In June 2008 this blog was somewhat scathing about the DUP's plans to establish a 'Unionist Academy', which it claimed would promote "the unionist culture" and the "advantages of the union"; encourage "unionist learning in the community" and provide a forum for unionist strategising and policy-making. Intended to be a think-tank rather a bricks and mortar establishment, it would offer a forum where DUP "policies can be formulated" and would also be an educational vehicle.
The DUP announced that this 'academy' would be set up in September 2008. It wasn't.
After a year of silence on the 'academy', on 21 July 2009 the DUP's nemesis, Jim Allister (channelled through TUV Secretary Karen Boal), asked: "Where are the DUP's Academy and Equality Unit?"
By sheer coincidence, no doubt, two days later the DUP leader, Peter Robinson, made his first reference to the 'academy' in over a year: "My plans for the development of a Unionist Academy are at an advanced stage and will be made public soon."
Needless to say, no mention was made in Robinson's statement of the TUV prodding, but it is abundantly clear that his mention of the 'academy' was a direct result of the TUV's questions. Yet more proof that the DUP is almost obsessive in the attention it pays to the TUV, and proof also that the DUP recognises the danger that Allister's brand of ultra-unionism poses to the DUP. Time is running out – the DUP has failed to ward off the Allister threat since it first appeared in Dromore in February 2008. The DUP were humiliated then, and humiliated again in June this year in the European Parliament elections. And the next few elections, coming closer and closer, pose an even bigger threat – if the DUP cannot deal with the TUV by the time of the next Westminster elections (April 2010?), they risk being mortally wounded, and risk suffering the same fate that they, in their turn, inflicted on the UUP.
Friday 24 July 2009
A 'Pan-Unionist' celebration?
DUP leader Peter Robinson has called for a 'Pan-Unionist celebration of the Ulster Covenant', but either he is slightly out of touch, or he is being wilfully blind.
He said: "I believe that such an anniversary belongs to everyone in the Unionist community and that the Unionist parties should co-operate in organising a series of events to commemorate this special and significant anniversary. I will therefore be writing to Reg Empey to seek out ways in which both Unionist parties can work together to jointly organise a series of events to celebrate this important date in Unionist history. I hope to see a working group formed to that effect."
Note that the event 'belongs to everyone in the Unionist community', but that he wants to set up a working group with only the UUP!
The elephant in the DUP's living room – Jim Allister's TUV – is studiously ignored. And thus Robinson simultaneous demonstrates two things: he is still running scared of Allister, and he is not actually interested in 'pan-unionism'. Both show that unionist splitting and infighting will continue into the run-up to the various elections due in 2010 and 2011, to nationalism's advantage!
He said: "I believe that such an anniversary belongs to everyone in the Unionist community and that the Unionist parties should co-operate in organising a series of events to commemorate this special and significant anniversary. I will therefore be writing to Reg Empey to seek out ways in which both Unionist parties can work together to jointly organise a series of events to celebrate this important date in Unionist history. I hope to see a working group formed to that effect."
Note that the event 'belongs to everyone in the Unionist community', but that he wants to set up a working group with only the UUP!
The elephant in the DUP's living room – Jim Allister's TUV – is studiously ignored. And thus Robinson simultaneous demonstrates two things: he is still running scared of Allister, and he is not actually interested in 'pan-unionism'. Both show that unionist splitting and infighting will continue into the run-up to the various elections due in 2010 and 2011, to nationalism's advantage!
Thursday 23 July 2009
Let it go, Jim
Poor Jim Allister. He lost his European Parliament seat in June's election, but he just cannot let go. The inaugural meeting of the new 2009-2014 European Parliament took place in Strasbourg on 13-16 July, and from that point onward Jim was no longer an MEP.
But you wouldn't know it from his web site: http://www.jimallister.org/, which still proudly presents him as 'Jim Allister MEP – Leading for Ulster – Non-attached Member of the European Parliament'. Um, … no, Jim … you're not, any more. Let it go.
But you wouldn't know it from his web site: http://www.jimallister.org/, which still proudly presents him as 'Jim Allister MEP – Leading for Ulster – Non-attached Member of the European Parliament'. Um, … no, Jim … you're not, any more. Let it go.
The twilight of the unionist plurality
Observant readers of the recent blog The 2008 balance sheet will have noticed two things:
Firstly, the rate of change due to deaths may be slightly slowing down. In 2007 the proportion of the deaths that were probably (statistically) Protestant was 65%, whereas in 2008 the proportion was 63% - slightly less. This is, of course, entirely natural –in each younger cohort the proportion that is Catholic increases, so over time as these cohorts reach the end of the road the proportion of deaths that will be Catholic will increase. The 'tipping point' in the 2001 census was around age 24 (thus at age 32 today). This means that at ages older than that a majority (or more correctly, a 'plurality') is Protestant, but at all ages below it the majority is Catholic. However, since the 'tipping point' is so far below the average life expectancy, a majority of deaths will be Protestant for at least another 40 years – though as the tipping point gets closer to average life expectancy, the deaths will converge.
Secondly, although the blog presented a snapshot for one year – 2008 – there is no statistical reason for it not to be extended another half-generation into the future. We have the statistics necessary to calculate the natural changes in the electorate for several years to come, because the entrants and exiters are already known to us. The entrants are the children currently below 18 years old, and thanks to the 2001 census we have a reasonable idea of the breakdown of those now aged 8 to 18 (those below 8 were not yet born in 2001). We know even more about the exiters, because they were more likely to express a religious affiliation than the children. If we assume that the death rate will continue more or less unchanged for another generation, then we can work out, on a year-by-year basis, how many Catholics and Protestants will die – and thus how many potential voters the unionist and nationalist blocks will lose.
The result of this (repeat: purely statistical) exercise is as follows:
In the period up to 2019 (as far as we can see with the results of the 2001 census), the 'Catholic cultural community' will gain 143,424 new voters, as the children reach 18. The 'Protestant cultural community' will gain 128,651 new voters. But, over the same period of time, if current death rates hold, the 'Catholic cultural community' will lose 63,909 voters through death, while the 'Protestant cultural community' will lose 110,251.
This gives a net gain of 79,515 to the 'Catholic cultural community', and a net gain of 18,400 to the 'Protestant cultural community'.
Not all potential voters actually vote, of course, as we know. But the older ones are more likely to vote than the young, which exacerbates unionism's difficulty. Because the 110,251 Protestant deaths probably represent 88,201 actual voters (assuming an 80% turnout rate for the elderly)! Factoring in the 50% turnout rate of the young, and the 80% turnout rate of the elderly, we see that unionism is likely to lose 23,875 actual votes by 2019, while nationalism may gain 20,585 actual votes – a net gain by nationalism of over 44,000 actual votes.
But in the 2007 Assembly election unionism's lead over nationalism was a mere 42,121 votes. So, some time before 2019 unionism is going to lose its plurality of the vote. No wonder some of its more foresightful members are trying to find a way to recruit Catholics.
This analysis does not include migration, which may play a role as well. We have seen (as has unionism!) that young Protestants are more likely to go to university in Britain than young Catholics, and once there they are more likely to stay there. So this would have the effect of removing a small additional number of potential unionist voters. Whether non-university migration might counteract (or reinforce) this trend we cannot yet see, but clearly unionism is worried, and with very good reason.
Another unfactored element is the increasing propensity of young voters to vote as they get older. An 18 year old may have only a 50% likelihood of voting, but that same individual a few years later is more likely to vote. As the younger cohort is majority-Catholic this factor may add slightly to the nationalist vote as time goes on.
We are living through the twilight of the unionist plurality. What follows it will be a period of double-minority, when neither unionism nor nationalism has a majority of either votes or seats, and the 'centre parties' will come into their own. But beyond that time should come a 'dawn', when nationalism finally achieves a majority in Northern Ireland. Of course, a week is a long time in politics, and this dawn will be almost a generation away, so all manner of things could change. Except, of course, the inexorable demographic decline of Northern Ireland's Protestant population – unionism's historic constituency.
Firstly, the rate of change due to deaths may be slightly slowing down. In 2007 the proportion of the deaths that were probably (statistically) Protestant was 65%, whereas in 2008 the proportion was 63% - slightly less. This is, of course, entirely natural –in each younger cohort the proportion that is Catholic increases, so over time as these cohorts reach the end of the road the proportion of deaths that will be Catholic will increase. The 'tipping point' in the 2001 census was around age 24 (thus at age 32 today). This means that at ages older than that a majority (or more correctly, a 'plurality') is Protestant, but at all ages below it the majority is Catholic. However, since the 'tipping point' is so far below the average life expectancy, a majority of deaths will be Protestant for at least another 40 years – though as the tipping point gets closer to average life expectancy, the deaths will converge.
