.It looks as if the intra-unionist bitterness and rivalry will continue for the time being – and probably as far as next year’s two major elections. This is, as has frequently been noted, a gift to nationalism – so this blog is pleased to note the resumption of normal relations between the DUP and the TUV.
Indeed, at that point Mrs Foster was still strutting around promoting herself as the DUP candidate. TUV kept out of the contest in Fermanagh and South Tyrone and called repeatedly for our supporters to vote for the unity candidate. Mrs Foster’s dishonest attempt to smear TUV, therefore, does not stand up to scrutiny.
Monday 31 May 2010
Fermanagh and South Tyrone – the story of a Westminster constituency
Although it is relatively rare for such a review to be requested, it is not surprising that it is FST that is the subject.
FST is a closely contested constituency, and has been one since its creation in 1948.
The first election in the new constituency was on 23 February 1950, and FST quickly established its exceptionality by recording a turnout rate record – 92.1%. The election was a straight battle between the veteran nationalist Cahir Healy (who stood as an abstentionist) and the unionist Lieutenant-Colonel Henry Richardson. Healy won, with 32,188 votes (51.9%) to Richardson's 29,877 (48.1%).
In 1951 another Westminster election was held, on 25 October 1951, and Healy won again – against the unionist candidate Frederick Patterson. Healy received 32,717 votes (52.1%) and
Patterson received 30,082 (47.9%). FST broke its own turnout record, with 93.4% of the electorate voting.
Sinn Féin contested the Westminster election that was held on 26 May 1955, and won – but with a smaller vote than Healy had previously received. Philip Clarke (SF) won 30,529 votes (50.2%) against the unionist candidate Colonel Robert Grosvenor who received 30,268 votes (49.8%). The turnout dropped to a still-remarkable 92.4%.
Clarke was a controversial candidate, having been captured less than a year earlier in an IRA raid on Omagh barracks (in a pre-operation for the planned border campaign). Clarke was declared ineligible due to his imprisonment and the Unionist runner-up was declared elected without a by-election.
The IRA's Operation Harvest (aka the border campaign) started in 1956, and would continue until 1962. It was a military failure, but a political disaster. The Westminster election held during the campaign, on 8 October 1959, saw Sinn Féin being wiped out in FST. Grosvenor, the sitting unionist (who had received the seat following the exclusion of Philip Clarke in 1955) received 32,080 votes (81.4%), while Sinn Féin's candidate, James Martin received a paltry 7,348 votes (18.6%). Although the turnout rate (61.6%) implied that most nationalists simply boycotted the election, Grosvenor actually received votes equivalent to more than 50% of the entire electorate – the first and only time such a thing has happened in FST, and implying that some nationalists had actually voted for a unionist in an apparent emphatic rejection of the IRA's campaign. It would be 1970 before the nationalist vote in FST would fully recover.
The next Westminster election, on 15 October 1964, came after the end of the border campaign, but the voters had not yet forgiven Sinn Féin. The new unionist candidate, James Hamilton received 30,010 votes (55.1%), while the Sinn Féin candidate Aloysius Molloy – who, since Sinn Féin was by then a proscribed organisation, called himself simply 'republican' – received 16,138 votes (29.6%). For the first time in FST 'other' candidates stood: Giles Fitzherbert (Liberal) got 6,006 votes (11.0%) and Baptist W Gamble (NILP) got 2,339 (4.3%). The turnout, still respectable, dropped to 85.9%.
By 1966, FST had already started to innovate with 'unity' candidates. In the Westminster election on 31 March 1966 the first such candidate – on the nationalist side – JJ Donnelly, managed to get beaten by the unionist incumbent James Hamilton, who got 29,352 votes (54.0%) to Donnelly's 14,645 votes (26.9%). Donnelly's score was not helped by the fact that he was not the only nationalist in the race (despite his description): a certain Ruairí Ó Brádaigh stood as a 'republican' (i.e. Sinn Féin), and got 10,370 votes (19.1%). Already chief of staff of the IRA, he would go on to become president of Sinn Féin and of his own Republican Sinn Féin party.
In 1970 the nationalist tactic of standing a 'unity' candidate finally paid off. Eight years after the end of the border campaign, the whole 'nationalist' (aka Catholic) electorate was prepared again to vote for a nationalist candidate. On 18 June 1970 Frank McManus, standing for Unity, received 32,813 votes (51.1%), beating the unionist incumbent, James Hamilton who got 31,390 votes (48.9%). The turnout rose again, to 91.2%.
However, as so often in FST, there were swings and roundabouts. In 1974 the new SDLP, buoyed by its success in the 1973 Assembly elections, contested the constituency, splitting the vote and letting the UUP candidate take the seat.
On 28 February 1974 Harry West, standing for the UUP-UUUC got 26,858 votes (43.6%), while Frank McManus got only 16,229 votes (26.3%). Denis Haughey, for the SDLP, got 15,410 votes (25.0%), and Hubert Brown, standing as a Pro-Assembly Unionist, got 3,157 votes (5.1%). McManus went on to become one of the founding members of the Irish Independence Party (IIP) in 1977.
But, remember those swings and roundabouts. A second election was held in 1974, on 10 October 1974, and this time the SDLP seems to have learned something, because they didn't stand. Instead nationalism found another unity candidate, Frank Maguire, who won the seat back with 32,795 votes (51.8%). Harry West received 30,285 votes (47.9%), which was about the limit of the unionist electorate in the constituency. Alan Evans for the Communist Party of Ireland got 185 votes (0.3%).
