The tenth anniversary of the Good Friday Agreement has led to acres of self-congratulatory newsprint all over the world. The underlying story being peddled is that Northern Ireland has miraculously become a tolerant, caring, sharing place, where former enemies have patched up their tribal quarrels and resolved to work in peace for the good of all.
This is, of course, simply not true. Northern Ireland remains a deeply divided place, where levels of bigotry and intolerance unknown in the civilised world are so commonplace as to pass almost without comment.
One little instance did not entirely pass with out comment, though. The Newsletter on 9 April printed this gem of naked bigotry:
"A meeting of North Down Borough Council’s Corporate Committee turned sour last month when DUP councillor John Montgomery offered up a tub of the dairy product for examination.
He blasted the retailer for branding it ‘Irish whipping cream’ produced in ‘Irish pastures’, when a closer inspection of information on the back showed it was churned out in Northern Ireland.
His proposal to write to the company to complain was passed by two votes at a town hall council meeting a fortnight ago – stirring up a backlash from ratepayers and opposing councillors.
Mr Montgomery told the News Letter yesterday: “I was in Marks and Spencer last month looking for some cream, and was in a rush, so I had no alternative but to pick up what was labelled ‘Irish cream’.
“But when I got it home, I read it was produced in Northern Ireland, and I feel it’s a shame Northern Irish produce is not getting its full recognition.”
Mr Montgomery added this was simply a case of promoting the work of Northern Ireland farmers for the good of the Province’s economy.
However, many of his council colleagues poured derision on his motion to write to the store, branding it a “silly” waste of time.
Independent Unionist Alan Chambers was said to have suggested that Mr Montgomery submit a personal complaint to Trading Standards instead of involving the whole council.
DUP alderman Leslie Cree abstained from the vote and said he found the debate “puerile”.
Alliance councillor Tony Hill added: “[Mr Montgomery] is from the DUP, so by criticising the fact that it said ‘Irish’ and not ‘Northern Irish’ on the cream, it’s quite obvious what the intention is.
“It was discussed by Alliance councillors and we felt it was a ridiculous matter to raise, and far too minor for council when we have more important things to discuss.”
Defending himself, Mr Montgomery said yesterday: “This affects the livelihoods of producers in Northern Ireland, and anything that affects them impacts on the country. It’s not a waste of time.”
Marks and Spencer were yesterday unavailable for comment."
In a nutshell, Mr Montgomery is telling us that he "had no alternative" but to buy "Irish" cream as he was in a hurry – the implication being that his normal instinct is to boycott any "Irish" products. He attempted to justify this by claiming that he would prefer that Northern Irish products should be promoted. Yet the cream was a northern Irish product, so what was his problem? Is he assuming that, like him, other unionist bigots would not buy something that they think comes from the south? Does he waste Council time railing against products imported from England or Scotland? If not, why not?
It seems also that he is angry that anything produced in Northern Ireland is described as "Irish" (He should be very upset with the largely Protestant linen industry who have always marketed their products as 'Irish linen').
And thirdly, he is prepared to waste ratepayers money on his bigoted campaign. Shame on North Down Council that they supported him, but congratulations are due to unionists Alan Chambers and Leslie Cree for not supporting him.
This blog awards its Bigot of the Week Award to John Montgomery.
Monday 14 April 2008
Monday 7 April 2008
Baby boom
NISRA's recent Statistical Press Release on Births in Northern Ireland (2007) shows that the number of births in Northern Ireland bounced back up by 5% compared with 2006. In fact, since the low point reached in 2000, births have been increasing almost every year. At the current rate of increase, the total period fertility rate (TPFR) may well exceed the population replacement level (2,1) within two years. This is quite an unusual state of affairs, though it mirrors the situation in the UK and in the south, though in the latter case the bounce-back had already started in 1996.
The link between fertility rates and economic prosperity is a complicated one, with prosperity pushing fertility both down and up at the same time. As more women have access to contraception, and as more women work outside the home, their fertility has tended to drop – but conversely as families have become more affluent, and perhaps better able to afford reasonable housing, education and so on, they have started to have slightly more children.
The south has boomed under the Celtic tiger, and women have flooded into the workforce in massive numbers. At the same time housing and childcare are expensive, and so logically one would expect a drop in the average family size – but this has not happened. On the contrary, the birth rate has increased over the period of the Celtic tiger.
In the north, where the economy is not so buoyant, there has nonetheless been a significant increase in employment over the past ten years, and most of this has occurred in typically female occupations (business services (+36,000), retail trade (+31,000) and hotels & restaurants (+15,000)). So, yet again, while one might expect women to delay having children due to their jobs, the opposite seems to have happened.
Interesting though these factors are, there is a further element in the rebound of the birth rates. The NISRA Statistical Press Release provides a breakdown of the births by local government area (see Table 3), and thus allows a very rough proxy estimation to be made of the 'community' identity of the births. As noted in previous years, the birth rates in some majority Protestant areas are well below the average. The Northern Ireland average was 13,9 babies per 1,000 of the population in 2007, and the rates for some majority Protestant areas were:
Ards: 12,2
Castlereagh: 12,3
North Down: 11,7
Coleraine: 11,4
Larne: 11,8
However, some other majority Protestant areas showed birth rates that were above the average:
Lisburn: 15,0
Antrim: 15,4
Banbridge: 14,9
These latter three are noteworthy for being relatively affordable dormitory areas for the greater Belfast area, and thus we would expect a fairly high rate of family formation. How much of this new family formation is Protestant, and how much is Catholic, is hard to tell. As this blog has pointed out before, some areas have a clearly higher proportion of Catholics amongst the very young than in the population as a whole, implying that the Catholic portion of their population is more fertile than the Protestant portion.