Secondly, although the blog presented a snapshot for one year – 2008 – there is no statistical reason for it not to be extended another half-generation into the future. We have the statistics necessary to calculate the natural changes in the electorate for several years to come, because the entrants and exiters are already known to us. The entrants are the children currently below 18 years old, and thanks to the 2001 census we have a reasonable idea of the breakdown of those now aged 8 to 18 (those below 8 were not yet born in 2001). We know even more about the exiters, because they were more likely to express a religious affiliation than the children. If we assume that the death rate will continue more or less unchanged for another generation, then we can work out, on a year-by-year basis, how many Catholics and Protestants will die – and thus how many potential voters the unionist and nationalist blocks will lose.
The result of this (repeat: purely statistical) exercise is as follows:
In the period up to 2019 (as far as we can see with the results of the 2001 census), the 'Catholic cultural community' will gain 143,424 new voters, as the children reach 18. The 'Protestant cultural community' will gain 128,651 new voters. But, over the same period of time, if current death rates hold, the 'Catholic cultural community' will lose 63,909 voters through death, while the 'Protestant cultural community' will lose 110,251.
This gives a net gain of 79,515 to the 'Catholic cultural community', and a net gain of 18,400 to the 'Protestant cultural community'.
Not all potential voters actually vote, of course, as we know. But the older ones are more likely to vote than the young, which exacerbates unionism's difficulty. Because the 110,251 Protestant deaths probably represent 88,201 actual voters (assuming an 80% turnout rate for the elderly)! Factoring in the 50% turnout rate of the young, and the 80% turnout rate of the elderly, we see that unionism is likely to lose 23,875 actual votes by 2019, while nationalism may gain 20,585 actual votes – a net gain by nationalism of over 44,000 actual votes.
But in the 2007 Assembly election unionism's lead over nationalism was a mere 42,121 votes. So, some time before 2019 unionism is going to lose its plurality of the vote. No wonder some of its more foresightful members are trying to find a way to recruit Catholics.
This analysis does not include migration, which may play a role as well. We have seen (as has unionism!) that young Protestants are more likely to go to university in Britain than young Catholics, and once there they are more likely to stay there. So this would have the effect of removing a small additional number of potential unionist voters. Whether non-university migration might counteract (or reinforce) this trend we cannot yet see, but clearly unionism is worried, and with very good reason.
Another unfactored element is the increasing propensity of young voters to vote as they get older. An 18 year old may have only a 50% likelihood of voting, but that same individual a few years later is more likely to vote. As the younger cohort is majority-Catholic this factor may add slightly to the nationalist vote as time goes on.
We are living through the twilight of the unionist plurality. What follows it will be a period of double-minority, when neither unionism nor nationalism has a majority of either votes or seats, and the 'centre parties' will come into their own. But beyond that time should come a 'dawn', when nationalism finally achieves a majority in Northern Ireland. Of course, a week is a long time in politics, and this dawn will be almost a generation away, so all manner of things could change. Except, of course, the inexorable demographic decline of Northern Ireland's Protestant population – unionism's historic constituency.
Monday 20 July 2009
The 2008 balance sheet
As last year (Part 1 and Part 2), this blog will examine the changes in the sizes of the two main religious blocks (Protestant and Catholic) during 2008 in order to get some idea of the changes in the relative sizes of the two main political blocks (unionist and nationalist).
Since we do not have any reliable statistics on migration, we are left with only the other components of the 'natural' evolution of the population to look at: births and deaths. In the context of politics, of course, a voter is 'born' at chronological age 18!
Deaths
NISRA published their Press Notice on Deaths in Northern Ireland in 2008 in March, which provides the actual number of deaths for each age band (in Table 3). Combining this with the results of the 2001 Census (Table S306: Age By Sex And Community Background (Religion Or Religion Brought Up In)), and moving the 2001 cohorts forward to more closely match their actual ages in 2008, it is possible to estimate the religious (and thus political) affiliations of the deceased people, and thereby to estimate the relative losses for each of the main political blocks.
The result is as follows. Of the 14,907 deaths in 2008, around 5,321 are likely to have been Catholic, 9,388 Protestant, and 198 'other' or no religion. From a political perspective, of course, only voters matter, so if we take only those of voting age, around 5,186 were Catholic, 9,270 Protestant, and 176 'other' or no religion. So, in the course of the single year 2008 unionism lost 4,067 more potential votes than nationalism through death.
In the 2007 Assembly elections unionism won 335,888 votes (48.7% of the total), to nationalism's 293,767 (42.6% of the total). The gap between the two main blocks was therefore 42,121 votes. In the 2007 Assembly election the turn-out was only 61.9%, so the 4,067 potential votes would normally represent only 2,518 actual votes (61.9% x 4,067). However, older people have a higher than average turnout rate, and thus the real losses to the two blocks through death is actually higher. There are a number of studies that show that older people are very likely to vote (in the order of 85%), while younger people have turnout rates of barely over 50%. So, out of the loss of 4,067 potential voters due to deaths the actual net loss to unionism may have been 3,254 actual votes, or 7.7% of its 2007 advantage. If the evolution of the electorate was dependent on deaths alone, unionism's lead would be cut to zero within 13 years!
But there is another factor - the new voters that the two main political blocks can expect to gain as voters reach their 18th birthdays.
New voters
This is a fairly easy calculation, as the people who turned 18 in 2008 will largely be those who were 11 in 2001, when the Census recorded their religions (in Table S306: Age By Sex And Community Background (Religion Or Religion Brought Up In)). Migration may also play a small part, but since 18 year-olds who move (to university, for instance) tend to remain registered at their home address, if they vote at all, it is likely to be in the same place that they lived as children. The religious break-down of 11 year-olds in 2001 was as follows: Catholic – 12,902 (49.7%), Protestant – 11,904 (45.8%), other religion or none – 1,157 (4.5%).
So around 25,963 new voters came of age in 2008. For 1,157 of them no real conclusions can be drawn, but for the vast majority this blog's working hypothesis (reminder: that (constitutional) political preferences in the north of Ireland are very closely related to religious affiliation) tends to indicate a net gain for nationalism of 998 potential voters (though remember their low turn-out rate). If we combine these figures with those for deaths, we can calculate a rough balance sheet for 2008, taking the votes in the 2007 Assembly election, adding the new voters and subtracting the deaths. Allowance is made for the different turnout rates of younger and older people. While no data on this has been published specifically for Northern Ireland - a very politicised society - evidence from Britain shows that youthful disaffection is massive. This analysis will take this into account by estimating a conservative turnout rate of 80% for the older voters, and 50% for new voters.
Outcome
The calculations below include the balance sheets for 2007, as calculated last year (Part 1 and Part 2):
(1) Nationalism
2007 Assembly election: 293,767 (42.6% of the total)
2007 gains - New voters: 13,352 x 50% = 6,676
2007 losses - Deaths (voting age only): 4,874 x 80% = 3,899
2008 gains - New voters: 12,902 x 50% = 6,451
2008 losses - Deaths (voting age only): 5,321 x 80% = 4,257
New total: 298,738
(2) Unionism
2007 Assembly election: 335,888 votes (48.7% of the total)
2007 gains - New voters: 11,941 x 50% = 5,970
2007 losses - Deaths (voting age only): 9,517 x 80% = 7,614
2008 gains - New voters: 11,904 x 50% = 5,952
2008 losses - Deaths (voting age only): 9,388 x 80% = 7,510
New total: 332,686
(3) Others or no religion
2007 Assembly election: 60,658 votes (8.8% of the total)
2007 gains - New voters: 1,110 x 50% = 555
2007 losses - Deaths (voting age only): 145 x 80% = 116
2008 gains - New voters: 1,157 x 50% = 579
2008 losses - Deaths (voting age only): 176 x 80% = 141
New total: 61,535
At the end of 2008, therefore, we might have expected a voting electorate of 692,959, of whom: 298,738 will vote nationalist (43.1%), 332,686 will vote unionist (48.0%), and 61,535 will vote for other candidates (8.8%).
The gap between nationalism and unionism, 42,121 votes in the 2007 Assembly election, would be reduced to 33,948, representing a reduction in this gap of 8,173. In only two years, therefore, unionism would have lost over 19% of its numerical superiority over nationalism.
2009, of course, allowed us an opportunity to test these assumptions, but in the European Parliament election the turn-out was disappointingly low, making any comparisons with 2007 unsafe. Nonetheless, it was instructive to notice that the percentages that voted for the three blocks were very similar to those calculated above (unionist 49.0%, nationalist 42.2%, and others 8.8%), and the gap between the unionist and nationalist totals was 32,763.