Frank Maguire was re-elected at the next election, on 3 May 1979, despite the intervention again of an SDLP candidate. Luckily for Maguire, the unionist vote was also split. He got 22,398 votes (36.0%), followed by the UUP's Raymond Ferguson on 17,411 votes (28.0%), Austin Currie, standing as 'Independent SDLP' on 10,785 votes (17.3%), Ernest Baird for the UUUP on 10,607 votes (17.0%), and, for the first time, an Alliance Party candidate, Peter Acheson on 1,070 votes (1.7%)
Maguire died in 1981 – at probably the most (in)convenient moment possible – right in the middle of the IRA/INLA hunger strikes. The rest is history – but is still fresh and raw in FST. Bobby Sands stood from his hospital bed, and won the seat, providing an immense boost to republican morale, and a huge propaganda victory for Sinn Féin. Much of the bitterness in the constituency's elections dates from this moment.
On 9 April 1981 the by-election was held to replace Frank Maguire. Sands, standing as an Anti-H-Block/Armagh Political Prisoner candidate (but, as a convicted IRA-man, clearly a republican), and received 30,493 votes (51.2%). The UUP candidate (and former short-lived MP in 1974), Harry West got 29,046 votes (49.8%). The SDLP chose not to stand, and with a turnout of 86.9%, its supporters clearly voted for Sands.
What is especially curious about this result was that it demonstrated an almost complete reversal in the attitude of the nationalist voters in the constituency vis-à-vis the border campaign. In the late 1950s and 1960s the vote for any form of nationalism suffered greatly – presumably from a reaction against the border campaign. That campaign, though controversial, was nothing like the IRA's all-out war in the 1970s – and yet in 1981 the nationalist voters of FST were prepared to vote massively for a known IRA man.
There was some element of resistance, of course. The number of spoiled votes – 3,280 – was far higher than normal, and the proportion of the electorate that voted for Sands (42.2%) was somewhat lower than the 45-46% that nationalism had been receiving in recent elections. However, the size of nationalism's lead over unionism ensured that Sands won.
Sands died on hunger strike, of course, and so another by-election was held to replace him, on 20 August 1981. His agent, Owen Carron, stood on the same Anti-H-Block Proxy Political Prisoner platform, and again won with 31,278 votes (49.1%), while Ken Maginnis for the UUP got 29,048 votes (45.6%). Alliance send down one of their big guns to try to bring civilisation to the wild west – Seamus Close got 1,930 votes (3.0%), but failed to inspire any Alliance revival in the constituency. Other odds-and-sods pointlessly jumped on the bandwagon – Tom Moore, for the Republican Clubs got 1,132 votes (1.8%), Martin Green, describing himself as General Amnesty got 249 votes (0.4%), and Simon Hall-Raleigh, describing himself as The Peace Lover got 90 votes (0.1%). Obviously the people of FST were not lovers of peace!
Carron never intended to take his seat, of course – he represented the strong abstentionist tradition in FST. It is interesting to note that the unionist vote in the two 1981 by-elections differed by precisely two votes – 29,046 in April, and 29,048 in August. This was clearly the utter limit of unionism's electorate in the constituency. It has never received so many votes since.
On 9 June 1983 the SDLP came again to unionism's assistance. In the Westminster election they stood again, and thus split the nationalist vote. Ken Maginnis then won the seat for the UUP with 28,630 votes (47.6%), while Owen Carron, standing now openly for Sinn Féin, got 20,954 votes (34.8%). Rosemary Flanagan, for the SDLP, got 9,923 votes (16.5%) and Davy Kettyles made his first appearance in a Westminster election, standing this time for the Workers' Party and getting 649 votes (1.1%).
Something seems to have snapped in the nationalist psyche at this point. Despite outpolling unionism, and achieving over 50% of the vote, nationalism appears to have become severely demoralised by its defeat in 1983. This allowed unionism, despite its downward trend, to outpoll nationalism in the four following contests. Around 5,000 voters, who had previously voted nationalist, stopped doing so. Around half started to vote for the perennial Davy Kettles in one of his various guises, or other small parties. But the other half just opted out.
On 23 January 1986, in the set of by-elections caused by the unionist protests against the Anglo-Irish Agreement, Ken Maginnis was re-elected with 27,857 votes (49.7%), despite the active participation of nationalist candidates (unlike in most other seats, where nationalists boycotted these by-elections – in Newry and South Armagh, however, Séamus Mallon snatched the seat from the unfortunate Jim Nicholson). Nationalism was split in FST, though, and Owen Carron got only 15,278 votes (27.2%), with Austin Currie (standing officially for the SDLP this time) getting 12,081 votes (21.5%). Davy Kettyles, still with the Workers' Party, got 864 votes (1.5%). The turnout was a low 80.9%, implying that neither side had really motivated their supporters.
On 11 June 1987, with an almost identical turnout (80.8%) in the general election Ken Maginnis retained the seat with 27,446 votes (49.6%). Carron, now on the run, was replaced as Sinn Féin candidate by Paul Corrigan, who got 14,623 votes (26.4%), while Rosemary Flanagan for the SDLP got 10,581 votes (19.1%) and Davy Kettyles, still WP, got 1,784 votes (3.2%). The Alliance Party, on another of its forays west, got 941 votes (1.7%) with John Haslett.