Adding to the difficulties in interpreting these figures are the low birth rates of some majority Catholic areas:
Moyle: 13,4
Fermanagh: 13,1
Omagh: 13,2
Strabane: 12,9
These latter areas are more rural and remote than the average, and this may have influenced the figures.
It remains true that the areas with the highest birth rates are ones with either a Catholic majority, or are close to parity:
Dungannon: 16,2
Craigavon: 16,0
Newry and Mourne: 15,9
Cookstown: 15,4
Magherafelt: 15,0
Armagh: 15,0
Derry: 14,6
This snapshot of 2007 supports the view that Catholic fertility remains higher than Protestant fertility, and thus that the current balance between the two communities is likely to keep shifting in favour of the Catholic community.
Table 4 of the Statistical Press Release is, however, the one that really raises questions, however. This shows the number of births per district over the past few years, and it shows that, despite the low birth rates, some Protestant areas showed a large increase in the number of births in 2007 compared with the previous years. For example Lisburn, with births in the range between about 1,400 and 1,500 for the past few years, shot up to 1,708 births in 2007. Ards, whose births have been in the narrow range 800 to 900, jumped to 940. Even North Down saw an increase in births in 2007.
This effect is not limited to Protestant areas. Curious little Moyle, with births in a very tight range of 183 to 198 since 2003, jumped to 225. What happened in 2006-2007 to make the women of Moyle more disposed to having children?
And more importantly, which women are having these children? In Lisburn for example, do the 200 'extra' babies come from Catholic Dunmurry, or from Protestant areas?
The current state of near-equality between the two communities in Northern Ireland makes these questions important. It is clear from a variety of sources (Census, Schools Census) that there is a Catholic majority amongst children, but this majority is not yet so great as to be irreversible. If Protestant birth rates were to rebound, and Catholic rates to decline, the achievement of a stable Catholic majority in Northern Ireland may be delayed by years, leading to a delay in the achievement of Irish re-unification.
So far there is no obvious reason for pessimism from nationalists – the TPFR in Catholic areas remains generally higher than the average, and that in many Protestant areas is still well below the average. But this is an area to watch, even though the significance of the figures can only be really tested at the time of the next Census in 2011.
The link between fertility rates and economic prosperity is a complicated one, with prosperity pushing fertility both down and up at the same time. As more women have access to contraception, and as more women work outside the home, their fertility has tended to drop – but conversely as families have become more affluent, and perhaps better able to afford reasonable housing, education and so on, they have started to have slightly more children.
The south has boomed under the Celtic tiger, and women have flooded into the workforce in massive numbers. At the same time housing and childcare are expensive, and so logically one would expect a drop in the average family size – but this has not happened. On the contrary, the birth rate has increased over the period of the Celtic tiger.
In the north, where the economy is not so buoyant, there has nonetheless been a significant increase in employment over the past ten years, and most of this has occurred in typically female occupations (business services (+36,000), retail trade (+31,000) and hotels & restaurants (+15,000)). So, yet again, while one might expect women to delay having children due to their jobs, the opposite seems to have happened.
Interesting though these factors are, there is a further element in the rebound of the birth rates. The NISRA Statistical Press Release provides a breakdown of the births by local government area (see Table 3), and thus allows a very rough proxy estimation to be made of the 'community' identity of the births. As noted in previous years, the birth rates in some majority Protestant areas are well below the average. The Northern Ireland average was 13,9 babies per 1,000 of the population in 2007, and the rates for some majority Protestant areas were:
Ards: 12,2
Castlereagh: 12,3
North Down: 11,7
Coleraine: 11,4
Larne: 11,8
However, some other majority Protestant areas showed birth rates that were above the average:
Lisburn: 15,0
Antrim: 15,4
Banbridge: 14,9
These latter three are noteworthy for being relatively affordable dormitory areas for the greater Belfast area, and thus we would expect a fairly high rate of family formation. How much of this new family formation is Protestant, and how much is Catholic, is hard to tell. As this blog has pointed out before, some areas have a clearly higher proportion of Catholics amongst the very young than in the population as a whole, implying that the Catholic portion of their population is more fertile than the Protestant portion.
Adding to the difficulties in interpreting these figures are the low birth rates of some majority Catholic areas:
Moyle: 13,4
Fermanagh: 13,1
Omagh: 13,2
Strabane: 12,9
These latter areas are more rural and remote than the average, and this may have influenced the figures.
It remains true that the areas with the highest birth rates are ones with either a Catholic majority, or are close to parity:
Dungannon: 16,2
Craigavon: 16,0
Newry and Mourne: 15,9
Cookstown: 15,4
Magherafelt: 15,0
Armagh: 15,0
Derry: 14,6
This snapshot of 2007 supports the view that Catholic fertility remains higher than Protestant fertility, and thus that the current balance between the two communities is likely to keep shifting in favour of the Catholic community.