Conclusion
Last year we estimated that unionism had less than 10 years of numerical superiority left. The updating of the statistics to include 2008 shows that this estimate still stands, but since one of those years has now passed, unionism probably only has nine years left before it is equalled or overtaken by nationalism. This is a purely statistical calculation and turn-out rates or 'novelties' (like the TUV) may influence the actual outcomes at each election – but in the long run the trend will probably continue, unless one or other block succeeds in attracting votes from its rival politico-ethno-religious group.
Since we do not have any reliable statistics on migration, we are left with only the other components of the 'natural' evolution of the population to look at: births and deaths. In the context of politics, of course, a voter is 'born' at chronological age 18!
Deaths
NISRA published their Press Notice on Deaths in Northern Ireland in 2008 in March, which provides the actual number of deaths for each age band (in Table 3). Combining this with the results of the 2001 Census (Table S306: Age By Sex And Community Background (Religion Or Religion Brought Up In)), and moving the 2001 cohorts forward to more closely match their actual ages in 2008, it is possible to estimate the religious (and thus political) affiliations of the deceased people, and thereby to estimate the relative losses for each of the main political blocks.
The result is as follows. Of the 14,907 deaths in 2008, around 5,321 are likely to have been Catholic, 9,388 Protestant, and 198 'other' or no religion. From a political perspective, of course, only voters matter, so if we take only those of voting age, around 5,186 were Catholic, 9,270 Protestant, and 176 'other' or no religion. So, in the course of the single year 2008 unionism lost 4,067 more potential votes than nationalism through death.
In the 2007 Assembly elections unionism won 335,888 votes (48.7% of the total), to nationalism's 293,767 (42.6% of the total). The gap between the two main blocks was therefore 42,121 votes. In the 2007 Assembly election the turn-out was only 61.9%, so the 4,067 potential votes would normally represent only 2,518 actual votes (61.9% x 4,067). However, older people have a higher than average turnout rate, and thus the real losses to the two blocks through death is actually higher. There are a number of studies that show that older people are very likely to vote (in the order of 85%), while younger people have turnout rates of barely over 50%. So, out of the loss of 4,067 potential voters due to deaths the actual net loss to unionism may have been 3,254 actual votes, or 7.7% of its 2007 advantage. If the evolution of the electorate was dependent on deaths alone, unionism's lead would be cut to zero within 13 years!
But there is another factor - the new voters that the two main political blocks can expect to gain as voters reach their 18th birthdays.
New voters
This is a fairly easy calculation, as the people who turned 18 in 2008 will largely be those who were 11 in 2001, when the Census recorded their religions (in Table S306: Age By Sex And Community Background (Religion Or Religion Brought Up In)). Migration may also play a small part, but since 18 year-olds who move (to university, for instance) tend to remain registered at their home address, if they vote at all, it is likely to be in the same place that they lived as children. The religious break-down of 11 year-olds in 2001 was as follows: Catholic – 12,902 (49.7%), Protestant – 11,904 (45.8%), other religion or none – 1,157 (4.5%).
So around 25,963 new voters came of age in 2008. For 1,157 of them no real conclusions can be drawn, but for the vast majority this blog's working hypothesis (reminder: that (constitutional) political preferences in the north of Ireland are very closely related to religious affiliation) tends to indicate a net gain for nationalism of 998 potential voters (though remember their low turn-out rate). If we combine these figures with those for deaths, we can calculate a rough balance sheet for 2008, taking the votes in the 2007 Assembly election, adding the new voters and subtracting the deaths. Allowance is made for the different turnout rates of younger and older people. While no data on this has been published specifically for Northern Ireland - a very politicised society - evidence from Britain shows that youthful disaffection is massive. This analysis will take this into account by estimating a conservative turnout rate of 80% for the older voters, and 50% for new voters.
Outcome
The calculations below include the balance sheets for 2007, as calculated last year (Part 1 and Part 2):
(1) Nationalism
2007 Assembly election: 293,767 (42.6% of the total)
2007 gains - New voters: 13,352 x 50% = 6,676
2007 losses - Deaths (voting age only): 4,874 x 80% = 3,899
2008 gains - New voters: 12,902 x 50% = 6,451
2008 losses - Deaths (voting age only): 5,321 x 80% = 4,257
New total: 298,738
(2) Unionism
2007 Assembly election: 335,888 votes (48.7% of the total)
2007 gains - New voters: 11,941 x 50% = 5,970
2007 losses - Deaths (voting age only): 9,517 x 80% = 7,614
2008 gains - New voters: 11,904 x 50% = 5,952
2008 losses - Deaths (voting age only): 9,388 x 80% = 7,510
New total: 332,686
(3) Others or no religion
2007 Assembly election: 60,658 votes (8.8% of the total)
2007 gains - New voters: 1,110 x 50% = 555
2007 losses - Deaths (voting age only): 145 x 80% = 116
2008 gains - New voters: 1,157 x 50% = 579
2008 losses - Deaths (voting age only): 176 x 80% = 141
New total: 61,535
At the end of 2008, therefore, we might have expected a voting electorate of 692,959, of whom: 298,738 will vote nationalist (43.1%), 332,686 will vote unionist (48.0%), and 61,535 will vote for other candidates (8.8%).
The gap between nationalism and unionism, 42,121 votes in the 2007 Assembly election, would be reduced to 33,948, representing a reduction in this gap of 8,173. In only two years, therefore, unionism would have lost over 19% of its numerical superiority over nationalism.
2009, of course, allowed us an opportunity to test these assumptions, but in the European Parliament election the turn-out was disappointingly low, making any comparisons with 2007 unsafe. Nonetheless, it was instructive to notice that the percentages that voted for the three blocks were very similar to those calculated above (unionist 49.0%, nationalist 42.2%, and others 8.8%), and the gap between the unionist and nationalist totals was 32,763.
Conclusion
Last year we estimated that unionism had less than 10 years of numerical superiority left. The updating of the statistics to include 2008 shows that this estimate still stands, but since one of those years has now passed, unionism probably only has nine years left before it is equalled or overtaken by nationalism. This is a purely statistical calculation and turn-out rates or 'novelties' (like the TUV) may influence the actual outcomes at each election – but in the long run the trend will probably continue, unless one or other block succeeds in attracting votes from its rival politico-ethno-religious group.
Friday 17 July 2009
Making tea and sandwiches
Apparently that is all that women in the UUP do. A cursory glance at the UUP's website reveals a sea of middle-aged men:
Dig deeper and you find that their MLA profiles are entirely male … well, of course, the UUP have no women amongst of their 18 MLAs – they must have all been making the tea and sandwiches when the nominations for candidates were decided.
Ah, but let's not forget that they have a female MP … or do they?
What do the UUP's new friends in the Conservative Party think of their female-unfriendly approach? The Tory 'shadow cabinet' is noticeable more female than the UUP, and people in Britain tend to see patriarchal parties like the UUP in a less than positive light. So when the inevitable 'joint selection committees' start their work, expect to see some new female faces – the question will be, though, who they will be. The UUP is rather short on photogenic and electable women – possibly as a direct result of its patriarchal past. Some of the existing male candidates will have to stand aside in order to allow a more modern image to be presented – and how will they take that?
This blog identified Deirdre Nelson – who defected from the DUP to the Conservatives in June – as a possible future candidate. But as a defector she will get little support from DUP voters, as a Tory she has a very slim support base, and within the UUP there will be several men in North Antrim who will be quite unhappy to be pushed off the list to make way for an ex-DUP woman.
What other women will appear on a ballot paper for the UCUNF vehicle-of-convenience? The non-merger has three sets of elections coming up in which it must prove that it is not just the old UUP – the Westminster election next year, and the Assembly and district council elections in 2011. It has already flunked the 'Time for Change' challenge this year by standing the same old UUP candidate for the European elections. Within two years it must prove that UCUNF actually means something by finding a raft of new candidates – women, minorities and (whisper it) ... Catholics. Otherwise UCUNF will be shown to be a fraud – just the old UUP with its hand in the Tory pockets.
McGimpsey's absurd quest to stop a united Ireland
Yesterday the UUP's Christopher McGimpsey tried, in an article in the Guardian newspaper, to refute Gerry Adams earlier article in the same newspaper.
McGimpsey's article is worth dissecting in detail, as it presents the thinking of a man who is seen by some as a moderniser within the UUP, and as an intelligent unionist. The result is not encouraging for unionism.
McGimpsey starts:
"Disastrous results in the Republic of Ireland's past two elections have forced Sinn Féin to kickstart yet another crusade for Irish unity, the terms of which were set out by Gerry Adams on Comment is free yesterday. In Dáil elections they did not make the breakthrough they hoped and indeed have lost ground. But it was in the recent European elections in the Republic that the Sinn Féin experiment really showed its vulnerability."