Nationalist – or more accurately, republican – demoralisation was approaching its nadir in FST in 1992. On 9 April 1992 Ken Maginnis walked home with 26,932 votes (48.4%), and unionists must have started thinking that this seat was theirs for ever more. Tommy Gallagher, for the SDLP, came in second with 12,810 votes (23.1%), and Sinn Féin managed only a third place, with Francie Molloy on 12,604 votes (22.9%). Davy Kettyles, now a 'Progressive Socialist', got 1,094 votes (1.9%), Eric Bullick, for the Alliance Party, got 950 votes (1.6%), and one of Kettyles erstwhile comrades, Gerry Cullen, standing for 'New Agenda' (a break-away from the Workers Party, and itself to become Democratic Left before merging with the (Irish) Labour Party) got 747 (1.2%).
In the 1995 boundary revision the constituency lost the heavily nationalist Coalisland area to Mid Ulster, thus reducing nationalism's hopes of recovering the seat, and probably reducing nationalist morale still further.
On 1 May 1997 Ken Maginnis again held 'his' seat, with 24,862 votes (51.5%), but Sinn Féin at least managed to overtake the SDLP – Gerry McHugh got 11,174 votes (23.1%), while Tommy Gallagher of the SDLP was close behind on 11,060 votes (22.9%). Stephen Farry, for the Alliance Party, got 977 votes (2.0%), and Simeon Gillan wasted a deposit for the Natural Law Party, getting 217 votes (0.5%). Turnout (74.8%) was slipping, though, perhaps reflecting a lessening of the tensions of earlier elections.
However, those FST swings and roundabouts should never be forgotten. On 7 June 2001 Sinn Féin dramatically won the seat by 53 votes. Michelle Gildernew got 17,739 votes (34.1%), but thanks to the intervention of an independent unionist the UUP candidate James Cooper got only 17,686 votes (34.0%). Tommy Gallagher of the SDLP got 9,706 votes (18.7%), which would ordinarily have been enough to ensure a unionist victory, but nobody foresaw the significant increase in the nationalist vote – from 22,234 in 1997 to 27,445 in 2001. Jim Dixon, the Independent Unionist, got 6,843 votes (13.2%) - and the life-long disapproval of the other unionists.
The increase in the nationalist vote appeared to mark the end of the nationalist demoralisation in FST. The turnout recovered, to 79.0%, and this appears to have been entirely due to nationalists returning to the polling booths – the unionist vote declined slightly.
The reason for the end of nationalist demoralisation is as little-known as that for its beginning. Perhaps the Good Friday Agreement electrified nationalism – but it was already three years old in 2001, and already experiencing unionist obstructiveness. In any case, despite the return to nationalism of a proportion of the electorate, the general tendency, in nationalism as in unionism, was towards apathy. The graph berlow shows the nationalist and unionist shares of the electorate (i.e. all of those eligible to vote):
On 5 May 2005 Michelle Gildernew retained the seat in a four-way race. Both nationalism and unionism had split votes. Gildernew got 18,638 votes (38.2%), the DUP's Arlene Foster got 14,056 votes (28.8%), the UUP's Tom Elliott got 8,869 votes (18.2%) and the SDLP's Tommy Gallagher got 7,230 votes (14.8%). The nationalist-unionist split widened slightly, to 53%/47%.
After the 2005 elections the boundary commission changed some constituencies, but left FST unchanged.
In 2010 unionists in FST had learned a valuable lesson – if they split their vote, they could never win the seat. Sinn Féin's lead amongst nationalists was greater than that of either of the unionist parties within their block. So an intense effort was made to 'resolve' this problem on the unionist side. There were early offers by the DUP to stand aside in favour of a unity candidate, but the UCUNF project had announced that it intended to stand in every seat, regardless of other factors. As the election campaign progressed, there were increasingly desperate attempts by the DUP to break the UCUNF resolve. The fact that the UUP's main standard-bearer in the constituency appeared not to share UCUNF's determination to stand gave it support. And, of course, that campaign worked – UCUNF backed down, and Tom Elliott, the wavering UUP man, was pivotal in helping to select a 'unionist unity' candidate – Rodney Connor – who was a member of neither party, and critically, not a member of UCUNF. His selection made liars out of the Tories, and possibly helped to repel almost as many voters elsewhere as he attracted in FST.
And, of course, the rest is history. Despite 'unionist unity' against a divided nationalism, Gildernew won. The nationalist voters in FST were determined not to be outmanoeuvred by the unionist minority, and plumped for Gildernew, giving her a 4 vote majority – the subject of Connor's current legal challenge.
The result on 6 May 2010 was Michelle Gildernew 21,304 votes (45.5%), Rodney Connor 21,300 votes (45.5%), the SDLP's Fearghal McKinney 3,574 votes (7.6%), the Alliance Party's Vasundhara Kamble 437 votes (0.9%), and Independent John Stevenson 188 (0.4%)Despite the high profile of the contest, and the emotions it aroused, the turnout was only 69.3%.
It is interesting to note that, as a result of the falling turnout in the constituency, nationalism attracts fewer actual votes than unionism ever did before 1997. The drop in turnout appears to be affecting both blocks roughly equally, but if turnout rates became decoupled the outcome would be hard to predict.
The British government's proposed reforms to the electoral system will make FST both easier and harder to predict in the future. Easier in the sense that the Alternative Vote (AV) system will make 'unity' candidates obsolete. If votes remain in their 'blocks' then there is no danger to either block if they compete amongst themselves – and by offering a genuine choice within each block such competition may actually increase the (first-preference) vote of the block. The nature of FST is such that transfers would tend to remain in the block, and thus the winner will almost always come from within the largest block – and will thus be a nationalist. Tactical voting by unionists, however, may help decide which nationalist wins.