Table 4 of the Statistical Press Release is, however, the one that really raises questions, however. This shows the number of births per district over the past few years, and it shows that, despite the low birth rates, some Protestant areas showed a large increase in the number of births in 2007 compared with the previous years. For example Lisburn, with births in the range between about 1,400 and 1,500 for the past few years, shot up to 1,708 births in 2007. Ards, whose births have been in the narrow range 800 to 900, jumped to 940. Even North Down saw an increase in births in 2007.
This effect is not limited to Protestant areas. Curious little Moyle, with births in a very tight range of 183 to 198 since 2003, jumped to 225. What happened in 2006-2007 to make the women of Moyle more disposed to having children?
And more importantly, which women are having these children? In Lisburn for example, do the 200 'extra' babies come from Catholic Dunmurry, or from Protestant areas?
The current state of near-equality between the two communities in Northern Ireland makes these questions important. It is clear from a variety of sources (Census, Schools Census) that there is a Catholic majority amongst children, but this majority is not yet so great as to be irreversible. If Protestant birth rates were to rebound, and Catholic rates to decline, the achievement of a stable Catholic majority in Northern Ireland may be delayed by years, leading to a delay in the achievement of Irish re-unification.
So far there is no obvious reason for pessimism from nationalists – the TPFR in Catholic areas remains generally higher than the average, and that in many Protestant areas is still well below the average. But this is an area to watch, even though the significance of the figures can only be really tested at the time of the next Census in 2011.
Monday 10 March 2008
Fáilte ó Rt Hon. Peter Robinson
Here's something you probably never expected to see. In a leaflet publicising the 'Make IT secure' campaign, Peter Robinson, DUP Minister for Finance, has put his name, his photo, and his signature, to an Irish language text:
[image removed temporarily]
Anyone with any knowledge of the public service will know that this could not have happened without the agreement of Robinson himself, or from one of his close advisors.
This raises interesting questions. Firstly, in the light of the DUP's open hostility towards the Irish language, why has Robinson agreed to put his name and signature to an Irish language leaflet? Secondly, why has this happened at this particular moment, when Robinson is being lined up to succeed Paisley as DUP leader? Quite apart from the Irish language aspect to the issue, the campaign is a clear example of the kind of north-southery that the DUP used to have such an objection to. A campaign that could just as easily have been 'UK-wide' is instead Ireland-wide, with Robinson placed below the southern Minister, Eoin Ryan, in the leaflet's lay-out.
Recently Edwin Poots, DUP Minister for Culture, has been receiving a lot of negative publicity (from a nationalist perspective) for his blatant discrimination against the Irish language, which, to be fair, is merely a reflection of the backwoods mentality so prevalent in the DUP. Poots is, of course, a member of the DUP's 'bigot brigade'. Is the 'Make IT secure' leaflet a shot over his bows from a member of the DUP's 'modern' wing? Is Robinson trying to subtly hint to nationalists that under his leadership the DUP will be less hostile to Irish culture? The leaflet was, of course, prepared and translated before Paisley's abdication, but everyone knew that that abdication was coming, so perhaps Robinson was already setting out his stall. If so, expect Poots to be moved or demoted in Robinson's first reshuffle of the DUP ministers.
[image removed temporarily]
Anyone with any knowledge of the public service will know that this could not have happened without the agreement of Robinson himself, or from one of his close advisors.
This raises interesting questions. Firstly, in the light of the DUP's open hostility towards the Irish language, why has Robinson agreed to put his name and signature to an Irish language leaflet? Secondly, why has this happened at this particular moment, when Robinson is being lined up to succeed Paisley as DUP leader? Quite apart from the Irish language aspect to the issue, the campaign is a clear example of the kind of north-southery that the DUP used to have such an objection to. A campaign that could just as easily have been 'UK-wide' is instead Ireland-wide, with Robinson placed below the southern Minister, Eoin Ryan, in the leaflet's lay-out.
Recently Edwin Poots, DUP Minister for Culture, has been receiving a lot of negative publicity (from a nationalist perspective) for his blatant discrimination against the Irish language, which, to be fair, is merely a reflection of the backwoods mentality so prevalent in the DUP. Poots is, of course, a member of the DUP's 'bigot brigade'. Is the 'Make IT secure' leaflet a shot over his bows from a member of the DUP's 'modern' wing? Is Robinson trying to subtly hint to nationalists that under his leadership the DUP will be less hostile to Irish culture? The leaflet was, of course, prepared and translated before Paisley's abdication, but everyone knew that that abdication was coming, so perhaps Robinson was already setting out his stall. If so, expect Poots to be moved or demoted in Robinson's first reshuffle of the DUP ministers.
Monday 3 March 2008
The laughter of our children
The political future of an octogenarian is dominating our news these days, giving the impression that the future of Northern Ireland will be decided by when Ian Paisley decides to retire. But the real future of Northern Ireland is being decided elsewhere, right at the other end of the age spectrum.
Last week the Department of Education released its annual Schools Census, a compendium of statistics of only slight interest to those outside the education system.
With one important exception: Table 5b of the compendium gives the religion of pupils in the education system.