But the Sinn Féin result in the 2007 Dáil election was hardly 'disastrous' – their vote, and their share of the vote actually increased, from 121,000 (6.5%) in 2002 to 143,410 (6.94%) in 2007. Yes, they lost one of their five seats, but in a Proportional Representation electoral system these things happen. McGimpsey's own party has, of course, suffered far worse results in Northern Ireland than the one he calls 'disastrous' when it is Sinn Féin's (in McGimpsey's personal case, the UUP vote in Belfast Court from 23.1% in 2001 to 7.7% in 2007, and McGimpsey lost his seat!).
"The loss of the Sinn Féin vice-president Mary Lou McDonald's European seat was probably a death blow. It indicated that Sinn Féin cannot break out of its northern ghetto. While it is still possible in Northern Ireland to simply avoid real answers to questions by hiding behind the rhetoric of the peace process, this is not an option in the republic or further afield."
There are lies, damned lies, and deliberate deceptions – and this statement falls into the latter category. McDonald's seat was already lost well before the election, when the number of southern MEPs was reduced from 13 to 12, and the number in Dublin from 4 to 3. Since McDonald had barely scraped in in 2004 below quota, it was her seat that was clearly the most vulnerable. As for this being a 'death blow', only time will tell.
"Adams sets himself three goals.
First, he wants the UK government to actively encourage a united Ireland. He makes no suggestions as to how he would achieve this or what the government would do to further a united Ireland agenda."
Indeed. But as this blog explained yesterday, there may be very good financial reasons why a future British government might want to ease the ungrateful colony in the direction of a united Ireland.
"Second, he wants the Irish government "to begin preparations for Irish unity". Once again there is no specificity to his call – and no costings. Someone should tell him that the Celtic Tiger has limped back into the undergrowth in such poor health that it will probably never be seen again. The republic cannot afford a united Ireland and its population by and large does not want it. The average citizen in the republic wants to go to bed at night and feel that Catholics in Northern ireland are receiving a fair shake. In other words they feel that the current political dispensation is the basis for Ireland's future."
McGimpsey is here starting to show his nasty streak, with his gloating about the economic difficulties in the south. He neglects to mention, of course, two important facts: the UK is suffering almost as badly at present, and most economists agree that the fundamental of the (southern) Irish economy are actually quite good, and that once the world economy picks up Ireland will be well placed to grow again.
He also cannot help himself – the immature unionist argument is here again used: "The republic cannot afford a united Ireland". Pathetic.
"Lastly he wants "to engage with Ulster unionism on the type of Ireland we want to create".
This last goal is undoubtedly the most ridiculous."
This goal is, of course, far from ridiculous. Irish nationalists intend to reunite our country, and unionists will be part of that country. It is essential that their voice is heard and heeded, and no true republican would have it any other way. Would McGimpsey prefer republicans to refuse to listen to unionism? I suppose he would, in order that he could whinge about being ignored!
"An Ulster unionist is someone who, by definition, believes in the efficacy of the Union. As a unionist I like being a member of a multinational, multiethnic, multicultural, multilinguistic, liberal, pluralist democracy. What Adams seems to believe is that we would voluntarily give all of this up and join another state. He gives no rationale for this suggestion. He seems to think that it will simply happen."
McGimpsey may "like being a member" of a pluralist society, but he and his political friends do their utmost to stop Northern Ireland from being 'multinational, multiethnic, multicultural, multilinguistic, liberal, or pluralist'. Where is his support for overt, official recognition for the Irish dimension, for the Irish flag, culture, sports and languages? What has his party done to promote 'multilingualism' concerning the Irish language? Does his party participate in the 'multicultural' St Patrick's Day festivities? Do members of his party actively support their local GAA clubs? His claims about what he 'likes being a member of' are proved to be lies on a daily basis by himself, his party, and its political alles.
"The problem that Adams has with his quest for a united Ireland is that he has no conception as to why over 1,000,000 Irishmen and Irishwomen would wish to remain within the United Kingdom. He seems to view us simply as errant brothers and sisters who can be easily persuaded to see the errors of our ways. Apart from being insulting, this is also dangerous."
The old canard about the 'million unionists'. There are, at the latest count (the 2007 Assembly election – the turnout in this year's European election was too low to count) 310,866 Unionist votes. There were independents and others who could validly be called unionists, but the total including these people would barely reach a third of a million – a third of McGimpsey's exaggerated claim!
Now, he would claim that even some non-voters "would wish to remain within the United Kingdom", but since they continually fail to prove this by voting for a unionist candidate, why should we believe him?
Perhaps he is conflating the concepts of 'Protestant' and 'unionist'? It is a common fallacy, but even then he is wrong – the 2001 census (Table s308) recorded precisely 759,193 Protestants in Northern Ireland (and 678,462 Catholics). McGimpsey is playing fast and loose with statistics to try to big up his argument – a sure sign that he knows himself to be on thin ice.
"If 30 years of violence, the murder of 2,000 people by the IRA and similar action by their loyalist counterparts, could not bring about a united Ireland then how does he believe that a series of conferences in the US and Great Britain can somehow persuade a significant section of the Irish race to completely change a political position they have held for many generations."
The IRA's war ended quite a few years ago, and for precisely the reason that McGimpsey mentions – it was not helping to achieve a united Ireland. But the failure of a military campaign is hardly proof that persuasion is pointless – they are two completely different things. And as time passes, and new generations grow up, the bitterness of the "30 years" will die down.
"The difficulty that Adams faces is that under the Good Friday Agreement the Irish government gave up its territorial claim over the people and territory of Northern Ireland and accepted that a united Ireland is not a right, but can only come about once the majority of the population of Northern Ireland demands it. Northern Ireland remains within the United Kingdom and Martin McGuinness, a former member of the Army Council of the Provisional IRA, is our deputy first minister. He and his Sinn Féin colleagues are helping the rest of us (DUP, UUP and SDLP) to administer British rule in Northern Ireland."
From factually correct to childishly taunting in one paragraph. Pathetic.
"There has been a final result to the IRA's armed struggle and they lost. Democracy won. The Irish and British governments won. More importantly, the people of Northern Ireland won. Comments likes those made by Gerry Adams this week in the "Mother of Parliaments" are simply a crude attempt to persuade Sinn Féin supporters in Northern Ireland that quest for a United Ireland goes on and is achievable. Everyone else in Ireland knows this to be nonsense."
Democracy, as McGimpsey should know, includes the right to campaign for a united Ireland. That is a right that McGimsey's own party agreed to in the GFA. And the quest for a United Ireland does go on, but unlike McGimpsey, many people in Ireland believe it to be very achievable. Time again will tell.
"Adams finishes his piece by stating that if 20 years ago he had, "... been in London asking for support to build a peace process I would have been thought of as at best naive or just daft. Had I predicted cessations, peace talks, an international agreement ... I would have been dismissed by the Guardian and others as crazy."
No Gerry you would not. But your comments this week are such that the Guardian and others might be forgiven for thinking that you are slightly bonkers."
McGimpsey attempts to end his piece on a patronising 'pat the little boy on the head' note, but ends up, frankly, sounding silly. If this is the best defence that unionism can come up with to a concerted campaign for reunification, then they may well be in trouble. There is no attempt by McGimpsey to actually argue any merits of the UK – he resorts instead to insults, taunts and dodgy statistics. Much the same as unionism has used for a long time, in fact. So it seems that while nationalism, and especially republicanism, is trying to find new paths for itself, unionism is still stuck in its old ways. As the demography changes, the old unionist ways will not be enough to save it, but it seems that they have still not started to face up to his. All the better for the nationalist cause!
McGimpsey's article is worth dissecting in detail, as it presents the thinking of a man who is seen by some as a moderniser within the UUP, and as an intelligent unionist. The result is not encouraging for unionism.
McGimpsey starts:
"Disastrous results in the Republic of Ireland's past two elections have forced Sinn Féin to kickstart yet another crusade for Irish unity, the terms of which were set out by Gerry Adams on Comment is free yesterday. In Dáil elections they did not make the breakthrough they hoped and indeed have lost ground. But it was in the recent European elections in the Republic that the Sinn Féin experiment really showed its vulnerability."
But the Sinn Féin result in the 2007 Dáil election was hardly 'disastrous' – their vote, and their share of the vote actually increased, from 121,000 (6.5%) in 2002 to 143,410 (6.94%) in 2007. Yes, they lost one of their five seats, but in a Proportional Representation electoral system these things happen. McGimpsey's own party has, of course, suffered far worse results in Northern Ireland than the one he calls 'disastrous' when it is Sinn Féin's (in McGimpsey's personal case, the UUP vote in Belfast Court from 23.1% in 2001 to 7.7% in 2007, and McGimpsey lost his seat!).