The other proposed reform involves reducing the number of constituencies. FST, nestled up against the border, will remain largely untouched, though the precise parts of South Tyrone that are attached to Fermanagh may be changed. It is hard to see this changing the balance except in nationalism's favour. The part of West Tyrone (Westminster constituency) bordering the current FST constituency is the West Tyrone DEA of Omagh district, which is quite heavily nationalist. The intention is to create constituencies of around 70,000 electors, and FST currently has almost 68,000, so it may emerge unscathed.
2010 is thus unlikely to represent the last election to the FST Westminster constituency, unless the reforms are more radical than expected. The constituency will continue to arouse passion for some time to come.
Friday 21 May 2010
What if the Alternative Vote system had been used?
AV is basically the well-known PR-STV system, but operated in single-member constituencies. If no candidate is the first preference of a majority of voters, the candidate with the fewest number of first preference rankings is eliminated and that candidate's ballots are redistributed at full value to the remaining candidates according to the next ranking on each ballot. This process is repeated until one candidate obtains a majority of votes among candidates not eliminated.
Obviously this particular 'what if' requires a certain number of assumptions to be made, but luckily Northern Ireland has a rich seam of previous elections – using PR-STV – to mine. So, for simplicity, the approximate transfer behaviour of the 2007 Assembly elections will be used. The TUV, of course, did not exist in 2007, but the transfer behaviour of like-minded unionists will suffice as a proxy.
West of the Bann Sinn Féin and SDLP transfers will go to each other – but only 60% of them – the rest do not transfer. East of the Bann (or, more accurately, in Greater Belfast), SDLP transfers will be split 50/50 between Sinn Féin and Alliance. Unionist transfers will remain within the family, but TUV votes will not all transfer – perhaps only 80% of them. Alliance transfers will be split 50/50 between the SDLPO and the UUP.
In addition, of course, account must be taken for the tactical voting in 2010, where voters had basically one chance to make it count, and may thus have already voted for their 'second, but most realistic, preference', rather than their real first preference (if he/she was perceived to have no chance of being elected).
With these brave assumptions, it is possible to assess the AV winners of each of the 18 seats as follows:
- West Belfast, Mid Ulster and North Down would be won outright, as their winner received over 50% of the 'First Preferences'.
- East Belfast: it is likely here that the Alliance first preference vote would not have been so high. The nationalist candidates would be quickly eliminated and their votes transferred to Long, but would make only a marginal difference. Vance's TUV votes would have gone in the opposite direction, adding slightly to both Ringland's and Robinson's total. The question of who would next be eliminated decides this contest. Probably all three – UCUNF, Alliance and DUP – are within a short distance of each other. If, at this point, Ringland is ahead of Long, then she is eliminated and many of her votes transfer to Ringland, giving him the winning margin. But if Long is ahead of Ringland, then it is the UCUNF votes that are transferred – and they may tend to stay in the unionist family, giving the victory – a narrow one – to Robinson.
- North Belfast: this would be close. All candidates except Dodds and Kelly would be eliminated – giving Dodds the UCUNF transfers, and Kelly some of the Alliance and SDLP transfers. But probably not enough, so Dodds would win.
- South Belfast: the Green and Alliance transfers would have seen McDonnell over the line without much difficulty.
- East Antrim: when the nationalists are eliminated a sufficient number of their votes would not transfer, and with a small number of transfers from the TUV Sammy Wilson would easily win.
- East Derry: Alliance and the TUV would be eliminated first, giving a small boost to the DUP and the SDLP. The SDLP would probably be next to go, giving Sinn Féin a boost, and in much smaller numbers, the UUP. Last to be eliminated, though, is UCUNF, who carry Campbell over the winning line.
- Fermanagh and South Tyrone; the SDLP transfers would see Michelle Gildernew safely home.
- Foyle: there was some unionist tactical voting here, but this merely pre-empted the transfers that would have happened under AV. Durkan would get in safely with unionist transfers.
- Lagan Valley: Donaldson is so close that the non-transferable votes after the elimination of Sinn Féin, the SDLP and the TUV would carry him mathematically over 50%.
- Newry and Armagh: this offers the interesting possibility of serious unionist tactical voting. Conor Murphy got 42% of the 'first preferences', but it would take 54% of all the other votes to transfer to the SDLP for Bradley would take the seat. The probability of such coordination amongst unionists is fairly small, though, so Murphy would probably retain the seat.
- North Antrim: nobody was within an ass's roar of Paisley, so he would take the seat with ease.
- South Antrim: the Alliance votes and some of the SDLP votes would probably transfer to Empey, and there is little chance that Sinn Féin transfers would go to McCrea. McCrea would get some TUV transfers, but there weren't enough TUV votes to change the outcome. Empey would have won.
- South Down: as in Foyle, Ritchie's 2010 vote was swollen by unionist tactical votes. But these would happen under AV, just one step later.
- Strangford: although Shannon may not have gotten many transfers, the non-transferrable votes from Sinn Féin and SDLP eliminations would see him safely over 50% of those remaining.
- Upper Bann: Alliance and SDLP elimination would take Sinn Féin beyond the UCUNF (and maybe DUP) candidates, but the elimination of UCUNF would have brought the DUP's Simpson out ahead.