What Table 5b shows is that Protestant children are a minority in the education system, and a declining minority too. In 2007/2008 the proportion of children whose religion was given as Protestant was 39%. This broke down as 39.5% in secondary schools and 38.5% in primary schools. The proportion who were Catholic was 50.7% (51.2% in secondary, 50.5% in primary).
There were also a small proportion from other Christian and non-Christian religions, but not enough to have any significant impact on the statistics. The only other group that was significant were those children described as 'Other/No religion/Not recorded', who accounted for 7.6% of the total.
Unionist deniers will, no doubt, claim that these 'Other/No religion/Not recorded' children are mostly (ex-)Protestants, as they appear mostly in schools in the controlled sector, which is overwhelmingly Protestant. However this claim cannot be verified, and these kids might easily be Catholics who do not wish to draw attention to themselves, or the children of mixed marriages whose religious identity is neutral. But even if one assumes that 70% of the 'Other/No religion/Not recorded' children are (ex-)Protestants, the picture still looks grim for the future of unionism, and thus for Project Ulster.
The 2007/2008 Schools Census has been carried out for a number of years, and thus it is possible to look at the evolution of the Catholic and Protestant proportions of Northern Ireland's school kids since 1999/2000.
The three graphs below show (a) the breakdown of the raw figures (Catholic and Protestant kids only), (b) the possible breakdown if one assumes the 'Other/No religion/Not recorded' children are evenly divided between the two main blocks, and (c) the possible breakdown if one assumes the 'Other/No religion/Not recorded' children are 70% 'cultural' Protestants, and 30% 'cultural' Catholics.
(a) Raw figures: Catholic and Protestant children in primary and secondary schools
The picture is clear. No matter how you try to sway the statistics, the Protestant proportion is declining, and the Catholic proportion is rising. This clear outcome mirrors the increasing proportion of religious marriages that are Catholic, and the higher birth-rate in Catholic areas. And it all adds up to one simple conclusion – Project Ulster has been beaten in the maternity wards, and it is all over bar the shouting. The whole basis of unionism's division of Ireland – its local majority in the north-eastern corner – is visible evaporating, and with it will go the division. Unionism has a short window of opportunity, before these kids grow up and vote it into oblivion, to come to an honourable settlement with their fellow Irishmen and women – but there is no indication yet that that reality has yet sunk into the consciousness of the leaders of unionism. Perhaps, like Paisley, they know that they personally will no longer be around when the day of Irish reunification comes, and so they are content to leave their children and grandchildren to their own devices.
Last week the Department of Education released its annual Schools Census, a compendium of statistics of only slight interest to those outside the education system.
With one important exception: Table 5b of the compendium gives the religion of pupils in the education system.
What Table 5b shows is that Protestant children are a minority in the education system, and a declining minority too. In 2007/2008 the proportion of children whose religion was given as Protestant was 39%. This broke down as 39.5% in secondary schools and 38.5% in primary schools. The proportion who were Catholic was 50.7% (51.2% in secondary, 50.5% in primary).
There were also a small proportion from other Christian and non-Christian religions, but not enough to have any significant impact on the statistics. The only other group that was significant were those children described as 'Other/No religion/Not recorded', who accounted for 7.6% of the total.
Unionist deniers will, no doubt, claim that these 'Other/No religion/Not recorded' children are mostly (ex-)Protestants, as they appear mostly in schools in the controlled sector, which is overwhelmingly Protestant. However this claim cannot be verified, and these kids might easily be Catholics who do not wish to draw attention to themselves, or the children of mixed marriages whose religious identity is neutral. But even if one assumes that 70% of the 'Other/No religion/Not recorded' children are (ex-)Protestants, the picture still looks grim for the future of unionism, and thus for Project Ulster.
The 2007/2008 Schools Census has been carried out for a number of years, and thus it is possible to look at the evolution of the Catholic and Protestant proportions of Northern Ireland's school kids since 1999/2000.
The three graphs below show (a) the breakdown of the raw figures (Catholic and Protestant kids only), (b) the possible breakdown if one assumes the 'Other/No religion/Not recorded' children are evenly divided between the two main blocks, and (c) the possible breakdown if one assumes the 'Other/No religion/Not recorded' children are 70% 'cultural' Protestants, and 30% 'cultural' Catholics.
(a) Raw figures: Catholic and Protestant children in primary and secondary schools
(b) Adjusted figures: assuming that the 'Other/No religion/Not recorded' children are evenly divided between the two main blocks
The picture is clear. No matter how you try to sway the statistics, the Protestant proportion is declining, and the Catholic proportion is rising. This clear outcome mirrors the increasing proportion of religious marriages that are Catholic, and the higher birth-rate in Catholic areas. And it all adds up to one simple conclusion – Project Ulster has been beaten in the maternity wards, and it is all over bar the shouting. The whole basis of unionism's division of Ireland – its local majority in the north-eastern corner – is visible evaporating, and with it will go the division. Unionism has a short window of opportunity, before these kids grow up and vote it into oblivion, to come to an honourable settlement with their fellow Irishmen and women – but there is no indication yet that that reality has yet sunk into the consciousness of the leaders of unionism. Perhaps, like Paisley, they know that they personally will no longer be around when the day of Irish reunification comes, and so they are content to leave their children and grandchildren to their own devices.
Friday 15 February 2008
Lord Laird's interest in rugby
A letter in today's Belfast Telegraph draws attention to the recent storm-in-a-teacup that John Laird (ex Stormont MP, made a lord for God-knows what reason) has been trying to stir up.