"The loss of the Sinn Féin vice-president Mary Lou McDonald's European seat was probably a death blow. It indicated that Sinn Féin cannot break out of its northern ghetto. While it is still possible in Northern Ireland to simply avoid real answers to questions by hiding behind the rhetoric of the peace process, this is not an option in the republic or further afield."
There are lies, damned lies, and deliberate deceptions – and this statement falls into the latter category. McDonald's seat was already lost well before the election, when the number of southern MEPs was reduced from 13 to 12, and the number in Dublin from 4 to 3. Since McDonald had barely scraped in in 2004 below quota, it was her seat that was clearly the most vulnerable. As for this being a 'death blow', only time will tell.
"Adams sets himself three goals.
First, he wants the UK government to actively encourage a united Ireland. He makes no suggestions as to how he would achieve this or what the government would do to further a united Ireland agenda."
Indeed. But as this blog explained yesterday, there may be very good financial reasons why a future British government might want to ease the ungrateful colony in the direction of a united Ireland.
"Second, he wants the Irish government "to begin preparations for Irish unity". Once again there is no specificity to his call – and no costings. Someone should tell him that the Celtic Tiger has limped back into the undergrowth in such poor health that it will probably never be seen again. The republic cannot afford a united Ireland and its population by and large does not want it. The average citizen in the republic wants to go to bed at night and feel that Catholics in Northern ireland are receiving a fair shake. In other words they feel that the current political dispensation is the basis for Ireland's future."
McGimpsey is here starting to show his nasty streak, with his gloating about the economic difficulties in the south. He neglects to mention, of course, two important facts: the UK is suffering almost as badly at present, and most economists agree that the fundamental of the (southern) Irish economy are actually quite good, and that once the world economy picks up Ireland will be well placed to grow again.
He also cannot help himself – the immature unionist argument is here again used: "The republic cannot afford a united Ireland". Pathetic.
"Lastly he wants "to engage with Ulster unionism on the type of Ireland we want to create".
This last goal is undoubtedly the most ridiculous."
This goal is, of course, far from ridiculous. Irish nationalists intend to reunite our country, and unionists will be part of that country. It is essential that their voice is heard and heeded, and no true republican would have it any other way. Would McGimpsey prefer republicans to refuse to listen to unionism? I suppose he would, in order that he could whinge about being ignored!
"An Ulster unionist is someone who, by definition, believes in the efficacy of the Union. As a unionist I like being a member of a multinational, multiethnic, multicultural, multilinguistic, liberal, pluralist democracy. What Adams seems to believe is that we would voluntarily give all of this up and join another state. He gives no rationale for this suggestion. He seems to think that it will simply happen."
McGimpsey may "like being a member" of a pluralist society, but he and his political friends do their utmost to stop Northern Ireland from being 'multinational, multiethnic, multicultural, multilinguistic, liberal, or pluralist'. Where is his support for overt, official recognition for the Irish dimension, for the Irish flag, culture, sports and languages? What has his party done to promote 'multilingualism' concerning the Irish language? Does his party participate in the 'multicultural' St Patrick's Day festivities? Do members of his party actively support their local GAA clubs? His claims about what he 'likes being a member of' are proved to be lies on a daily basis by himself, his party, and its political alles.
"The problem that Adams has with his quest for a united Ireland is that he has no conception as to why over 1,000,000 Irishmen and Irishwomen would wish to remain within the United Kingdom. He seems to view us simply as errant brothers and sisters who can be easily persuaded to see the errors of our ways. Apart from being insulting, this is also dangerous."
The old canard about the 'million unionists'. There are, at the latest count (the 2007 Assembly election – the turnout in this year's European election was too low to count) 310,866 Unionist votes. There were independents and others who could validly be called unionists, but the total including these people would barely reach a third of a million – a third of McGimpsey's exaggerated claim!
Now, he would claim that even some non-voters "would wish to remain within the United Kingdom", but since they continually fail to prove this by voting for a unionist candidate, why should we believe him?
Perhaps he is conflating the concepts of 'Protestant' and 'unionist'? It is a common fallacy, but even then he is wrong – the 2001 census (Table s308) recorded precisely 759,193 Protestants in Northern Ireland (and 678,462 Catholics). McGimpsey is playing fast and loose with statistics to try to big up his argument – a sure sign that he knows himself to be on thin ice.
"If 30 years of violence, the murder of 2,000 people by the IRA and similar action by their loyalist counterparts, could not bring about a united Ireland then how does he believe that a series of conferences in the US and Great Britain can somehow persuade a significant section of the Irish race to completely change a political position they have held for many generations."
The IRA's war ended quite a few years ago, and for precisely the reason that McGimpsey mentions – it was not helping to achieve a united Ireland. But the failure of a military campaign is hardly proof that persuasion is pointless – they are two completely different things. And as time passes, and new generations grow up, the bitterness of the "30 years" will die down.
"The difficulty that Adams faces is that under the Good Friday Agreement the Irish government gave up its territorial claim over the people and territory of Northern Ireland and accepted that a united Ireland is not a right, but can only come about once the majority of the population of Northern Ireland demands it. Northern Ireland remains within the United Kingdom and Martin McGuinness, a former member of the Army Council of the Provisional IRA, is our deputy first minister. He and his Sinn Féin colleagues are helping the rest of us (DUP, UUP and SDLP) to administer British rule in Northern Ireland."
From factually correct to childishly taunting in one paragraph. Pathetic.
"There has been a final result to the IRA's armed struggle and they lost. Democracy won. The Irish and British governments won. More importantly, the people of Northern Ireland won. Comments likes those made by Gerry Adams this week in the "Mother of Parliaments" are simply a crude attempt to persuade Sinn Féin supporters in Northern Ireland that quest for a United Ireland goes on and is achievable. Everyone else in Ireland knows this to be nonsense."
Democracy, as McGimpsey should know, includes the right to campaign for a united Ireland. That is a right that McGimsey's own party agreed to in the GFA. And the quest for a United Ireland does go on, but unlike McGimpsey, many people in Ireland believe it to be very achievable. Time again will tell.
"Adams finishes his piece by stating that if 20 years ago he had, "... been in London asking for support to build a peace process I would have been thought of as at best naive or just daft. Had I predicted cessations, peace talks, an international agreement ... I would have been dismissed by the Guardian and others as crazy."
No Gerry you would not. But your comments this week are such that the Guardian and others might be forgiven for thinking that you are slightly bonkers."
McGimpsey attempts to end his piece on a patronising 'pat the little boy on the head' note, but ends up, frankly, sounding silly. If this is the best defence that unionism can come up with to a concerted campaign for reunification, then they may well be in trouble. There is no attempt by McGimpsey to actually argue any merits of the UK – he resorts instead to insults, taunts and dodgy statistics. Much the same as unionism has used for a long time, in fact. So it seems that while nationalism, and especially republicanism, is trying to find new paths for itself, unionism is still stuck in its old ways. As the demography changes, the old unionist ways will not be enough to save it, but it seems that they have still not started to face up to his. All the better for the nationalist cause!
Thursday 16 July 2009
The perils of dependency
A constant refrain from immature unionists is that "the south couldn't afford us". The implication is that the net cost of Northern Ireland is such that only a country with deep pockets could afford to keep it – and that country, of course, is the UK.
As with all immature arguments there is a partial truth at its heart, but the partial truth is distorted and exaggerated to give the appearance of an irrefutable proof.
The net cost of Northern Ireland is certainly high, but no-one really knows how high. Tax revenues are subsumed into the British exchequer, and some expenditure (on reserved or excepted matters) cannot be separated from that of the UK as a whole. But in order to fund its devolved responsibilities Northern Ireland receives some £10 billion a year from London.
Clearly the Dublin government, already facing a monumental budget deficit, would not be capable of matching this type of transfer – even with Northern Irish tax revenues taken into account it is likely that Northern Ireland is a net recipient of several billion pounds a year.
Of course there is no reason why the cost of Northern Ireland could not be met by simply reducing its cost – cutting expenditure on Quangos, schools, roads, and social welfare. But if a post-reunification Dublin government did that, then a lot of people, and not just unionists, would question the wisdom of reunification.
On that level the immature unionists are right – Northern Ireland is so dependent on outside funding, and so incapable of supporting itself, that it must remain on welfare for the foreseeable future. The question, though, is whether the generosity of London will, or can, continue.