- West Tyrone: Sinn Féin would be over 50% with the help of only a few transfers. It would have taken over 92% of all of the other transfers to have gone to the SDLP for them to have beaten Doherty, and that is nigh-on impossible.
Tuesday 18 May 2010
The Greening of South Belfast
However, a combination of free education and improving equality led to increasing numbers of middle-class Catholics – and many of them also wanted to live in the nicer areas off the Lisburn Road, the Malone Road, or in Stranmillis. Queens graduates, already familiar with the Holy Land from their student days, perhaps sought to remain in the area if they found jobs in Belfast. Little by little the Catholic proportion of the population in South Belfast grew.
In the 2001 Census, the statistics on Community Background (religion or religion brought up in) showed the scale of the Catholic influx. Of those aged over 75, around 80% were Protestant – however amongst lower age groups the proportion of Catholics increased until, around the age of 40, it starts to equal or exceed that of Protestants. Amongst the student-age population the Catholic proportion exceeds that of Protestants, but many of these are transient residents of the constituency.
Tellingly, amongst the children, Catholics exceed Protestants at the youngest ages – indicating an increased tendency amongst young Catholics to settle in the area. The proportion claiming no religion also increases at these youngest ages, and we will have to wait until after the next census to try to understand which religion (if any) these children are being brought up in.
This increase in the Catholic proportion of South Belfast's population had its inevitable impact on the politics of the constituency. Forty years ago – when those over-75s were in their thirties – South Belfast was over 70% unionist. This is entirely consistent with the age profile of those aged over 50 in the graph above – only these would have been in the electorate in 1970. But as time passed, the decreasing Protestant proportion, and the increasing Catholic proportion, meant that the unionist proportion of the vote declined, and the nationalist proportion increased:
The election results shown in the graph above are for the constituency as it was configured at the times of the elections – boundary revisions mean that it is not always the same area, but the bulk of the constituency has remained largely unchanged.
In 2005, for the first time ever, South Belfast was won by a nationalist candidate – the SDLP's Alasdair McDonnell. Unionism, accustomed to 'owning' South Belfast, contorted itself in the hope of wresting it back in 2010, but ultimately failed when McDonnell was the only nationalist candidate.
There is little reason to expect a freezing, still less a reversal, of the greening of South Belfast. The older age-groups remain predominantly Protestant, and as they die they will be replaced in the electorate by a more mixed group. A majority of Northern Ireland's students, and thus its graduates, are Catholic and many will probably continue to settle in South Belfast.
Obviously turn-out can influence the outcome of future elections – if unionist turn-out is higher than nationalist turn-out they may again win a majority of the vote – but this appears to be a declining possibility. A 'unionist unity' candidate may still win South Belfast at the next Westminster election, unless the Sinn Féin abstention becomes a tradition. Finally, if the number of Westminster seats in Northern Ireland is reduced, this will obviously have an impact on South Belfast, perhaps leading to an entirely different constituency with more Protestant-majority districts, and thus a new unionist majority. But this is early days for such speculations.
At present, and in its current shape, South Belfast is a constituency that is visibly greening.
Monday 17 May 2010
Going, going, …
Given that Protestants in Northern Ireland – unionism's main supporters – have an age profile that is older than that of Catholics, there can be little doubt that the downward trend will continue, probably bringing unionism below 50% in the next Westminster elections (unless the current British government crashes sooner than foreseen). Leaving aside the wobble in the 1992-1997 elections the graph is almost perfectly smooth – and downward.
Sunday 16 May 2010
Castlereagh East – not forgotten
As anticipated, the DUP won the seat with its photogenic but loyalist-paramilitary-linked candidate. Their share of the vote, though, dropped considerably: from 59.2% in 2005 to 39.2% this year. Admittedly a lot of the 2005 vote was Iris Robinson’s personal vote – on her own she got over 27% of the vote.
The threat from the TUV evaporated in Castlereagh, as it did elsewhere in the Westminster election. In Castlereagh they got 8.2% of the vote – barely more than the UDA-linked Frankie Gallagher got in 2005 (7.1%). Maybe they were the same voters? In fact the TUV got fewer votes than even the Green candidate – and came bottom of the poll.
The ever-hopeful, but clearly hopeless, Hazel Legge managed to shrink the UUP vote, from 18.9% in 2005 to 15.9% this year. Legge is/was a full-time party worker and clearly someone in the UUP likes her, but that doesn’t really appear to carry much weight with the voters.
The big winner in Castlereagh East was Alliance. The Alliance candidate won 26.1% of the vote, up from only 12.4% in 2005. The council by-election covered part of the East Belfast Westminster constituency where, of course, Alliance candidate Naomi Long defeated Peter Robinson. Clearly the same swing – on a lesser scale – was evident in Castlereagh East, but not enough to win the seat. If the Alliance vote stays stable, though, it should pick up at least one additional council seat (if the next council elections are to the existing councils, as seems increasingly likely).
Even the Greens did well in Castlereagh East, winning 10.5% of the vote. With a little help (i.e. transfers) from other candidates they could be in the running for a seat here too next time.

The turnout this year was almost identical to that in 2005 – 55.1% this year, 55.5% in 2005 – so the changes cannot really be ascribed to that. It seems that a lot of the unionist vote that went to the DUP simply deserted the party - but not to go to the dead-enders of the TUV, or even to the 'new force' of the UUP. Bizarrely, the ‘extremists’ of the DUP shifted their allegiances to parties that most would see as the antithesis of DUP hard-line unionism. Most observers would have expected a protest against the ‘swish family Robinson’ to lead to a swing to the right, or at least to stay within the unionist block. For the ‘centre’ block to benefit so dramatically – from 12.4% in 2005 to 36.6% this year – is almost unheard of in Northern Irish politics.