In a nut-shell, Laird is trying to insist that the Irish rugby team, whenever it plays in Belfast, should play under the British flag, and sing the British national anthem. His point appears to be that the Irish team represents two jurisdictions, one of which remains part of the UK, and that this fact is not being given adequate recognition.
But is this really his point? Is his gripe really about recognition of British symbols, or is he trying to use an ostensibly reasonable issue to further a longer-term political objective?
If Laird was a reasonable man, he might call upon the two ministers responsible for sport in Ireland to come together, under the north-south arrangements already in place, to discuss the creation of new and neutral symbols that all Irish sports fans could unite under. In that way, a common identity could be created for rugby, cricket, hockey, athletics, and other sports organised on an all-Ireland basis. And who knows, maybe even soccer a bit further down the line. If he made this suggestion, he would be pushing against an open (or at least unlocked) door in the south.
But Laird does not suggest the creation of neutral all-Ireland symbols. Instead he tries to insist on British symbols, knowing that they are unacceptable to the overwhelming majority of players and supporters of most sports organised on an all-Ireland basis. He is doing this in the knowledge that such a demand is unacceptable to the majority, because he is counting on that resistance, so that he then can call for the partition of the sporting bodies, and thus contribute even more to the partition of the country.
Laird's interest is not sport – he is on record (BBC radio Talkback programme) as saying, when asked if he supported the Ireland rugby team or the Scotland rugby team, that he unequivocally supported Scotland. His interest, as it is on so many other issues, is as far as possible to divide the north from the south, and to obstruct all areas where north-south cooperation and co-existence are the norm. He is a wall-builder rather than a bridge-builder.
So far, happily, the IRFU, the governing body of Irish rugby, has largely ignored his provocation.
In a nut-shell, Laird is trying to insist that the Irish rugby team, whenever it plays in Belfast, should play under the British flag, and sing the British national anthem. His point appears to be that the Irish team represents two jurisdictions, one of which remains part of the UK, and that this fact is not being given adequate recognition.
But is this really his point? Is his gripe really about recognition of British symbols, or is he trying to use an ostensibly reasonable issue to further a longer-term political objective?
If Laird was a reasonable man, he might call upon the two ministers responsible for sport in Ireland to come together, under the north-south arrangements already in place, to discuss the creation of new and neutral symbols that all Irish sports fans could unite under. In that way, a common identity could be created for rugby, cricket, hockey, athletics, and other sports organised on an all-Ireland basis. And who knows, maybe even soccer a bit further down the line. If he made this suggestion, he would be pushing against an open (or at least unlocked) door in the south.
But Laird does not suggest the creation of neutral all-Ireland symbols. Instead he tries to insist on British symbols, knowing that they are unacceptable to the overwhelming majority of players and supporters of most sports organised on an all-Ireland basis. He is doing this in the knowledge that such a demand is unacceptable to the majority, because he is counting on that resistance, so that he then can call for the partition of the sporting bodies, and thus contribute even more to the partition of the country.
Laird's interest is not sport – he is on record (BBC radio Talkback programme) as saying, when asked if he supported the Ireland rugby team or the Scotland rugby team, that he unequivocally supported Scotland. His interest, as it is on so many other issues, is as far as possible to divide the north from the south, and to obstruct all areas where north-south cooperation and co-existence are the norm. He is a wall-builder rather than a bridge-builder.
So far, happily, the IRFU, the governing body of Irish rugby, has largely ignored his provocation.
Jim Allister's future
The council by-election in Dromore on Wednesday 13 February can be seen either as a victory for Jim Allister's Traditional Unionist Voice party (who successfully blocked their arch-rivals, the DUP, from winning), or as a defeat (they did not win the election).
However, at council level, and perhaps more widely in Northern Ireland, the TUV is essentially a protest movement – protesting in the short term against the DUP-Sinn Féin coalition that holds the top jobs in the executive, but also protesting in the long term against all compromises with nationalism (one description of the TUV is that it is the party for those who miss the B Specials).
For its founder and chief spokesman, Jim Allister, the success or failure of the TUV has a more direct importance. Because he is an MEP, elected to the European Parliament in 2004 as the DUP candidate, and as chosen successor to Ian Paisley. His whole political future now rests on the support that he can muster via the TUV. Before he established the party there was a chance that he could remain as an independent unionist MEP, slightly critical of the DUP, but from the same political family. Now that he has set up a party specifically to target the DUP, he is prey.
So the performance of the TUV gives a foresight of the support that Allister will get in 2009 when his seat is up for re-election.
In Dromore the TUV received 19,6% of the vote, but this was not a representative area. Dromore is much more unionist than the average, with 72% of its electorate voting for one or other unionist candidate, against a Northern Ireland-wide figure of 48,7% in the 2007 Assembly election. Admittedly, in European Parliament elections, with only three seats at stake, voters tend to concentrate on electable candidates, as the minor parties and independents have no chance at all. But even in the last European Parliament elections the unionist total only reached 48,6%.