Britain is also suffering, and suffering badly. As The Economist put it: "Britain’s public finances, however, are on some measures the worst of any rich country. It is likely to have a bigger deficit in 2010, as a percentage of GDP, than even the likes of Italy. With the financial heart shot out of the economy, tax revenues have fallen dramatically just as social spending has increased. That is unavoidable; but the government’s heavy borrowing, even before recession hit, was not. Now Mr Brown needs to tap the markets for £175 billion ($254 billion) in the current fiscal year and the same the year after. In last year’s budget, public net debt was expected to be 39% of GDP this year; now it is put at 59%, and likely to increase to 79% by 2013-14. This outcome would push Britain only to the middle of the rich-country pack. But the rapid increase in borrowing is eye-watering."
And this is before Britain addresses the other issues that it has been putting off: the need to build hugely expensive power stations to replace the aged ones that are in use, the need to upgrade road and rail infrastructures, the appalling schools, the impending pensions time-bomb, and so on. Unemployment in the UK has just risen by "the biggest quarterly rise since records of the ILO measure began in 1971".
Faced with almost insurmountable financial problems at home, the British government may increasingly cast a jaundiced eye at its ungrateful yet costly little colony across the Irish Sea. A British government that is, to most extents, an English government, but one with a need to keep Scotland sweet, may increasingly resent the billions of pounds that Northern Ireland costs, especially when it sees, night after night, that the 'natives' are a mixture of rebellious nationalists and costly 'loyalists'. English money spent policing Northern Ireland's unnecessary and downright illiberal 'marching season' could have been spent on schools or hospitals. If the British government took a closer look at the costs of the dozens of Quangos and tribunals that add precisely nothing to the wellbeing of the people, yet provide some people with a standard of living much higher than that of working people in Britain, it may be tempted to rethink its generosity. The extent to which Northern Ireland depends on taxpayer-funded jobs, and its apparent lack of interest in actually creating any wealth, must grate on voters and politicians from areas where people work hard and take risks.
So Northern Ireland is caught in a fork. By remaining dependent, and producing far less than it consumes, it remains unaffordable for Dublin, and this puts a brake on aspirations for reunification. But by the same token, by remaining dependent it taxes London's patience. Nobody would suggest that Britain would ever unilaterally cast Northern Ireland aside without a border poll in favour of reunification, but if London starts to feel that the cost of Northern Ireland, and its careless dependency, is at the expense of improvements in Britain itself, attitudes towards Northern Ireland could harden.
If the power-brokers in London decide that something must be done to reduce the Northern Irish drain on the British exchequer, this could involve two possibilities, neither of which is in unionism's interests:
As with all immature arguments there is a partial truth at its heart, but the partial truth is distorted and exaggerated to give the appearance of an irrefutable proof.
The net cost of Northern Ireland is certainly high, but no-one really knows how high. Tax revenues are subsumed into the British exchequer, and some expenditure (on reserved or excepted matters) cannot be separated from that of the UK as a whole. But in order to fund its devolved responsibilities Northern Ireland receives some £10 billion a year from London.
Clearly the Dublin government, already facing a monumental budget deficit, would not be capable of matching this type of transfer – even with Northern Irish tax revenues taken into account it is likely that Northern Ireland is a net recipient of several billion pounds a year.
Of course there is no reason why the cost of Northern Ireland could not be met by simply reducing its cost – cutting expenditure on Quangos, schools, roads, and social welfare. But if a post-reunification Dublin government did that, then a lot of people, and not just unionists, would question the wisdom of reunification.
On that level the immature unionists are right – Northern Ireland is so dependent on outside funding, and so incapable of supporting itself, that it must remain on welfare for the foreseeable future. The question, though, is whether the generosity of London will, or can, continue.
Britain is also suffering, and suffering badly. As The Economist put it: "Britain’s public finances, however, are on some measures the worst of any rich country. It is likely to have a bigger deficit in 2010, as a percentage of GDP, than even the likes of Italy. With the financial heart shot out of the economy, tax revenues have fallen dramatically just as social spending has increased. That is unavoidable; but the government’s heavy borrowing, even before recession hit, was not. Now Mr Brown needs to tap the markets for £175 billion ($254 billion) in the current fiscal year and the same the year after. In last year’s budget, public net debt was expected to be 39% of GDP this year; now it is put at 59%, and likely to increase to 79% by 2013-14. This outcome would push Britain only to the middle of the rich-country pack. But the rapid increase in borrowing is eye-watering."
And this is before Britain addresses the other issues that it has been putting off: the need to build hugely expensive power stations to replace the aged ones that are in use, the need to upgrade road and rail infrastructures, the appalling schools, the impending pensions time-bomb, and so on. Unemployment in the UK has just risen by "the biggest quarterly rise since records of the ILO measure began in 1971".
Faced with almost insurmountable financial problems at home, the British government may increasingly cast a jaundiced eye at its ungrateful yet costly little colony across the Irish Sea. A British government that is, to most extents, an English government, but one with a need to keep Scotland sweet, may increasingly resent the billions of pounds that Northern Ireland costs, especially when it sees, night after night, that the 'natives' are a mixture of rebellious nationalists and costly 'loyalists'. English money spent policing Northern Ireland's unnecessary and downright illiberal 'marching season' could have been spent on schools or hospitals. If the British government took a closer look at the costs of the dozens of Quangos and tribunals that add precisely nothing to the wellbeing of the people, yet provide some people with a standard of living much higher than that of working people in Britain, it may be tempted to rethink its generosity. The extent to which Northern Ireland depends on taxpayer-funded jobs, and its apparent lack of interest in actually creating any wealth, must grate on voters and politicians from areas where people work hard and take risks.
So Northern Ireland is caught in a fork. By remaining dependent, and producing far less than it consumes, it remains unaffordable for Dublin, and this puts a brake on aspirations for reunification. But by the same token, by remaining dependent it taxes London's patience. Nobody would suggest that Britain would ever unilaterally cast Northern Ireland aside without a border poll in favour of reunification, but if London starts to feel that the cost of Northern Ireland, and its careless dependency, is at the expense of improvements in Britain itself, attitudes towards Northern Ireland could harden.
If the power-brokers in London decide that something must be done to reduce the Northern Irish drain on the British exchequer, this could involve two possibilities, neither of which is in unionism's interests:
- A Tory government (and maybe the next one) might decide that Northern Ireland's welfare addiction must be cured. The cure could mean a radical slimming of the bloated public services, the overlapping authorities, and the unaccountable Quangos. Thousands, even tens of thousands of cushy jobs could be lost. Northern Ireland could be expected to stand on its own feet, and contribute to the British exchequer for the first time in generations. Wages would tumble as unemployment rose, and Northern Ireland would become a low-cost back-office for richer parts of Europe. The 'cost' of Northern Ireland to the British exchequer would drop, as its tax revenues would start to balance out the transfer from London that covers the costs of the remaining public services. But at the same time, of course, the potential cost for Dublin would also drop, and unionism's childish taunt that "Dublin couldn't afford us" would no longer be true. Reunification would not cost Dublin much money, and it would inherit a reasonably sound economy in Northern Ireland.
- A British government of either flavour could decide to use its undoubted influence to act as a 'persuader for Irish unity'. There is no doubt that it could make life much more uncomfortable for unionism, and if the demographic and electoral tide towards a nationalist majority became clearer, the British government could push the process of Irish reunification forward rather faster than unionism might want.
Unionism's 'strength through weakness' – the unaffordability of Northern Ireland – could turn out to be simply a weakness. No government in the current climate will happily subsidise an underperforming, yet sullen and difficult, region. But any solution to Northern Ireland's welfare dependence will render Irish reunification easier and more likely.
Tuesday 14 July 2009
Irrelevant, irrelevant, irrelevant
Northern Ireland's three MEPS, recently elected, are all irrelevant in the European Parliament.
One (Bairbre de Brún) is a member of the leftist Confederal Group of the European United Left - Nordic Green Left (GUE/ NGL), which with 35 members (4.8% of the total) is only the sixth largest group in the Parliament.
Another (Jim Nicholson) is a member of the European Conservatives and Reformists Group (ECR), a breakaway from the European People's Party. The ECR, with 55 seats (7.5% of the total) is the fourth-equal largest group. But the EPP, that Nicholson used to be in before he followed David Cameron out into the wilderness, is the largest group by far, has just seen one of its number elected President of the European Parliament, and will dominate proceedings for 5 years. Nicholson, meanwhile, will achieve nothing.
The last Northern Irish MEP (Dianne Dodds) is not a member of any group, and falls into the rag-tag 'non-attached' category, giving her neither power nor position. She'll enjoy the salary and Brussels' fine restaurants, but she is a political nothing.