This result, minor and forgettable as it is, points towards some seismic changes in political allegiances in Northern Ireland. It will be necessary to wait until next year to see if the changes are a once-off protest or a structural change. It leaves the outcome of next year’s elections quite open.
Tuesday 11 May 2010
Proportional representation
One of the unexpected outcomes of last week’s Westminster election in Northern Ireland was that the result was extremely proportional. In general the first-past-the-post system does not lend itself well to proportionality, but by chance the results last week were very close to what would be achieved by a PR system – as far as the major blocks are concerned, at any rate.
- Unionism won 50.5% of the vote, and won 50% of the seats.
- Nationalism won 42.0% of the vote, and won 44.4% of the seats.
- The Alliance party won 6.3% of the vote, and won 5.6% of the seats.
Within the blocks there was some proportionality too – Sinn Féin, with 60% of the nationalist vote, won 62.5% of the nationalist seats – the SDLP with 40% of the nationalist vote won 37.5% of the nationalist seats.
Only within unionism was there a distinct lack of proportionality. The DUP, with 50% of the unionist vote, won 8 out of its 9 seats (89%). The UCUNF, with 30% of the unionist vote, won precisely nothing. The ninth unionist seat was won, of course, by Sylvia Hermon, who won 6.2% of the unionist vote – but this was concentrated in one constituency.
The lesson appears to be that chance can also lead to a proportional outcome, but will not necessarily do so.
The TUV in 2011
Allister revealed that:
“... he hopes to topple power-sharing by using a boycott plan that would likely see a nationalist majority in a Sinn Fein-led Executive. This would be intolerable to most unionists, and might scupper the prospect of republican-led rule of the Province”.
Depending on how many MLAs Mr Allister enters Stormont with, any boycott by him could mean unionists are in the minority at the Cabinet table.
He said “his party would field candidates in every seat at the 2011 Assembly election, hoping to take enough seats to qualify for at least one Executive seat”.
In a situation where Martin McGuinness would probably be First Minister and unionists a minority in the Executive, Allister hopes that the entire Executive would "implode" because it would be unrepresentative of unionism.
Cunning, no?
However, Allister’s hopes for Executive implosion in 2011 may have taken a small knock last week. His party stood in 10 seats, and received less than an Assembly quota in nine of them. Only Allister himself in North Antrim would have been elected for certain if last week’s election had been an Assembly election. Obviously transfers are important, but since the TUV are sworn enemies of the DUP, and hardly best buddies with the UUP, it is hard to see where their transfers might come from.
The TUV would have an outside chance of taking Assembly seats in East Derry and Lagan Valley, but beyond these three seats, their chances are remote. Even with three Assembly seats Allister and the TUV would neither win an Executive seat nor be able to ‘implode’ the Executive. 2010 showed quite clearly that his appeal to unionists is limited, and he is increasingly only picking up support from unionism’s extremist fringe – the hoped-for defections from the DUP simply haven’t happened, and the DUP (apart from Robinson) came out of the Westminster election in fairly good shape, so a melt-down between now and the Assembly election is unlikely.
As the Assembly election approaches, and as it becomes clearer that the TUV is only a fringe party, its appeal may diminish further, perhaps leaving Allister all alone in opposition in the Assembly.
Borrowed seats
In East Belfast, though, Naomi Long’s shock defeat of Peter Robinson was more of a theft in unionist terms. Although Long got 37.2% of the vote, the combined unionist vote was 59.3% - but it was split three ways and Long slipped in through the middle. There can be little doubt, though, that East Belfast is a majority-unionist seat, and the Alliance Party has just borrowed it. They will have an incumbency advantage next time, but if unionism gets its act together it will get East Belfast back.
No other seats were ‘borrowed’ last week – though Fermanagh and South Tyrone came close. The defeat of unionist-unity candidate Rodney Connor, and continuing demographic changes, make it unlikely that unionism will ever feel that this is a seat that they can steal again, and it may become more like West Tyrone or Mid Ulster, where several unionist parties compete half-heartedly in the knowledge that none of them will actually win. Last Thursday may have represented the end of any unionist hopes west of the Bann.
North Belfast in Sinn Féin’s sights
“Dodds [… ] could lose his seat, if not at the next election, then at the one that follows it”Thursday was the ‘next election’ and Dodds held his seat, but not easily. True, he received 14,812 votes (40.0%) to Gerry Kelly’s 12,588 (34.0%). But the gap between the two ‘blocks’ – unionist and nationalist – narrowed to little more than a margin of error:

It appears that Dodds had been kept afloat in 2001 and 2005 by the absence (actual in 2001, virtual in 2005) of the Alliance Party. But now that they have returned to life in the constituency unionism’s decline has become clearer. With only 47.7% of the vote unionism is perilously close to being overtaken by nationalism, which is now on 46.3%. Although Fermanagh and South Tyrone is a poor role model for urban North Belfast, the ability of nationalists to unite around a single candidate if they feel that a seat should be theirs should not be underestimated.