So if Allister can only attract 27% of the unionists of Dromore (i.e. 19,6% of 72%), he may have trouble in 2009. If he gets the same proportion of unionist votes then, he will barely achieve 13% of the total vote (i.e. 27% of 48,6%). And on that low percentage, he is likely to be eliminated early, as the four main parties will probably all receive more than that. If the bad blood between Allister and the DUP continues to fester, his voters may not transfer in sufficient numbers to carry the other two unionist parties beyond the SDLP candidate, and hence one of them (the UUP, probably) will be the next to be eliminated, leaving Northern Ireland with two nationalist MEPs for the first time ever. The psychological value to nationalism and the damage to unionism, of sending 2 nationalists and one unionist to Strasbourg cannot be underestimated. Allister may turn out to be an important nail in unionism's coffin.
However, at council level, and perhaps more widely in Northern Ireland, the TUV is essentially a protest movement – protesting in the short term against the DUP-Sinn Féin coalition that holds the top jobs in the executive, but also protesting in the long term against all compromises with nationalism (one description of the TUV is that it is the party for those who miss the B Specials).
For its founder and chief spokesman, Jim Allister, the success or failure of the TUV has a more direct importance. Because he is an MEP, elected to the European Parliament in 2004 as the DUP candidate, and as chosen successor to Ian Paisley. His whole political future now rests on the support that he can muster via the TUV. Before he established the party there was a chance that he could remain as an independent unionist MEP, slightly critical of the DUP, but from the same political family. Now that he has set up a party specifically to target the DUP, he is prey.
So the performance of the TUV gives a foresight of the support that Allister will get in 2009 when his seat is up for re-election.
In Dromore the TUV received 19,6% of the vote, but this was not a representative area. Dromore is much more unionist than the average, with 72% of its electorate voting for one or other unionist candidate, against a Northern Ireland-wide figure of 48,7% in the 2007 Assembly election. Admittedly, in European Parliament elections, with only three seats at stake, voters tend to concentrate on electable candidates, as the minor parties and independents have no chance at all. But even in the last European Parliament elections the unionist total only reached 48,6%.
So if Allister can only attract 27% of the unionists of Dromore (i.e. 19,6% of 72%), he may have trouble in 2009. If he gets the same proportion of unionist votes then, he will barely achieve 13% of the total vote (i.e. 27% of 48,6%). And on that low percentage, he is likely to be eliminated early, as the four main parties will probably all receive more than that. If the bad blood between Allister and the DUP continues to fester, his voters may not transfer in sufficient numbers to carry the other two unionist parties beyond the SDLP candidate, and hence one of them (the UUP, probably) will be the next to be eliminated, leaving Northern Ireland with two nationalist MEPs for the first time ever. The psychological value to nationalism and the damage to unionism, of sending 2 nationalists and one unionist to Strasbourg cannot be underestimated. Allister may turn out to be an important nail in unionism's coffin.
Thursday 14 February 2008
Banbridge District Council By-Election – Dromore DEA, 13 February 2008 – the result
The by-election in Dromore DEA (part of Banbridge District Council area) on 13 February threw up a few surprises, of which the result was not the least!
In an area where the DUP had collected almost 50% of the votes at the 2005 District Council elections, and thus should have had little trouble winning the seat this time, they were beaten. The UUP's Carol Black took advantage of the split extreme-unionist vote to come through and retain the seat vacated by her party colleague Trevor Howe, who had resigned.
The main interest in the election was, of course, the performance of Jim Allister's new Traditional Unionist Voice, and how it would affect the DUP. And affect it, it did! The DUP scored 28,3% of the first-preference votes, down 21,5% from their 2005 score. The TUV picked up 19,6% – almost exactly the amount that the DUP lost. While other factors may have played a small part, the unavoidable conclusion is that a large chunk of the DUP vote abandoned it, and moved over to the uncompromising old-style tribal unionism of the TUV. In a sense, the TUV has done to the DUP what the DUP previously did to the UUP. By providing a place even further to the right, it could snipe at everything the DUP has done, especially sharing power with the hated nationalists.
The first round of votes went thus (all figures subject to confirmation by the Electoral Office):
DUP: 1069 (28,3%)
UUP: 912 (24,2%)
TUV: 739 (19,6%)
APNI: 357 (9,5%)
SF: 350 (9,3%)
SDLP: 290 (7,7%)
Green: 59 (1,6%)
Round 2: The SDLP and Green candidates were then eliminated, and their votes transferred like this:
DUP: +5 to make: 1074
UUP: +25 to make: 937
TUV: +3 to make: 742
APNI: +122 to make: 479
SF: +157 to make: 507
SDLP ---
Green ---
This round shows two things; firstly that 'moderate' voters find the unionist extremes fairly repellent, and secondly that Sinn Féin is not as transfer unfriendly as previously thought.
Round 3: The elimination of the Alliance Party candidate would normally benefit other 'moderate' parties, but these had already been eliminated, so a large number of transfers reverted to their natural home, the UUP:
DUP: +53 to make: 1127
UUP: +182 to make: 1119
TUV: +59 to make: 801
SF: +60 to make: 567
APNI ---
SDLP ---
Green ---
In this round, unexpectedly, the supposed moderates of the Alliance Party gave the right-wing bigots of the TUV and the DUP 112 transfers. Surprising, also, is the transfer to Sinn Féin, who previously received few if any transfers from the nice middle-class Protestants of the Alliance Party.