Luckily no-one in Northern Ireland appreciates how important the European Parliament is in their lives, and how its influence is growing. Otherwise the voters might be a bit unhappy about having elected three completely irrelevant members.
One (Bairbre de Brún) is a member of the leftist Confederal Group of the European United Left - Nordic Green Left (GUE/ NGL), which with 35 members (4.8% of the total) is only the sixth largest group in the Parliament.
Another (Jim Nicholson) is a member of the European Conservatives and Reformists Group (ECR), a breakaway from the European People's Party. The ECR, with 55 seats (7.5% of the total) is the fourth-equal largest group. But the EPP, that Nicholson used to be in before he followed David Cameron out into the wilderness, is the largest group by far, has just seen one of its number elected President of the European Parliament, and will dominate proceedings for 5 years. Nicholson, meanwhile, will achieve nothing.
The last Northern Irish MEP (Dianne Dodds) is not a member of any group, and falls into the rag-tag 'non-attached' category, giving her neither power nor position. She'll enjoy the salary and Brussels' fine restaurants, but she is a political nothing.
Luckily no-one in Northern Ireland appreciates how important the European Parliament is in their lives, and how its influence is growing. Otherwise the voters might be a bit unhappy about having elected three completely irrelevant members.
Marching madness – what does it signify?
The news reports provide a steady drip-feed of hatred – arson attacks, intimidation, riots, flag-flying, flag-stealing, poster-burning, spitting, shouting, and on, and on, and on …
One side claims it is 'celebrating its culture', even though its 'culture' is simply dressed-up sectarian bigotry; the other side vents its anger through squalid attacks on orange halls and the police. And, as ever, the real victims are the silent minority/majority who do nothing. The world looks on, perplexed to see that the 'war' that they were told was over, is still raging on the streets.
Despite the half-generation that has passed since the cease-fires, despite the 11 years that have passed since the Good Friday Agreement, the level of visible hatred seems to be as high as ever – in some respects even higher. Men who were boys in 1994 still hate Catholics enough to spit at them, and boys barely born in 1994 still hate the police and the marching Orangemen enough to try to hurt them.
Within 15 years of the end of the Second World War France and Germany had pooled their iron and steel industries and had already set up the European Economic Community. It took barely 20 years from the end of the Vietnam War for Vietnam to re-establish diplomatic relations with the USA. Most countries coming out of conflict heal their wounds and find a modus vivendi within a decade or so.
So why has Northern Ireland so clearly failed to make real peace? And what is the significance of its failure?
The answer to the first question is superficially easy. There is no peace because there is no wish for peace. The hatred both sides feel for the other is still as strong as ever. But why is this? Why do people who share a small space, who speak a common language, and who have all had the benefit of a reasonable education persist in seeing the 'others' as objects? The mystery of the Northern Irish conflict lies in its complete pointlessness – even a comprehensive victory for one side of the other would change almost nothing for either victors or vanquished. And yet the hatred is such that men can come together to deliberately beat a man to death simply because he is nominally a member of a different religion! The very act of doing so proves that the attackers are men of no religion, and that therefore any justifications based upon 'religious freedoms' (or whatever) are false. The conflict is not about land ownership, or even (any more) housing or jobs. It is a conflict about hatred, pure and simple. Anyone who doubts that should spend a few minutes on Bebo, or look at the pictures of the Eleventh Night bonfires.
If half a generation of mostly-peace has not dulled the hatreds, it is likely that a full generation may not either. And after that generation, perhaps another one.
But in a generation Northern Ireland will be a demographically different place. There will be a Catholic majority in the population as a whole, and the electorate will be very evenly divided. Amongst younger people, and in the west of Northern Ireland, the Catholic majority will be unmissable.
The continuation of the hatreds of yesterday and today into the next generation will ensure that political conflict continues. Politics will continue to be dominated by the divisions between 'us' and 'them' – perhaps becoming even more tense as the nationalist share continues to rise, and as some borderline areas tip into the nationalist camp.
As long as the primitive hatreds continue, the attempts by some unionists to attract Catholics to their cause will fail. There is a basic contradiction in the strategy of trying to recruit Catholics, and retaining membership and support for viscerally anti-Catholic organisations like the Orange Order. The only logical strategy for unionism is to ditch all of its sectarian baggage and to become a liberal economic and political movement – but there is no evidence that it has started to do that.
Every year that passes represents another small shift in the demographic balance. Every inflamed marching season represents another wasted year for unionism, and another year closer to its defeat. There is no equivalent pressure on nationalism, simply because the demographic shift is bringing it a windfall victory.
No intelligent unionist could be other than appalled at the damage that Orangism is doing to their cause. No intelligent unionist could actively participate in contentious marches, or approve of the primeval bonfires, or the lamp-post flags. And yet, this year again, not one single unionist voice has been raised in opposition to the tribal antics of the Orangemen and their supporters. Silence in this context denotes either consent or fear – but neither will do the unionist cause any good. Perhaps future generations will look back in wonderment at the self-destructive stupidity of unionism. Having created the monster of Orangism to provide the bulwark of its strength, unionism is now incapable of separating itself from its creation, and will be dragged down to certain death by it.
One side claims it is 'celebrating its culture', even though its 'culture' is simply dressed-up sectarian bigotry; the other side vents its anger through squalid attacks on orange halls and the police. And, as ever, the real victims are the silent minority/majority who do nothing. The world looks on, perplexed to see that the 'war' that they were told was over, is still raging on the streets.
Despite the half-generation that has passed since the cease-fires, despite the 11 years that have passed since the Good Friday Agreement, the level of visible hatred seems to be as high as ever – in some respects even higher. Men who were boys in 1994 still hate Catholics enough to spit at them, and boys barely born in 1994 still hate the police and the marching Orangemen enough to try to hurt them.
Within 15 years of the end of the Second World War France and Germany had pooled their iron and steel industries and had already set up the European Economic Community. It took barely 20 years from the end of the Vietnam War for Vietnam to re-establish diplomatic relations with the USA. Most countries coming out of conflict heal their wounds and find a modus vivendi within a decade or so.
So why has Northern Ireland so clearly failed to make real peace? And what is the significance of its failure?
The answer to the first question is superficially easy. There is no peace because there is no wish for peace. The hatred both sides feel for the other is still as strong as ever. But why is this? Why do people who share a small space, who speak a common language, and who have all had the benefit of a reasonable education persist in seeing the 'others' as objects? The mystery of the Northern Irish conflict lies in its complete pointlessness – even a comprehensive victory for one side of the other would change almost nothing for either victors or vanquished. And yet the hatred is such that men can come together to deliberately beat a man to death simply because he is nominally a member of a different religion! The very act of doing so proves that the attackers are men of no religion, and that therefore any justifications based upon 'religious freedoms' (or whatever) are false. The conflict is not about land ownership, or even (any more) housing or jobs. It is a conflict about hatred, pure and simple. Anyone who doubts that should spend a few minutes on Bebo, or look at the pictures of the Eleventh Night bonfires.
If half a generation of mostly-peace has not dulled the hatreds, it is likely that a full generation may not either. And after that generation, perhaps another one.
But in a generation Northern Ireland will be a demographically different place. There will be a Catholic majority in the population as a whole, and the electorate will be very evenly divided. Amongst younger people, and in the west of Northern Ireland, the Catholic majority will be unmissable.
The continuation of the hatreds of yesterday and today into the next generation will ensure that political conflict continues. Politics will continue to be dominated by the divisions between 'us' and 'them' – perhaps becoming even more tense as the nationalist share continues to rise, and as some borderline areas tip into the nationalist camp.
As long as the primitive hatreds continue, the attempts by some unionists to attract Catholics to their cause will fail. There is a basic contradiction in the strategy of trying to recruit Catholics, and retaining membership and support for viscerally anti-Catholic organisations like the Orange Order. The only logical strategy for unionism is to ditch all of its sectarian baggage and to become a liberal economic and political movement – but there is no evidence that it has started to do that.
Every year that passes represents another small shift in the demographic balance. Every inflamed marching season represents another wasted year for unionism, and another year closer to its defeat. There is no equivalent pressure on nationalism, simply because the demographic shift is bringing it a windfall victory.
No intelligent unionist could be other than appalled at the damage that Orangism is doing to their cause. No intelligent unionist could actively participate in contentious marches, or approve of the primeval bonfires, or the lamp-post flags. And yet, this year again, not one single unionist voice has been raised in opposition to the tribal antics of the Orangemen and their supporters. Silence in this context denotes either consent or fear – but neither will do the unionist cause any good. Perhaps future generations will look back in wonderment at the self-destructive stupidity of unionism. Having created the monster of Orangism to provide the bulwark of its strength, unionism is now incapable of separating itself from its creation, and will be dragged down to certain death by it.