Unionism’s problem in North Belfast – and thus Dodds’ problem – is that the Protestant population is older, and thus prone to higher ‘natural decrease’ (i.e. deaths) than the Catholic population. As this blog has pointed out before, in North Belfast (as it was in 2001, before the boundary changes) over 70% of old people were Protestant, whereas that religious group falls to around 40% amongst young people. Amongst the young – who are now starting to vote – Catholics comprise over 50% of the cohort.
The turnout rate increased significantly in 2010, to 56.5%, from the 45.6% recorded on 2005. Both blocks benefited – but nationalism benefited far more than unionism, adding 3,435 votes while unionism added only 1,560. Whether this implies a greater surge of enthusiasm amongst nationalists than amongst unionists, or simply a relatively greater number of potential nationalist voters, we cannot yet say. Perhaps unionists were also motivated, but too many of their habitual voters were simply dead. Or perhaps the nationalist parties – in particular Sinn Féin – were simply more determined to get their voters registered and get them to the polling booths.
If the votes received by the two blocks are looked at as proportions of the electorate, we can see the following:

Apart from in 2005, when turnout appears to have been abnormally high, the pattern is one of nationalist stability, with the two parties receiving a vote equivalent to around 23-26% of the electorate. The (linear) trend is going up, however. But for unionism, if 2001 is excluded as well, the trend is clearly downward, and at a fast rate.
Unionism is still slightly ahead in North Belfast, but on the basis of the demographic profile of the constituency, and the trends in voting patterns, 2010 represents probably the last time it will be ahead. In another 4 or 5 years this will be a nationalist plurality seat (if not an outright majority seat). Whether nationalism comes together successfully, as in FST, to claim its prize we will have to wait and see. Next year’s Assembly elections will give another opportunity to examine the evolution in this constituency.
Friday 7 May 2010
No Robinson, No Connor, No UCUNF
Peter Robinson, leader of the DUP and successor to Paisley, has been defeated in the constituency that he virtually owned for over 30 years.
Rodney Connor, the 'non sectarian' unionist unity candidate in Fermanagh and South Tyrone, has been defeated despite a split nationalist vote.
UCUNF, the bastard child of the English Tories and their UUP lap-dogs, has been left bereft of seats, and with a very uncertain future.
Nationalism made no seat gains – and none were realistic – but thanks to 4 votes in Fermanagh and South Tyrone it has not lost any seats either.
Unionism, on the other hand, lost one seat, dropping from 10 to 9. For the first time ever, only half of Northern Ireland's MPs are unionists.
The proportion of the vote that went to nationalist candidates remained virtually unchanged – 42% against 41.8% five years ago. Despite the habitual hostility of the media, Sinn Féin's share of the vote has again increased, from 24.3% in 2005 to 25.5% in 2010 – making Sinn Féin Northern Ireland's largest party again.
Unionism's share dropped by 1.4%, though, from 51.9% to 50.5%. One more election, perhaps, and unionism will be only a plurality.
This election has been a stressful one, and one with many unknown elements. But at the end of the day nationalism has emerged unscathed, while unionism in all of its guises – DUP, UUP/UCUNF, TUV and independent unionist, has emerged battered and diminished. Good.
UCUNF, you go …
In 2010 the vote for combined entity of UCUNF dropped to 102,361 votes – or 16.3% of the total.
Of course, the 2005 total includes both Sylvia Hermon in North Down and Tom Elliott in Fermanagh and South Tyrone – neither of whom counted towards UCUNF's total this time around.
However, UCUNF did have a candidate in North Down yesterday – the awful Ian Parsley – and campaigned vigorously against Hermon, so they cannot exclude that constituency from a comparison.
If FST is removed from the 2005 figures, the combined UUP/Tory vote was 121,163 – 16.9% of the total poll.
So it seems that the non-merger of the UUP and the Tories – even at a time of Tory advance in Britain, and distaste with the DUP's Robinson family – has actually gone backwards in both absolute and relative terms; from 121,163 votes (16.9%) in 2005 to 102,361 votes (16.3%) in 2010.
What a failure! The inability of UCUNF to win any seats is perhaps indicative of the whole project. It managed to lose its sole MP, and despite shackling itself to an ascendant British party it managed to lose votes. It proclaimed non-sectarianism and then entered a nakedly sectarian pact in Fermanagh and South Tyrone – thereby losing the support of some of its most capable supporters.
It's time to quietly drop the whole project. UCUNF is a dead party walking.
Tactical voting – Part 2 – South Down
If the share of the vote that the unionists and the SDLP received in 2007 were applied to the voting turnout of 2010, unionism should have got 13,326 votes (or 31.8% of the votes cast) – but yesterday it got only 8,244. The SDLP, on the other hand, should have got 13,358 (or 31.4% of the total) – but they actually got 20,648 votes (48.5%).
So the unionist total decreased by 5,282, and the SDLP total increased by 7,290. It seems likely that over 5,000 of the SDLP's extra votes were unionists trying to thwart a Sinn Féin victory.
But who were the other 2,000 votes that the SDLP received over its 'natural' vote? Well, a few hundred may have been people who had voted Green in 2007, but it seems likely that even some Sinn Féin voters switched to the SDLP. The Sinn Féin vote yesterday was actually 1,898 votes lower than in 2007. So South Down may have seen a strange combination – unionists, ex-Greens and ex-Sinn Féin voters combining to thwart Caitriona Ruane - this may be a report-card from the voters on Ruane's performance as Minister of Education.
Tactical voting – Part 1 – Foyle
This blog will look at several of the constituencies where tactical voting probably happened, to estimate its extent. Firstly, Foyle.