Round 4: Having survived miraculously until now, it was Sinn Féin's turn to be eliminated, and with a choice of only three unionist parties for their transfers!
UUP: +75 to make: 1194
DUP: +51 to make: 1178
TUV: +27 to make: 828
SF ---
APNI ---
SDLP ---
Green ---
On the face of it, these transfers are quite odd. However, it is likely that the 414 votes that did not transfer included most of the 'real' (i.e. first round) Sinn Féin votes, and that the transfers were actually votes for other candidates that were simply transiting through Sinn Féin. They favoured the DUP over the two other unionist parties, which is strange if they came from the 'moderate' parties. One would expect them to favour the UUP, but perhaps they were trying to be strategic to stop any possibility of a TUV victory.
Round 5: Now with only the unionist parties left standing, the TUV's turn as kingmaker came. It had to be eliminated, but with only 16 votes separating the other two unionist parties, the breakdown of the TUV transfers decided the outcome. And such was their antipathy for the DUP that they plumped for the UUP, giving Carol Black the seat:
UUP: +377 to make: 1571
DUP: +327 to make: 1505
TUV ---
SF ---
APNI ---
SDLP ---
Green ---
So what overall lessons can Dromore teach us? Firstly, that there is a large part of the DUP electorate that is unhappy with it. The semblance of good-natured cooperation with Sinn Féin sticks in many unionist throats, as indeed it was supposed to have stuck in Ian Paisley's in previous years. To recover these anti-republican votes the DUP will have to start talking and acting tough – but the nature of the mandatory coalition means that their room for manoeuvre is small. They may end up just looking like petulant children. Another option, one that has already been signalled, is that the DUP will decide that it is time to heap all of the blame on Ian Paisley and dump him.
The TUV has done very well, but still remains essentially a protest movement. Whether it maintains its momentum until next year's elections is open to doubt. The DUP will work out a strategy to kill it off, and while the TUV is a one-man party it has few opportunities to argue its case.
On the nationalist side, while Dromore was never going to be a gain for either Sinn Féin or the SDLP, it provided a useful snapshot of their standing in a fairly middle-of-the-road country town. Worryingly for the SDLP, who put in a lot of canvassing before the election, Sinn Féin beat them, thereby strengthening their position as the senior nationalist party. The overall nationalist vote dropped to 17% (from19%), which is not too bad considering that this was a by-election for a single seat that a nationalist could not win.
The Alliance Party, who returned to Dromore's fray for the first time in 10 years, did quite well, taking both unionist and nationalist votes to reach 9,5% of the total. Their votes seem to have come from the SDLP (about 2%) and the UUP (about 7%). This should give their strategists some indication of where to seek gains in the future.
The UUP won the seat, but this was not a victory for them. In 1993 they got 63,5% of the votes in the DEA – in 2008 they got 24,2%. The spoiling tactics of the TUV handed them the seat, but they must know that it is only on loan.
In a previous blog on this election, we said that "if the TUV comes in third, its votes will also benefit the DUP"; but it seems that like many others we underestimated the antipathy of the TUV extreme unionists to the current political arrangements. The TUV, despite losing, will probably have a large impact on the future direction of the DUP, and thus ultimately on the success or failure of the whole Good Friday Agreement implementation.
While this blog is strongly anti-unionist, and relishes the sight of intra-unionist antipathy, vote-splitting and demoralisation, we recognise that the DUP will be unpredictable and therefore dangerous in the next 12 to 18 months. With the unenviable job of replacing Paisley and then facing into a series of elections, the DUP will be like a caged animal. Inevitably, to distract from intra-unionist disputes they will turn their fire on nationalism. It is to be hoped that the loyalist bigots who take their lead from the overall tone of unionist discourse will not feel in any way encouraged to revert to their habitual violence. For nationalism, the period may be a difficult one, but it should remain aware that this period will pass, and when it does, unionism will emerge weaker and nationalism stronger, than at present.
Update, 27 February 2008:
The Electoral Office has published the official result, and these show one tiny difference with respect to the results originally shown above. That difference (+327 to the DUP in the final round, to give a total of 1505) has now been corrected, and the figures above correspond to those of the Electoral Office.
In an area where the DUP had collected almost 50% of the votes at the 2005 District Council elections, and thus should have had little trouble winning the seat this time, they were beaten. The UUP's Carol Black took advantage of the split extreme-unionist vote to come through and retain the seat vacated by her party colleague Trevor Howe, who had resigned.
The main interest in the election was, of course, the performance of Jim Allister's new Traditional Unionist Voice, and how it would affect the DUP. And affect it, it did! The DUP scored 28,3% of the first-preference votes, down 21,5% from their 2005 score. The TUV picked up 19,6% – almost exactly the amount that the DUP lost. While other factors may have played a small part, the unavoidable conclusion is that a large chunk of the DUP vote abandoned it, and moved over to the uncompromising old-style tribal unionism of the TUV. In a sense, the TUV has done to the DUP what the DUP previously did to the UUP. By providing a place even further to the right, it could snipe at everything the DUP has done, especially sharing power with the hated nationalists.