Sunday 5 July 2009
The IBEC-CBI Joint Business Council
“The IBEC-CBI Joint Business Council is the voice of business on the island of Ireland”.
And as its web site puts it:
“Current Mission and Role:
Economic priorities and the needs of companies have changed radically over the past 17 years, and JBC in its strategy must reflect these changes and adjust its strategic priorities accordingly.
A more pan-nationalist manifesto could barely be written. And it goes further:
And they clearly see the border as a hindrance and increasingly as an irrelevance. Their statements are a million miles from the politically-inspired nonsense about Northern Ireland being better off in the UK. The JBC wants the economies north and south to be increasingly integrated and interwoven. And where economies go, there also goes governance.
The business world is not ‘unionist’ in the traditional sense – it does not seek to erect a barrier at the border and pretend that the south is ‘a foreign country’. Quite the opposite – it sees north and south as one logical unit, and its power and influence will ensure that this view becomes increasingly the norm. Unionist politicians, who depend upon business for contributions, will increasingly have to accept that reality or risk losing their financial support.
The task for nationalists is to facilitate this new reality, and to understand that the business world of today is radically different to that of the shipyards, the linen mills and Mackies. Business not longer means unionist, and so the default position of many nationalists, anti-business pseudo-socialism, needs to be revised and jettisoned. Ireland will be united by its people, of course, but not in a “32 County Socialist Republic” – that is a nonsense that needs to be dropped. The new Ireland will be a social-democratic republic in which business will play a vital role in ensuring high living standards. Nationalists need to recognise this and change their rhetoric to match the reality. Business is an ally not an enemy, and will help to accelerate and facilitate the reunification of our country.
And as its web site puts it:
“Current Mission and Role:
Economic priorities and the needs of companies have changed radically over the past 17 years, and JBC in its strategy must reflect these changes and adjust its strategic priorities accordingly.
- Providing a single business voice for the island of Ireland in policy formulation
- Providing a challenge function to public sector policy, including Government and state agencies, where there is an all island dimension of interest to both business communities
- Providing a high level all island business network and acting as a bridge to greater mutual understanding and as a means of increasing North South business flows
- Providing strategic leadership around global business and competitiveness issues from an all island perspective
- Deepening the JBC remit beyond the east coast corridor and also building on JBC work to date on strengthening the East-West dimension
- Facilitating mutual understanding and development of partnerships between SME’s north and south.”
A more pan-nationalist manifesto could barely be written. And it goes further:
- “JBC focuses on developing all-island people issues including skills, training and education, employment, social cohesion and labour mobility.
- Developing all-island infrastructure is a key priority and includes logistics, supply chain, environment, energy and telecommunications.
- JBC works to deliver all-island innovation, technology, entrepreneurship/social entrepreneurship and R&D.
- JBC collaborates with a number of partners and organisations to strengthen its work and influence on all-island business issues.”
And they clearly see the border as a hindrance and increasingly as an irrelevance. Their statements are a million miles from the politically-inspired nonsense about Northern Ireland being better off in the UK. The JBC wants the economies north and south to be increasingly integrated and interwoven. And where economies go, there also goes governance.
The business world is not ‘unionist’ in the traditional sense – it does not seek to erect a barrier at the border and pretend that the south is ‘a foreign country’. Quite the opposite – it sees north and south as one logical unit, and its power and influence will ensure that this view becomes increasingly the norm. Unionist politicians, who depend upon business for contributions, will increasingly have to accept that reality or risk losing their financial support.
The task for nationalists is to facilitate this new reality, and to understand that the business world of today is radically different to that of the shipyards, the linen mills and Mackies. Business not longer means unionist, and so the default position of many nationalists, anti-business pseudo-socialism, needs to be revised and jettisoned. Ireland will be united by its people, of course, but not in a “32 County Socialist Republic” – that is a nonsense that needs to be dropped. The new Ireland will be a social-democratic republic in which business will play a vital role in ensuring high living standards. Nationalists need to recognise this and change their rhetoric to match the reality. Business is an ally not an enemy, and will help to accelerate and facilitate the reunification of our country.
The Allister surge continues
TUV leader Jim Allister has indicated that his party will force a Ballymoney council by-election after the resignation last week of DUP councillor Roy Wilson. Allister said that: "my understanding is that councillor has resigned not just from the council but from the DUP because of his principled objection to the DUP's present political stance. Of course it throws up the opportunity of a by-election, and we're not ones to run away from such opportunities. I look forward to that testing of the water in a constituency which is for some reason attracting increasing interest."
The DUP, of course, claim that Wilson had not resigned from the party and his decision was a personal matter unconnected with its power-sharing policy.
Thanks to its existing councillor on Ballymoney Council, Audrey Patterson, the TUV can block the co-option of a replacement for Wilson. Legislation that would have stopped by-elections in the run-up to the 2011 elections to the new larger councils has apparently not yet been enacted, and so if the council cannot agree unanimously to a co-option a by-election must be held.
Roy Wilson was elected in 2005 in the Bann Valley electoral area. The DUP then took 43.3% of the vote in Bann Valley, leaving the UUP far behind on 12.4%. But, not too far behind the DUP was Sinn Féin on 33.7%. On previous outings (only two, of course: Dromore and the European Parliament) the TUV has taken over 40% of the aggregate DUP/TUV vote (call it the extreme unionist vote) – almost 43% of that aggregate only a month ago! So if they eat into the DUP vote in Bann Valley in a similar fashion, the outcome could be that neither the DUP nor the TUV take the seat, and it is won by Sinn Féin.
Neither in Dromore – a safe unionist seat – nor in the European Parliament did Allister’s intervention actually hand a seat to nationalists (though he did hand them a large propaganda victory in the European elections). But Bann Valley is at least 44% nationalist and if the transfers do not fall correctly Sinn Féin could pick up the seat, and Allister will earn the hatred of many extremist unionists in exactly the area (North Antrim) where he will be keen to woo them.
Allister is thus playing a high-risk game. If he does force the by-election and the TUV wins it (which would need a DUP meltdown of catastrophic proportions) then he would be a shoe-in for the North Antrim seat in the Westminster election. But if he forces the by-election and Sinn Féin wins the seat then he will be branded as a splitter and will lose a lot of his support, thus calling into question his chances in the Westminster election. If he does not quickly rule out the forcing of a by-election then he will be seen as a ditherer, but if he waits too long and then rules it out he will also be seen as too scared to fight in his own back-garden. Maybe he will come to regret his rash bravado about the “testing of the water” in North Antrim.
The DUP, of course, claim that Wilson had not resigned from the party and his decision was a personal matter unconnected with its power-sharing policy.
Thanks to its existing councillor on Ballymoney Council, Audrey Patterson, the TUV can block the co-option of a replacement for Wilson. Legislation that would have stopped by-elections in the run-up to the 2011 elections to the new larger councils has apparently not yet been enacted, and so if the council cannot agree unanimously to a co-option a by-election must be held.
Roy Wilson was elected in 2005 in the Bann Valley electoral area. The DUP then took 43.3% of the vote in Bann Valley, leaving the UUP far behind on 12.4%. But, not too far behind the DUP was Sinn Féin on 33.7%. On previous outings (only two, of course: Dromore and the European Parliament) the TUV has taken over 40% of the aggregate DUP/TUV vote (call it the extreme unionist vote) – almost 43% of that aggregate only a month ago! So if they eat into the DUP vote in Bann Valley in a similar fashion, the outcome could be that neither the DUP nor the TUV take the seat, and it is won by Sinn Féin.
Neither in Dromore – a safe unionist seat – nor in the European Parliament did Allister’s intervention actually hand a seat to nationalists (though he did hand them a large propaganda victory in the European elections). But Bann Valley is at least 44% nationalist and if the transfers do not fall correctly Sinn Féin could pick up the seat, and Allister will earn the hatred of many extremist unionists in exactly the area (North Antrim) where he will be keen to woo them.
Allister is thus playing a high-risk game. If he does force the by-election and the TUV wins it (which would need a DUP meltdown of catastrophic proportions) then he would be a shoe-in for the North Antrim seat in the Westminster election. But if he forces the by-election and Sinn Féin wins the seat then he will be branded as a splitter and will lose a lot of his support, thus calling into question his chances in the Westminster election. If he does not quickly rule out the forcing of a by-election then he will be seen as a ditherer, but if he waits too long and then rules it out he will also be seen as too scared to fight in his own back-garden. Maybe he will come to regret his rash bravado about the “testing of the water” in North Antrim.
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