In 2007, on a 62.7% turnout, unionism got 8,788 votes (21.4%).
In 2010, on a 57.5% turnout, unionism got 5,710 votes (15.1%). If the 2007 turnout had been repeated, this would have been 6,222, so 512 unionists failed to vote due to apathy or demographic decline. But another 2,566 disappeared from the 2007 unionist total (8788-6222) – where did they go?
The clear beneficiary seems to have been the SDLP. In 2007 it got 15,182 votes (37.0%), on a turnout of 62.7%, equivalent to 13,930 votes on a turnout of 57.5% as yesterday.
But the SDLP actually received 16,922 votes (44.7%) yesterday – almost 3,000 more than the 2007 experience would have led us to expect. The electorate in Foyle has slightly increased (though this was slowed down by the loss, due to boundary changes, of some territory to East Derry). The absence of Green and independent candidates yesterday may have slightly boosted the SDLP's total, but the inescapable conclusion is that, not for the first time, a large number of voters (around 2,500) who are unionists in local and Assembly elections voted tactically for Durkan yesterday.
Thursday 6 May 2010
Ní beidh a leithéid arís ann
Today marks the end of a long and unpretentious tradition in Northern Ireland, probably dating back a hundred years. For today is the very last district council by-election that Northern Ireland will ever enjoy – Castlereagh East.In March the law changed to allow the parties to nominate a replacement for any seat that becomes 'casually vacant', but the Notice of Election for Iris Robinson's seat on Castlereagh Borough Council was published just a few days before the law changed, and thus the election will go ahead. Treasure it, though, because it will be the last.
So while 99% of the voters in Northern Ireland will be faced with a single ballot paper today, the lucky – and historic – few in Castlereagh East (all 14,000 or so of them) will be faced with two.
Almost definitely the DUP will win this small victory, but equally certainly the world will not notice. Other events will overshadow the sadness of Castlereagh East. The world will be a slightly emptier place, and a slightly less democratic one, without the sporadic fun of a district council by-election.
The parties may not mourn your passing – after all it will save them money, effort and uncertainty. The District Councils blessed with casual vacancies will save around £25,000 each time, to the rate-payers relief. The Electoral Office too will enjoy the longer periods of quiet between the major elections – and may even be able to save the tax-payer some money too.
So slip away into the night, dear district council by-election – you will not be entirely forgotten – in the hearts of Northern Ireland's small band of psephologists you will always be remembered with nostalgia.
Wednesday 5 May 2010
Preferences, not predictions
Instead, this blog will simply list the outcomes it would prefer – despite the obvious improbability of some of them. Where there is simply no chance of a nationalist victory, a choice must be made amongst the unionist candidates – the reasons for the choice will be explained below:
- Belfast East: Peter Robinson (DUP) – this blog sees less danger in the DUP than in UCUNF. The DUP as 'Ulster nationalists' are devolutionists, whereas UCUNF are increasingly integrationist.
- Belfast North: Gerry Kelly (Sinn Féin)
- Belfast South: Alasdair McDonnell (SDLP)
- Belfast West: Gerry Adams (Sinn Féin)
- East Antrim: Sammy Wilson (DUP), as above.
- East Derry: Gregory Campbell (DUP) is more likely, but a victory by Cathal O hOisin (Sinn Féin) would be nice if the unionist vote splits three ways.
- Fermanagh and South Tyrone: Michelle Gildernew (Sinn Féin)
- Foyle: Martina Anderson (Sinn Féin)
- Lagan Valley: Jeffrey Donaldson (DUP), as above.
- Mid Ulster: Martin McGuinness (Sinn Féin)
- Newry and Armagh: Conor Murphy (Sinn Féin)
- North Antrim: Jim Allister (TUV) – this blog has a soft spot for Allister – he has done a lot for nationalism, and if elected he would be a great help.
- North Down: Sylvia Hermon (Independent Unionist)
- South Antrim: This is a really tough one. This blog wants both main unionist challengers to lose. On balance, though, McCrea (DUP), extremist as he is, is a better friend of nationalism.
- South Down: Caitriona Ruane (Sinn Féin)
- Strangford: Jim Shannon (DUP), as above.
- Upper Bann: John O'Dowd (Sinn Féin)
- West Tyrone: Pat Doherty (Sinn Féin)
Although the TUV is as far to the right within unionism as it is currently possible to go, this blog wishes them some limited success. Partly because they are useful splitters of the unionist vote, and partly because they would advertise to the world just how backward, bigoted and odd unionism can be. A TUV MP would show the world outside Northern Ireland just how strange unionism is, and drive a nice wedge between unionism and the metropolitan political elite in London.
The reality, of course, will be different to the list above – and this blog will be disappointed. There may be only four Sinn Féin MPs, there may be three SDLP MPs, there may be one or more UCUNF poodles sitting on Tory laps, and there may be no rabid TUV MP to scare the horses. But this blog will not be disheartened – the future is long and change comes dropping slow (apologies to WB Yeats).
A modern sophisticated society
"There would be really quite appalling consequences for this country if we are not able to produce a credible plan for dealing with the deficit and the debt. And that involves some very difficult decisions.That pretty much sums up how the DUP and the UUP are seen by the British political elite.
If I have to sit and talk to three or four other groups... in the end you can always do a deal with an Ulsterman, but it's not the way to run a modern sophisticated society in the grips of an economic crisis which weak government under Gordon Brown has already caused."
Colonials, not 'us', not really British, and neither modern nor sophisticated.