The first round of votes went thus (all figures subject to confirmation by the Electoral Office):
DUP: 1069 (28,3%)
UUP: 912 (24,2%)
TUV: 739 (19,6%)
APNI: 357 (9,5%)
SF: 350 (9,3%)
SDLP: 290 (7,7%)
Green: 59 (1,6%)
Round 2: The SDLP and Green candidates were then eliminated, and their votes transferred like this:
DUP: +5 to make: 1074
UUP: +25 to make: 937
TUV: +3 to make: 742
APNI: +122 to make: 479
SF: +157 to make: 507
SDLP ---
Green ---
This round shows two things; firstly that 'moderate' voters find the unionist extremes fairly repellent, and secondly that Sinn Féin is not as transfer unfriendly as previously thought.
Round 3: The elimination of the Alliance Party candidate would normally benefit other 'moderate' parties, but these had already been eliminated, so a large number of transfers reverted to their natural home, the UUP:
DUP: +53 to make: 1127
UUP: +182 to make: 1119
TUV: +59 to make: 801
SF: +60 to make: 567
APNI ---
SDLP ---
Green ---
In this round, unexpectedly, the supposed moderates of the Alliance Party gave the right-wing bigots of the TUV and the DUP 112 transfers. Surprising, also, is the transfer to Sinn Féin, who previously received few if any transfers from the nice middle-class Protestants of the Alliance Party.
Round 4: Having survived miraculously until now, it was Sinn Féin's turn to be eliminated, and with a choice of only three unionist parties for their transfers!
UUP: +75 to make: 1194
DUP: +51 to make: 1178
TUV: +27 to make: 828
SF ---
APNI ---
SDLP ---
Green ---
On the face of it, these transfers are quite odd. However, it is likely that the 414 votes that did not transfer included most of the 'real' (i.e. first round) Sinn Féin votes, and that the transfers were actually votes for other candidates that were simply transiting through Sinn Féin. They favoured the DUP over the two other unionist parties, which is strange if they came from the 'moderate' parties. One would expect them to favour the UUP, but perhaps they were trying to be strategic to stop any possibility of a TUV victory.
Round 5: Now with only the unionist parties left standing, the TUV's turn as kingmaker came. It had to be eliminated, but with only 16 votes separating the other two unionist parties, the breakdown of the TUV transfers decided the outcome. And such was their antipathy for the DUP that they plumped for the UUP, giving Carol Black the seat:
UUP: +377 to make: 1571
DUP: +327 to make: 1505
TUV ---
SF ---
APNI ---
SDLP ---
Green ---
So what overall lessons can Dromore teach us? Firstly, that there is a large part of the DUP electorate that is unhappy with it. The semblance of good-natured cooperation with Sinn Féin sticks in many unionist throats, as indeed it was supposed to have stuck in Ian Paisley's in previous years. To recover these anti-republican votes the DUP will have to start talking and acting tough – but the nature of the mandatory coalition means that their room for manoeuvre is small. They may end up just looking like petulant children. Another option, one that has already been signalled, is that the DUP will decide that it is time to heap all of the blame on Ian Paisley and dump him.
The TUV has done very well, but still remains essentially a protest movement. Whether it maintains its momentum until next year's elections is open to doubt. The DUP will work out a strategy to kill it off, and while the TUV is a one-man party it has few opportunities to argue its case.
On the nationalist side, while Dromore was never going to be a gain for either Sinn Féin or the SDLP, it provided a useful snapshot of their standing in a fairly middle-of-the-road country town. Worryingly for the SDLP, who put in a lot of canvassing before the election, Sinn Féin beat them, thereby strengthening their position as the senior nationalist party. The overall nationalist vote dropped to 17% (from19%), which is not too bad considering that this was a by-election for a single seat that a nationalist could not win.
The Alliance Party, who returned to Dromore's fray for the first time in 10 years, did quite well, taking both unionist and nationalist votes to reach 9,5% of the total. Their votes seem to have come from the SDLP (about 2%) and the UUP (about 7%). This should give their strategists some indication of where to seek gains in the future.
The UUP won the seat, but this was not a victory for them. In 1993 they got 63,5% of the votes in the DEA – in 2008 they got 24,2%. The spoiling tactics of the TUV handed them the seat, but they must know that it is only on loan.
In a previous blog on this election, we said that "if the TUV comes in third, its votes will also benefit the DUP"; but it seems that like many others we underestimated the antipathy of the TUV extreme unionists to the current political arrangements. The TUV, despite losing, will probably have a large impact on the future direction of the DUP, and thus ultimately on the success or failure of the whole Good Friday Agreement implementation.
While this blog is strongly anti-unionist, and relishes the sight of intra-unionist antipathy, vote-splitting and demoralisation, we recognise that the DUP will be unpredictable and therefore dangerous in the next 12 to 18 months. With the unenviable job of replacing Paisley and then facing into a series of elections, the DUP will be like a caged animal. Inevitably, to distract from intra-unionist disputes they will turn their fire on nationalism. It is to be hoped that the loyalist bigots who take their lead from the overall tone of unionist discourse will not feel in any way encouraged to revert to their habitual violence. For nationalism, the period may be a difficult one, but it should remain aware that this period will pass, and when it does, unionism will emerge weaker and nationalism stronger, than at present.
Update, 27 February 2008:
The Electoral Office has published the official result, and these show one tiny difference with respect to the results originally shown above. That difference (+327 to the DUP in the final round, to give a total of 1505) has now been corrected, and the figures above correspond to those of the Electoral Office.
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